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I. Introduction 
A. The Problem 
Fift een thousand employees were killed in industry 
in The United States in 1952. Two million more suffered 
major disabling injuries in 1 952. These accidents cost the 
nation $2,900,000,000*, therefore the prevention of accidents 
in industry is a major problem for management. The Chemical 
Industry has been among the leaders in solving this problem. 
Figure 1 shows the high position of the Chemical Industry in 
comparison with other industries in 1 952. Moreover the Chem-
ical Industry in the pas t ten y ears has done better than the 
average of "All Industry" as shown by Table I. However, even 
in the Chemical Industry there is still room for improvement. 
This is borne out b y the progress that has been made in the 
last t en years and also by the variation within the industry 
itself. Among the seven leading firms reporting to the 
Manufacturing Chemist s Association, the ratio of Lost Time 
Frequencies between the first and seventh firm is 1 to 1 7 . 
(Table II) 
In view of the high standing of the Chemical In-
dustry the present study is being undertaken in order to 
determine the answers to the following questions: (1) What 
does a modern chemical company do to keep its accident pre-
vention p rogram dynami c? (2) What are t he most effective 
means of achieving results? (3) What are the necessary 
*8 P.4 
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Table I 
Comparison of the Chemical Industry 
Frequency with all Industry Average 
1943 - 1952 
Year Chemical Industry All Industry Avg . 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1 9 L~8 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
10.07 
10.24 
10.08 
10.09 
8 . 86 
7.51 
5 . 72 
5.82 
5.48 
5 .10 
Table II 
14.52 
14.46 
13.63 
14.16 
13.26 
11.49 
10.14 
9 . 30 
9 . 06 
8 .40 
Acc1dent F'acts 
National Safety Council* 
Lost Time Injury Statistics 
Leaders in the Chemical Industry 
for 1953 
Company 
1. E .I. duPont de Nemours & 
Company 
2 . Monsanto Chemical Company 
3 . Dow Chemical Company 
4. American Cyanamid 
5. Carbide & Carbon Chemical 
Company 
6. Hercules Powder Company 
7 . Mathieson Chemical Corp. 
*8 
Avg . Days 
Lost Per 
Frequen~y Severity Injury 
0.55 o. 70 1273 
1.30 0. 31 238 
2.54 0.25 984 
2.68 o. 70 261 
3 .48 0.67 193 
4.31 6 .17 1432 
9 . 36 0.52 55 
Data Courtesy of the 
Everett Plant 
Monsanto Chemical Company 
3 
elements of an accident prevention program for the Chemical 
Industry? 
There may exist a wide variation in injury rates 
among the Chemical Industry leaders but their rates are 
about one per cent as great as some of the small chemical 
plants . "One study, covering over five hundred firms employ -
ing less than one hundred employees each, yielded an average 
frequency rate of 45.4 for a five year period, 1936-40 inclu-
sive ."* During this period the Chemical Industry average was 
less than 10. The larger companies have shown that accidents 
can be prevented . By following their example and practices, 
these smaller companies have the most to gain. Why should 
the expense resulting from accidents continue when it costs 
less to prevent them? Furthermore the prevention of acci-
dents is wise public relations, good human relations and 
sound management. 
B. Method of Approach 
Background material for this thesis has been ob-
tained from standard text books on accident prevention, from 
National Safety Council publications, from Monsanto Chemical 
Company's Accident Prevention Manual and from the experience 
of the author while Safety Engineer for Monsanto 's Everett 
Plant for two years; 1949 and 1950. In addition, several 
chemical companies, whose safety experience has been excel-
lent, have been approached to learn what elements they have 
*l P. 36 
4 
in their program and which elements have been most influen-
tial in achieving results. (For an example of results, the 
National Safety Council's "World Record" is held by E. I . 
duPont de Nemours and Company, Old Hickory Rayon Plant, Old 
Hickory, Tennessee, in the Chemical Industry -- 28,160,000 
injury-free manhours LContinuin~.*) 
Because of its importance in relation to accident 
prevention, some study has been made of the human factors in 
safety. A separate chapter on "personalized safety" has been 
devoted to this topic. 
*9 p .1 0 
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II . Background 
The purpose of the present chapter is to acquaint 
the r eader with the basic phi l osophy of accident prevention . 
To this end it is felt advisable to define the terms which 
wil l be used later in this thesis . 
A. Definitions 
Accident - A sudden and u npl anned occurrence which interrupts 
or interferes with order l y procedure . 
Injury - The physical damage or harm ( i.e . , fracture or 
laceration ) which may result from an accident . 
Lost Time Injury - An injury severe enough to prevent the 
employee from returning to work on his next regul arly 
schedul ed shift . The few exceptions to this are l isted 
i n the Ameri can Standard Association, Code 216 .1 - 1945 . 
Lost Time In j ury Frequency - The numbe r of lost time in-
juries occurr ing per mi ll ion man - hours vwrked . 
Lost Time I njury Severity - The numbe r of days l ost per 
thousant mB n - hours worked . The American Standard 
Association Code 21 6 . 1 - 1945 gives standard hou rs to 
be cha rged for certain permanent partial or tota l disabil-
ities even though the injur ed may lose no time . (See 
Table III ) . The actual number of days l ost is used for 
a ll others. 
l 
TABLE III 
Days Charged for Severity Calculations for Permanent 
Partial Disabilities 
Disability 
Arm 
Any point above elbow including 
shoulder joint . ..... . ......... . 
Any point above wr ist and at or 
below e lbow .. .... . .. .......... . 
Hand 
At or belm.'r wrist a nd above proximal 
joints on fingers ............. . 
Thumb 
At or below ( toward tip ) proxima l 
joint, and above distal joint .... 
At or below distal j oint ........ . 
F inger, Except thumb 
At or above midd l e joint, up to and 
including proximal j oint . .. ..... . 
At or above distal j oint , up to but 
not including midd l e joint . . .. .. . 
Be l ow distal joint, provided bone 
is da1naged ...................... . 
Tip, with out eith er traumatic or sur-
gical bon e invo lvement .......... . 
More than one Finger of Same Ha nd 
Days Charg ed 
4,500 
3,600 
3,000 
6oo 
300 
300 
150 
75 
Actual No . of Days 
Lost 
7 
Tvvo Fingers .................. . . . 
Three Fingers ...... .. . . ....... . . 
Four Fingers . . . ... . ..... . .... . . . 
Thmnb and one Finger . .......... . 
Th mnb and tvJo Fingers ... . ...... . 
Thumb and three Fingers . .. . . .. . . 
Th umb and four Fingers ......... . 
Leg 
Any point above knee 
Any point above ankl e and at or be l ow 
knee . ....... . .... . ..... . ....... . 
Foot 
At ankl e and above proxima l joint 
of toes . .. .. . . . .. . . . . ..... . .. . . . 
Great toe, above distal j oint up to 
and inc l ud i ng proximal joint . . . . 
Great toe at or be l ow distal joint 
Tv-ro great toes . .. .. . .. . . . ... . .. . 
Each toe oth er t han great toe 
-Con1plete ..... . .............. . 
-Less t ha n compl ete . ......... . 
One Eye 
Loss of sight ... . .. . ... . .... .. . . 
One Ear 
Loss of hearing ............. . .. . 
Both Ears 
750 
1 ,200 
1,800 
1 ;, 200 
1 , 500 
2,000 
2,400 
4,500 
3,000 
2,400 
300 
150 
600 
150 
75 
1 ,800 
600 
8 
• 
Loss of hearing .................. . 3~000 
( Method of Compiling Industrial I njury Rates - American 
Standards Code )* 
B. Inc entives for the h~evention of Accidents 
In the Introduction, some of the incentives for 
preventing accidents were indicated . These bear further 
explanation at this point. I t was indicated that prevent-
ing accidents is good human relations, and that accidents 
cost the company and the emp l oyee a considerable amount 
of money. 
1. Human Re l ation s 
Enlightened management has learned that one essen-
tial to efficient production and high productivity is good 
morale and good human relations . Employees with low morale, 
in effect, tend to resist or even to sabotage efforts of 
supe rvision to meet production standards or to improve them. 
Accidents not only tend to decrease morale , they are also 
a sign of poor morale. They cause confusion and disrupt 
order l y procedures. "We have long ago concluded that 
safety and efficiency of operation go hand in hand. 11** 
2. The Cost of an Accident 
a . The Direct Cost 
The direct cost of an accident is commonl y taken 
to be onl y the compensation payments required by l aw for 
* 10 
**21 
9 
the injured worker and for his medical treatment . For ex -
amp l e , in Massachusetts , it is required by law that $30 . 00 
per week be paid the emp l oyee, plus $2.50 for each dependent, 
and that all of his doctors, hospita l , and other medical bi l ls 
be paid . This direct cost liability may be assumed by the 
employer or, as is the usual case, by his insurance company . 
b . Indirect Cost 
The indirect costs may be referred to as "inc idental " 
or hidden costs. They are l ess definitive than the direct 
costs --not always easy to perceive . They do not appear on 
any account sheet as a separate c l ear - cut item . However, 
the y do exist , and a l though some may be hard to estimate, 
they have been 11 found by research to be four times as great 11 
as the direct c ost .* Al though this ratio will vary with 
each accident and with each type of business, it has been 
found to be a conservative average for a ll industry . 
Some of the· follo~Iing factors may be indirect 
costs of an accident : 
( 1 ) PI'oduction lost because of the accident . This may 
be due to the absence of the injured emp loyee, his 
fellow empl oyees who stop vwr k, or his supervisor . 
( 2 ) The out-of -pocket expense for training a rep l ace -
ment or having a substitute . 
(3 ) First aid expense, when not c overed by insurance . 
(4 ) Cost of damaged goods, tools, or equipment . 
*2 p. 50 
( 5 ) Possible cost or loss of premium due to fai lure 
to meet production or contract goa ls . 
( 6 ) Decreased productivity due to loss of injured man~ 
l owered mora l e, or to l ower ed efficiency of the 
injured on his return to vwrk . 
Thes e factors ent er into the total cost of an acci -
dent and even though they may not be direct out - of - pocl{et 
expenses, they reduce the profits of the company . The com-
bination of the direct and indirect costs of accidents has 
proved to be the most important incentive for a firm to 
start an accident prevention program . 
c. Cost to the Injured 
The statuatory requirements of most State vlorkmen ' s 
Compensation laws provide the injured empl oyee with only a 
subsistent l eve l of income . Unl ess his income is further 
augmented by his emp l oyer, the employee stands to l ose the 
greater portion of his wages . For exampl e, in Massachusetts ~ 
a chemica l worker a vera ge s about eighty dollars per week . 
Since by law he would be r eimbursed onl y thirty-five do llars 
per week ( assu~ing two dependents ) his l oss woul d be forty -
five do llars per weelc . It is the in jured emp l oyee and his 
family wh o suffer most because of an industrial accident . 
Thes e lost wages and unnecessary human distress should be 
an exce llent incentive for an emp l oyee to vwrk safe l y . 
However~ empl oyees tend t o p l ace g r eater weight on their 
chances o~ not gettin g hurt ~ rather than the consequences 
11 
which may result if they should get hurt . rvrost workers are 
gamb lers. They take chances . The odds of the gamble have 
more weight than the possibl e l osses. Financial loss is 
n o t as g r eat a n inc ent ive as bodily harm. Even this possible 
result can be far from an employee ' s mind whi l e he is perform-
ing an unsafe act . 
C. Basic Philosophy 
It is important for evaluating the various elemen ts 
12 
of an accident prevention program to understand some of the 
basic philosophy of accident pre vention as written in Heinrich ' s 
11 Industrial Ac cident Prevention." His wor k vms t h e first to 
state this phi l o s ophy a nd ha s been used a s refe renc e by all 
who ha v e writte n about accident prevention since then . 
l. The Acc ident Sequence 
Accord ing to Heinrich the accident sequence c on-
sists of five steps : ( l) Anc e stry and social enviromnent, 
( 2 ) Fault of a person, ( 3 ) Unsafe act and/or c ond i tion, 
(4 ) Accident a nd ( 5 ) Injury . These a re i llustrated and 
exp l a ined in Exhibit I. The illustrat ion indicate s that 
t h e removal of the unsaf e act and/ or condit i on should e lim-
ina t e a cc idents and injuries. The historical development 
of accid ent prevention programming bears out the thinkin g 
that remova l of unsafe acts and/or c onditions would e l im-
inate a ccidents. More recently, programming has been 
developed with the thought in mind of e limi nating the sub 
causes or faulta of a person. The elimination of the 
EXHIBIT I 
The Accident Sequence 
The five factors in the accident sequence 
The injury is caused ty the action of preceding factors 
The unsafe act and mechanical hazard constitute t he 
central factor in the accident sequence. 
The removal of t~e central factor makes the 
action of preceding factors ineffective . 
13 
14 
Exhibit I 
Accident Factors 
1. Ancestry and Social 
environment 
2. Faul t of Person 
3 . Unsafe act and/or 
mechanical or 
physical hazard 
4 . Accident 
5. Injury 
Explanation of Factors 
Reck lessness, stubbornness, av-
ariciousness , and other undesir-
ab l e traits of character may b e 
passed along through inheritance. 
Environment may develop undesir-
able traits of character or may 
interfere with education . 
Both inheritance and environ-
ment cause faults of person. 
Inherited or acquired faults 
of person, such as, reckless-
ness, violent temper, n e rvous-
ness, excitability, inconsider -
ateness, i gnoranc e of safe prac -
tice constitute proximate reasons 
for committing unsafe acts or for 
the existence of mechanical or 
physica l hazards. 
Unsafe perfor mance of persons , 
such as, standing under suspended 
l oads , starting machinery 'N i thout 
warning , horseplay, and removal 
of safeguards, a nd mechanica l 
or physical hazards, such as un -
guarded gears, unguarded points 
of operation, absence of rail 
guards, and insufficient light 
result directly in accidents. 
Events, such as, fal ls of persons 
and striking of persons by fly-
ing ob jects are typical accidents. 
Fractures and lacerations are 
the injuries that result directly 
from accidents. 
From Industrial Accident Prevention by H. W. Heinrich 
psy chological causes of accidents, is the most recent and 
unexplored regionof accident pr evention . Persona lized 
safety, discussed in Chapter VI , is a new technique which 
is designed to elimina t e sub causes of accidents. 
2 . Unsafe Acts and Unsafe Conditions 
It is ea sily demonstrated by the domino analogy 
that accidents can be prevented by removing unsafe acts 
and-/or mec hanical or physical hazards, but it is much more 
difficult to accomplish this in practice . First, it is 
necessary to be able to recogni ze an unsafe ac t or condi -
tion. The fo llovvin g is a list of t h e more common types of 
unsafe acts and unsafe conditions : 
a . 
( 1). 
( 2 ). 
( 3 ). 
( 4 ) . 
( 5 ) . 
( 6 ). 
( 7 ). 
Unsafe Acts 
Failure to use, or improper use of personal 
protective equipment . 
Failure to warn others of hazards . 
Horsep l ay, distracting, teasing . 
Improper method . 
Making safety devices inoper ative . 
Operat ing or working at unsafe speed. 
Operating without authority . 
(8 ) . Unsafe loading, pi l ing, placing, and 
mixing . 
(9 ). Unsaf e position or posture . 
( 10 ) . Using equipment unsafely . 
( 11 ). Yeing unsafe equipment. 
5 
(1 2 ) . Working on moving of dangerous equipment. 
b . Unsafe Conditions 
( 1 ). Defective, inadequate, or improper equip-
ment or agency . 
( 2 ) . Hazardous arrangement in, on, or around 
agency. 
(3 ). Hazardous procedure or methods . 
( Lr ) . I mproper design . 
(5 ). Improper illumination. 
(6 ) . "Improper venti l ation . 
(7). I mproperly guarded . 
3 . The Re l ation Between Unsafe Acts, Accidents, and 
Injuries 
1~ 
A second important safety axiom is that the person 
who suffers a disab l ing injury caused by an unsafe act, in 
the average case has had over 300 narrow escapes from serious 
injury as a result of committing the very same unsafe act. 
From the data now availab le concerning the frequency of 
potential--injury accidents, it is estimated that in a unit 
group of 330 accidents of the same kind and invo l ving the 
same person, 300 result in no injury, 29 in minor injuries, 
and one in a major or l ost-time injury . * The importance of 
this principle is that attention should be paid to the pre-
vention of accide nts and the injuries will take care of 
themselves. 
A great amount of emphasis is placed on lost-time 
injuries - -their frequency and severity-- thus focusing too 
much attention on these data. This emphasis obscures the 
fact that the same accident which caused the lost-time 
injury may h ave occurred many times before and gone 
unnoticed . I t is fortunate for the individua l worker, 
for the supervisor and for the safety engineer that luck 
p l ays such an important part in the severity of the injury 
occurring from an accide nt . 
Taking advantage of chance, the alert person can take 
corrective action before a serious injury resul ts . 
However, too often n o -injury accidents rec eive no cor-
rective action . Unfortunately, too often it takes a 
major injury to awaken peopl e to the serious potential 
of a previous l y occurring accident . 
17 
III. Merck and Company 
~llerck is primarily engaged in the manufacture or 
purchase and distribution of approximate l y on e thousand in-
dividua l fine and medicinal chemicals a nd drugs. The i r 
produc ts are us e d mainly for medicinal, prescription, nutri-
tiona l , industria l l aborator y and p h otographic purposes . 
Merck has a creditable safety record which attests 
to the soundne ss of their program. Figure 2 shows their 
lost-time injury frequency and severity for the past ten 
years . The following is a description a nd evaluat i on of 
the various e l ements which comprise their progr am . 
A. Organization 
In their safety program, safety is the responsibil-
ity of the line orga n ization . The Safety Department is a 
staff function which assists the l ine in carrying out their 
r e s p onsibi l ity . Exh ibi t II shows this organization arr ange-
ment and assignment of responsibility . This or ga nization has 
the interesting feature that the Safety Department r eports 
to a Functional Vice Pres i dent , wh i le the line reports 
throu gh a separate Vice President. Alternate types of or -
ganizations bring the safety function closer to the line 
aut hority by having safety personnel r eport either to the 
same Vice President as the Pl ant Mana g ers or to t h e Plant 
Managers themse lve s . This will depend on the size of the or -
ganization and the number of peopl e involved . However, hav-
t8 
ing the Safe t y De p t. report hig her i n the organization as in 
this case , is likely to cause conflic t with Plant Manager l eve l. 
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EXHIBIT II 
Merck Safety Organization 
Chief - Safety Engineering and Inspection 
Safety aspects of new operations and process 
revisions . 
Design of safety devices and guards. 
Liaison with Insurance Company, Medical Department, 
and Fire Department . 
Routine and special safety inspections and rec-
ommendations . 
Investigation and processing of safety suggestions. 
Chief - Safety Promotion and Standards 
Safety training and indoctrination programs . 
Divisional safety programs and committees . 
Codes, procedures, and rule books . 
Accident investigations and statistics . 
Contests, posters, publications, and reports. 
Safety aspects of process documentation . 
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l. Committees 
Merck has severa l safety cominittees on different 
leve ls which meet at period intervals . The rrPl ant Safety 
CoiTLrni ttee 11 meets annua l l y to review the safety program and 
assist in deciding all safety matters affecting policy. 
., 
This committee is composed of superinte ndent, division heads 
or assistants to represent the following : plant physician, 
fire chief , all operating divisions, personnel training and 
safety managers. The organization of this committee and its 
function seems to indicate an area for improvement in · their 
program . The fact that such a high l eve l po l icy committee 
exists is good; however, it does not seem that such in-
frequent meeting would be sufficient to guide the program 
effectively. Consideration should be given to meeting n1ore 
frequently and taking up more~ the objectives of the pro -
( 
gram. 
On the nex t level they have rrDivisiona l Safety 
CoiTLrni ttees. 11 Be low that are "Departmenta l Safety Committees . rr 
The functions of these committees are not defined nor do a l l 
departments have them . Next come emp l oyee committees. 
"Some plants have union safety committees (em-
p l oyee committees ) or union representatives which meet 
with the divisiona'l safety committees . Meetings of the 
committee are held monthl y . 
The functions of a typical l aboratory committee 
are: ( l ) Promote activities which wi l l stimulate and main-
tain interest in safety, such as, training programs, con-
23 
tests~ etc. 
2. Make inspections and report all hazardous conditions. 
brought to the attention of the com~ittee to the manage -
ment and persons in a position to correct unsafe condi-
tions . 
3 . Review all accidents and conditions causing near accid ents 
and make reco~nendations for the prevention of their 
occurrence. 
4 . Set standards for properly guarding glassware and other 
laboratory equipment . 
5 . Devise safe methods of performing potentially hazardous 
work and specify the personal protective equipment which 
may be required . 
6 . Assist in deciding any questions which may arise in 
applying safety standards or questions regard ing opera -
ting methods which may affect the safety of the labora -
tory personnel. 
A typical agenda includes: 
1. Revie\IT of plant safety performance for previous month. 
2. Discussion of a ll reportable injuries which occurred 
since the previous meeting . 
3 . Check on status of al l recommendations previously sub -
mitted . 
4. New reco~mendations . 
5. Consideration of any special hazards 1'7hich may be present 
due to the us e of new materia ls and/or equipment . 11 * 
*7 
The fact that there exist these committees on 
v.Jhich there is Union- Management cooperation is commendable . 
TrlJ.e coopera t "ion from a l l employees cannot be obtained un -
l ess there is this co opel''ation bet1-1Teen the Union and I'1anage-
ment . Again the frequency of meetings of this Emp l oyee 
Corrmlitte e is questionab l e . DuPont, as will be described 
in detail l ater , ho l ds weekly meetings of a comparable 
committe e . How frequent l y meetings shoul d be he l d will 
depend u pon the time spent in each meetin g ( i . e . , shorter 
meet ings more often ) , the materia l to be covered, and the 
general status of the p l ant program at t h e time ( i . e . , 
when the accident frequency is high , more meetings shoul d 
be he l d ). 
The typica l agenda presented does not seem to be 
st imul ating . Unfortunately, it is typica l of too many 
depa rtment l e v e l meetings . These best part of the mee ting 
is in points 3 and 4 --the stimul ation of ideas and sugges -
tions from the group . S ince Merck has a Safety Suggestion 
System , however, many s uggesting vJi ll be funne l ed through 
that chann el . This t ype o f meeting l a c ks the e l ement of 
education and training . To b e of va l ue , the emp l oyee 
should have l earned something which will benefit h i m or 
his fe llovJ emp l oyees. This edu cation and t r aining shoul d 
be an integrated program to review basic indoctrination in-
c l uding subjects, such as , Persona l Protec t ive Equipment, 
Fire p-.cotection, First Aid, t·lorkmen ' s Compensation , 
24 
Electrical Hazards, Eye Safety . 
2. Safety Engineering 
This sect.ion of the Safety Department has the 
functions described on the organization chart, Exhibit II . 
Details of their inspection and safety suggestion s y stem 
will be discussed here. 
a . Inspections 
11 ( l ). Plant - vVide Inspections 
Plant a n d lab or a t or y facilities are 
checked monthly a nd reports made to the 
op erating superv isors, manager and any 
others concerned with issuing orde rs to 
have the r e c om..mendati ons made eff e ctive . 
( See Exh ibi t III f or r eport form used .) 
( 2 ). Tank Inspections 
Bef or e p e rsonnel are permitted t o enter 
tan ks or other confined spaces the t a nk 
must be che c ked a nd emergency equipment 
available. ( Se e Exhibit IV for d e tails .) 
The Fire Chief issues hot wor k p ermi ts. 
(3 ). Specia l Inspections 
Recon~endations made by insur ance com-
panies and gov e rnmental agencies are 
followed up. Reports are issued directly 
on the act ion taken, except to fir e in-
sur a nc e companies, which a r e cleared by 
2 
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SAFETY INSPECTION REPORT 
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Please return t he attached dupli cate cop y or thi s re port togethe r with your comments as to what act ion 
bee n or wlll be taken to co rre ct the cond itions noted. If an order has been written , giye order nycber 
i dat e . 
Contest penalt i es, H any , are included with the recommendations. The numb e r o r asterisks (*) ind i cate 
e number or months since the rec ommendat ion was orlgln a l l y s u bmitted. 
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REC~ENDATION 
1. Rail off opening to tunnel pit to pre-
vent someone from falling off into pito 
2. Clean up leaves, papers, etc., from .floc~ 
and outside entrance at west end of 
basement. 
3. Install guards on open bulbs of ceiling 
liehts. 
4. Use of this base..-.,ent for storage of 
porcelain pipe and fittings is irnprac• 
tical and unsafe. i!:nb:lring this area 
empty handed is not an easy accomplish-
ment, and nothing practical can be done 
about it. ;.;e, therefore, recommend 
that these supplies be relocated to the 
equipment area east of B-.50F am., if 
necessary, covered with canvas. 
S. De :::troy 10' tacf_:ed. st.rai.ght ladder with 
cracked side rails. Unsafe to us eo 
6. Replace 12' st.raight ladder, marked 
(Ii.n.s.), destroyed on spot by inspec-
tor. 
1. Install removable screen or sheet metal 
[piarC1 over !3Cnerator drive belt on ;_:as-
aline fire pump engineo 
I 
I 
I ~1:Il ... :H1' Ili 
COM-AENTS 
_ _ _____ Li' _______________________________________ L ____________________________ ~ 
I • o\ \. p 
APPROVAL FOR WORK IN TANKS DR CONFINED c; PAC E 
. · · ~· N EQU IPMENT DATE 
BEFORE ENTERING TANK OR AREA PREPARATION OF TAN f< OR AREA 
TANK ~T EAMED AN D FLUSHE D WITH WATEH LIFE LINE AND HARNESS WO RN 
----------------------------~--r 
Fl f< E PER MIT NECESSARY AIR MASK READY FOR USE 
~~~~~~~~~~~~----,_-r 
AT MOSrrlr. llE TESTED AND APPR OVE D BY THE EXTRA MAN PRESENT THROUGHOUT JOB 
1 ~M~E~· D~I C~A~L7D~E~PT~-~~~~~~~~~~--~--r 
I ill LI NE!: DISCONNECTED, BLAN KED OR MOVED, LADD ER IN PLAC E 
~~ ·~c 7u~D71~~G=J~4C~K~E~T~H~E~AT ~~~~~~~--~~ I-:~:0:~7;;E:;:O ';-p~S:';:':L;cc':~7,=·~~7:PI-;N"'N:;;-E D=" . 0-;F:;-:-f-;;"::;A;::,N:;-D -;;-T;;-AGG-E_D_A_N_D---+-+~~ H !~N W1~R~ A~K A~~AA~~: TS~~;~;D CR EATE HAZA'RD 
: ~~~~~L~;~o WITH CO PPUS BLOWER OR WATER READILY AVAILABLE WHEN WELDI NG 
1 REMARKS: 
I UNDERSTAND THE HAZARDS PRESE NT AND PRECAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED AS CHECKED ABOVE. 
I OPE RAT ING DEPT. 
MECHAN ICA L FORf.MAN APPROVE D FOR SAFETY DEPT. 
P 1 !t · P R[Y , 6~0 1252 
EXHI BI T IV 
HOUSEKEEPING RATING FORM 
~ pa rtmt:nt ___ - --- -- -- - ·--- Q I dg . i :.. r a t eJ c::. s fo I I ows 
I. 
? . 
3 . 
4- . 
s. 
O r der- l in;Js:; 
MAX IIAUM A LLOWED 
POI ~~TS 
.......... /5 
C l ean liness 
Gr o un ds 
.. .. ······ ...... ····· ······ ········· ..................... .......................... .. .. ........ ......... ······· .......... .. 25 
·· ····· ............... .... .... ..... ... 25 
~~re~ ra nce of ~qu i pme nt 
Co ndition of ~ i s l vs 
Note unusual ly poor condition s 
on n 've rsc side. 
15 
10 
-:-o ta.l 
RA TIN G 
Date 
--- ··- - - --··-- - Inspected By ________________ __ 
EXHI BIT V 
' . . / 
the Plant Manager ' s office a nd then issued 
t hrough t h e Engineering Division which 
acts as liason for the company . 
(4 ). Night Inspections 
These are made quarterly~ principally to 
observe work practices outside of regular 
working hours and to let t h e Horkers know 
that operations may be checked for safe ty 
at any time. 
(5). Housekeeping Inspect ion 
Each spring a dr ive is made for a special 
clean- up. Operating units are judged on 
their housekeeping a nd given recognition 
for outstanding performance ."* (See 
Exhibit V. ) 
Merck ' s Inspection program by the Safety De~art ­
ment is very good and quite comprehensive . Month l y i n spec -
tions of a ll facilities can be a sizeable task~ but a most 
important one in preventing accidents . There is no indica -
tion of how much inspection is done by the individual line 
supervisors . This shoul d be a part of the overa ll prog ram. 
The inspe ction form, E~1ibit III, has provision 
for follow -up, in that incomp l eted recommendations are 
highlighted. Al thou gh this method may not insure that the 
recommendations are comp l eted at l eas t it is one meth od 
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of handling fo llow - up. This important part of an inspec -
tion program should not be ne g lected , otherwise the inspec -
tor has wasted his time . Until corrective action has been 
taken the inspection program is not comp l e te . 
Ta nk inspections and the procedure to be fol l owed 
in ente ring a tank are nec e ssary f eatur es of a ny saf ety 
program . I n industries accidents are cau sed every year 
b ecause someone of the items which Merck has on its check 
list has not b een checked. Unti l a s y stem such as this is 
rigid l y used, they will c ontinue . 
The va l u e of Night Insp e ctions by the Safety Depart-
. 
ment is dubious . This function seems to belong who l ly to the 
line supervision. Even then the purpose should be more than 
mere l y to "let the workers know that operations may be 
checked for safety at any time . " 
Recognition o f outsta nding hous ekeep ing i s g ood . 
However, housekeeping shoul d b e a year-arou nd job, not 
just a shot in the arm every spring. A continuous program 
of housekeeping - mainte nanc e and improvement shoul d be set 
up . Inspections should be made by all leve ls o f the l ine 
supervision so that their interest can be demonstrated, s o 
that standards can be set, and so that on-the - spot recogni -
tion ca n be giv e n . 
b. Suggestion s 
Safety suggestions are investigated and judged by 
the Safety Department . I1 erck feels that they p l ay a major 
role in their program. Over two thousand suggestions are 
received each year and more than half receive rewards which 
total about $3500 per year . In the Factory group in 1951 
about seventy- five suggestions were submi tted per one hun-
dred employees . The number of suggestions is also used in 
their interdepartmental competition (described later ). More 
facts woul d be necessary to eva luate properly the effective -
ness of this e l ement . If a suggestion system is ~vel l run_, 
it can be a very effective means of stimul ating safety 
activity and thinking . 
B. Techniques of Accident Prevention 
l . Indoctrination 
The initial training wh ich an emp l oyee_, either 
just hired or transferred _, rece i ves on a new job is very 
important . Lasting impressions can be instilled at this 
time. All important inform..a tion shoul d be covered; hovv -
ever_, if too much information is given too fast_, the em-
p l oyee will be l eft con fused . 
Merck appears to have a pre t ty compr ehen sive 
indoctrination program . A new employee receives a Safety 
Manual and Instructions for New Emp l oyees ( Exhibit VI ) 
before l eaving the emp l oyment office . He takes these to 
his new supervisor_,-who gives him the i n structions i n-
3 ) 
I 
dicated on the form . Approximate l y ten n:iays l ater the ne-r.<J 
emp l oyee is visited on the job by a safety man and given a 
1vri tten test on the safety manua l ( Exhibit VII ). If a need 
for a review of the basic material is indicated , it will be 
given at this time . 
Merc k ' s instruction check sheet is a good one , 
but there is room for improvement . For example, there is 
no mention t o the employee of management ' s safety policy. 
Also the form l ends itself to a formal type of instruction . 
The erap l oyee should be put at ease . He wi ll be more recep -
tive if this is done. Also he should be assured that he has 
n othing to fear in working in this plant. Having a multi -
tude of precautionary measures and strange protective d e vices 
thrown at him a ll .at once is l ikely to cause unnecessary 
menta l dis turbanc e whic h can, in itse l f, cause accidents . 
Plant accident statistics compared vJith those of other in-
dustries can be used to point out that workin~ conditions 
are safe . 
Since, on his first day, the employee is primari l y 
interested in getting to work and starting to earn his pay 
check, the important points necessary for doing a safe job 
shoul d be stressed in a minimum of time . Having a Safety 
I'fJanua l is good for review and further education . Operating 
procedures stressing the safe method of operation can be 
referred to . Having the follow - up quiz is a good check on 
the progress of training . 
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--------------------- SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION $] SAFETY INSTRUCTION FOR NEW EMPLOYEE 
Mr. HEAD OF DEPT . 
NAME OF EMPLOYEE 
Safety Department 
--------------------~------~ DEPARTMENT 
Personnel Department 
( P L E AS_E __ I N_I_T_I A_L __ A_N 0--F-0-RW_A_R_O~) -----"------~ 
This new employee has been given a safety Manual and has been told of our 
insistence that our employees not only know the contents of this book, but that they 
!
practice the regulations it contains. The employee has been told that additional 
safety instruct1on will be given applying specifically to the Department to which 
ass·i gned. 
1: 
II 
It 1s the responsibility of the Department Head to see that each new em-
ployee in his Department is told of any dangers which may be present in the Depart-
ment. His initial safety instructions should include such of the following as may 
be applicable to his part1cular Department. The Department Head will please write 
his in1tials opposite those which he has explained to this new employee, and have 
the employee sign the acknowledgment then initial and route this form as above directed. 
[ ] 
[ J 2 . 
[ ] 3. 
Correct method of operating equipment and handling materials. Explain that 
employees must not operate equipment or handle materials new to them until 
instructed. 
Use and care of goggles, respirators, safety shoes, and other protective 
equipment; where these ~ay be obtained, and when they must be worn. 
Warning of any special hazards, poisons, flammable materials, not to 
carry ''strike anywhere" ~atches, no smoking regulations, etc. 
[ ] 4 . . Location of emergency equipment and how to use it; gas masks, f ire 
ext in gu1she rs, safety showers, etc. 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
5. How to turn in a fire alarm and the location of the nearest telephone. 
5 . How to lift properly using the legs and keeping the back erect. 
I: [ 
7. Responsibility for self-protection and safegua rding fellow workers, 
suc h as turning in all defective tools and reporting any unsafe 
conditions. Explain that a violation of a safety rule is a serious 
offense which ma y be considered cause for dismissal. 
8 . Necessity of reporting all injuries, no matter how small, to the Plant 
Health Department. 
I OSbsc __ _ 
v~ lue of order, keeping locker s and work places clean and orderly 
i- ' recautions which must be taken when handling carboys and drums, empty 
o r full. 
EMPLOYEE ' S ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The a bove it e ms have been exp l a ined to me. I agree to obey the Co mp a ny s 
Re Ru l a tion s ?.n d to t ake a l l n ec ess a ry precautions in my work . 
..l:!i.t'dtl.Jj l.'f v 1 
Signed ___________________________ Date 
EMPLOYEE 
-
' II 
!i 
II 
ii 
I 
!I 
I! 
I • 
Name 
----------------------------
Ratin~ 
------- -
Dept . 
- -----------------
Date 
----------------------------
The answers to these questions may be found in the Safety Manual . 
An~~er a l l que stions briefly. 
l. If an injury that you received at work requires medical attention while you 
are at home, what Should you do? 
2. i-Tha t should you do in case you receive a chemica l burn? 
:1 3. 1,-lhat Shoul d you do when you notice defects in electrical equipment? 
u. Are a l l ga s mask canisters good for protection against any gas? 
S. Where is eating permitted? 
,I 
!: 
II 
,. 6 . How can you tell when a gas mask canister should be renewed? 
Jl 
7. What precautions should be taken when cleaning, oiling or repairing 
machinery? 
Before starting a machine or shaft ing in any department, name one thi ng you 
must a l ways do. 
Hhy are hand tools , such a s chisels, hanuners, etc., dangerous when they have 
mushroomed heads ? 
Will respirators protect you against harmful fumes and gases? 
Why must t he bung plug of a drum be removed slowly? 
Hhy is it necessary that you always drink at regular drinking f ountains? 
I have r ead t he Safety Manual and I am thoroughly familiar with all 
:neral hazards and safety rules as outlined in this Manual. I will a lso 
!Clrrl t he specific safety rules and regulations governing the department to 
tich I have been assi gned . 
Signed 
Department 
at e 
• 
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"Usually within a month they are required to 
attend five, one - hour classes, which inc lude: 
Class l 
Explanation of the importance of safety, the 
company ' s interest, the safety record , and 
their r esponsibility for cooperating and ob -
serving safety regul ations . A sound movie, 
"Mirac l e in Paradise Valley" is shown . 
Class 2 
Stresses the need for reporting every injury to 
Plant Health Department and emergency action, 
including how to control bleeding and perform 
artificial respiration. A sound movie, "Help 
Wanted", is shown . 
Class 3 
Causes of fire, and precautions which must be ob -
served, particularly when hand l ing flam~ables, 
are discussed. The use and operation of fire ex-
tinguishers and a l arms are demonstrated . A 
sound slide film, "Fire Thiefrr, is shown . 
Class 4 
The importance of eye protection and need of 
respiratory protection is explained . Inspection 
and care of personal protective equipment is dis-
cussed and a sound s l ide film, "Easy on the Eyesrr, 
is shown . 
Class 5 
Safe methods of lifting, handling containers 
and operating chemical plant equipment are re-
viewed . A written test is given on a ll of the 
material covered . " (Exhibi t VIII ) 
This specia l safety training program is cer -
tainl y very good . It is something which Merck 's exper -
ience ·wi ll shov.,r them hmnJ to improve - -what might be added, 
deleted, or emphasized . If their on-the-j ob training is 
as good as this, their whole indoctrination a nd training 
program is far better than most companies . 
2. Contest s and Awards 
The Me rc k departmental safety competition is 
based on measuring the various safety performanc e f actors 
which c a n be measured. Credit is given for safe t y sugges -
tions submitted, a nd debits for accidents, poor hous ekeep -
ing a nd safety vio l at ions. Scores are adjusted for the 
numbe r of employee s. As a n av.rard, a dinner is given 
a nnually to the contest winners, the safe ty committee mem-
bers, fire squad and employees who submitted more than 
five ac cep t ab l e suggestions during the year . 
Deta iled information on the method of scoring 
is not known; h owev e r, there are some pitfalls to be 
guarded against in running this type of contest. For 
h ousekeepin g contests, the number of employees may not be 
1. 
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T:.>ugh -housinl_! 'Jr horseplay penni --:f>d 1 
r '~"Hr ."''1 .,. f· when han~lin~S wah 'i•l · \.J ion 
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b. 
EXH I BIT VIII 
- - --- . -'------=-.::.-:=-=-=-=-:..:===-=== 
---
'\r,r ''.J't' nt t•xt in RfJisb·r· 1s be~t s ut ted for use on Lhf' followin g firesi 
i.l. 
1
E.I er t ri r nl fj res ------------------------
!.. Ruh\.i _·h F jrP s 
r·. 111• Lr her, Ben zol , 
L To wl,om s hou ld you rPport any un s afe condit ions? 
.>. l\1, ere may you mok e ? 
[ f thf·rc i .' any o ther i n formation you would like to have on safety, which we have not covered or 
'~> lained Lo your s atisfaction, jo t it down . 
a good basis f or comparison . If points are deducted for 
each item of poor housekeeping, ceteris paribus, the depart -
ment with the l arge r area will have a l ower score . This ex-
amp l e i s mere l y to point out the difficulties in picking an 
equita ble basis f or group competition. Having competition, 
contest, and awards, however, does have a stimulating effect 
on a safety program . On the other hand, what is the r eaction 
of the 11 runner-up 11 in the contest? It should be vva tched for . 
The who l e contest program shoul d be observed for unexpected 
reactions . · 
3 . Posters and Bulletin Boa rds 
One interesting point is brought out by Merck 1 s 
experience with posters a nd bulletin board promotion . 
Sma ll Nationa l Safety Council posters are mounted in small 
frames next to drinking fountains throughout the plant a nd 
changed every ten days . Larger posters are plac ed on the 
Safety Bulletin boa rd at the plant entrance . But a series of 
origina l cartoons made by one of the plant emp l oyees, show-
ing a safety character involved in various accidents aroused 
11appreciab l e interest." Homemade signs, posters, and dis -
plays almost always evoke more intere st than professional l y 
prepared material, even though the latte r may be far bette r 
artistical l y . 
4 . Plant Eng ineering Inspections 
Another good feature of Merck 1 s p rog ram is the in-
spections made by Pl ant Engineering . Potentially dangerous 
• I 
c«. • co., t~c. RAHYIAY 
CENTRIFUGAL INSPECl !ON REPOR T 
DATE 0F INSPECTI ON: 
JOB NO. : ___________ _ 
I " NL :MBER: - ----------
::SCRIPT I ON: ·---------
:>CATI ON: DEPT. BLDG. NO. 
ERVICE : _______________________ _____ ___ 
NSPECTION RE QUE STED BY 
-------·----·· 
ON 
IOt ed . 
REMARK S : 
The following were checked and found sat i s factory unless othe rwi se 
8/,SK ET __ ·- --------
BE:A RINGS 
RELTS ------------
STI\. TIC ARR ESTOR S --· - ·----
RP~KE -------------
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:t;XHIBIT X 
FOREi'•iAN 
.· . 
equipment and safety d evices are inspected as routine. In-
spection reports are circulated through the Safety Depart-
ment and corrective action is fo l lOW'ed up. Exhibit I X 
shows a typical inspection report. The backl og of incom-
pleted r e commendations can b e followed up using the form, 
Exhibit X. 
This element of an accident preve ntion prog r am 
is important a nd should not be overlooked or n eglected . 
As with a ll inspections, follow-up is difficult but should 1 
be systematized. 
5 . Accident Investigat ions 
All l ost-time injuries and reportable accidents 
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are investigated . Reports a r e sent to the various interested 
parties . First-aid cases a re not invest i gated 11 unless there 
i s a n indication of an unusual feature . 11 The accident investiga-
tion r eport form, Exhibit XI, is on translucent paper for 
ha ndy reproduction . Their code of accident causes is shown 
in Exhibit XII. Thes e are used to classify accident causes 
which are statistical ly analyzed . 
Merck does n ot follow Heinrich ' s cause breakdown 
a lthou gh they do indicate that the sub - cause -- 11 r eason the 
cause existed 11 --should be d e termined . Basic cause an~_lysis 
is important for a compl ete remedy . When their code of 
accident causes is compared with the list of unsafe acts 
and conditions in Chapter II, it appears that theirs could 
be a more detai l ed bzeakdown . For exampl e , a com~on type 
of accident is a 11 slip, trip, or fa ll. 11 An increase in the 
' llf: 1: ,.0 I C. AAH AY 
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SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION 
CODI~ FOH ACCIDENT C1~ USES 
ffiOCED~IN REPORTH KZ MINOR INJUR~ 
HI NOR (R.Ho) 
I n j ured l o:sef> no time except for trea:tme!i.t . 
~.ft JOR (S .W. ) 
Injured loses the balance of t he day or shift, but i s 
able to repor ·t for hie next. regulAr ahi!'t. 
LOST TIME (J .. . T.) 
InJured suffers some permanent disability or is not 
able to report for work a t his next r egular ahi!'t. 
CODE FOR CAUSE o:"' INJURY 
UNAVOIDABlE 
1-1 RISK OF EMPLOIM1.'lrr (To incltde <nly such oases e are 
clearly caused by some condi tien of employment which 
cou1.d not have been reasonably foreseen ar guarded 
against.) 
1-2 MISC~-NEOUS (To inolme cau.ees not 1ncident3l to 
empl oyment over whioh the plant has no con·t;rol, such ae 
ligb:tning, train wrec ks 1 e tc.) 
PHYSICAL OONDITION OF PLANT OR &.lUIFMOn 
2-1 'l'YF1!: OF OONS'lRUCTiotl (To include cases caused by ia-
proper plant layout, design ur cor:YStructia.l work.) 
2-2 MACHJNmY AND ~UIFMENt (To inclme ce.ses caueed. bT 
inadequate or illlproper:Qr designed or erected machineey 
and equipuent exclusive of portable tooltt.) 
2-3 INAD&.lUAT'~ MfoiNT"".i!r'NANCE {To incl\Xle !ll..l cases where 
cause was duG to lack or proper maintenance ani repair 
o! original buildings, equi.pnent, etc.) 
2-4 PORTABLE TOOlS (To include s.ll cases caused by 
inadequate 1 ~roper or poorly maintained port.nble tools. ) 
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SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION 
CODE i''OR ACCIDBNT CAUSES 
• 
OPl~RA Tr.NG CONDITIO!'S 
3-l METHODS OR PROC~ (To include cases oauaed by nature ot 
the process or method of doing the job in qu~et.1.on not 
directly chargea.ble t.o Persona.lcau.-;es or 3'1.l}X!rv:ieion.) 
3-2 MATERIALS (·ro include oasos eawsoo by' nature of material.e 
being hmxiled1 except those directly cr.argeable to Per-
aal&.l cattaee or supervieion.) 
3-3 OOUSEKEEl:.Illl AND .fiRRANGUlli.NT (To :tnclude all ca5ee where 
poor arrangerrtent or housekeeping was +..be underlying 
cause.) 
SAFE'I'Y DE.VICES 
4-1 TYPE OF DEVICE (To include all ca.see in which the typt · ot 
aafety de-vice provided did not meet the neoessary requ L.re-
rnents.) 
h-2 Mi\:IN'rlliANCE OF DLVICE (Tc inelooe all cases in which tbe 
safety device provided was not properly maintained. 
4·3 DEVICE NOT PROVIDED (To include all oases in which an 
applicable fHdety device could have been provided bat 
was not.) 
PERSONAL 
5-l SELEC'I'XON (To inclooe all c93es were the UDder lying 
cause vae due to tbe aapl.oyee DOt being suited to tbe 
job.) 
5-2 TRA:nr:oo (To include all cases llhere tbe employee vas 
not prq:>erly trained for the wrk or particular job. ) 
5-3 INSUFFICIENT SAFEft K>RALE (To include all cues vb8re 
the employee injured himself or anot.Mr through a lack 
of extrane care or desire to prevent accidente.) 
5-4 INSUFFICimT SOI'ERVISIOB (To 1nelme all OMes where 
better 8l'Xi closer supervisim or the plant, am the 
equiplloot1 the work under way or the employee involTOd 
couJ.d reasonab]Jr have prevented the accident. ) 
5-S PHYSICAL DEF'ICIEBGY {To include all cases roainly 
attributable to an unknown riJysical deficiency 1n the 
person involved or causing the accident.) 
5·"5:t DK..ft!<IA1'I'fiS 
5...6 NO~I-USE OF PRC"n.:CTIVE 1::-.tUI.Pt~T (Particularly eoggleao) 
5-1 HORSEPLAY 
---- - - ------
number of this type of accident would make a campaign on 
11Fallsn desirab l e . No such category exists in their 
breakdown. 
One other criticism is the existence of the 
11 Unavoidab l e 11 classifications of injury causes. True 
enough, .they may exist, but when they are so highlighted, 
they may be used instead of the proper basic cause. For 
example, lighting strikes a barn and burns it down . vlas 
the injury--the harm done --unavoidab l e? These unavoidable 
causes are better left off any ana l ysis with a possib l e 
substitute of "not otherwise classified, specify 
These then can be ana l yzed to determine what action might 
be taken to prevent a r e currence. 
6 . Other Techniques 
As indicated under Organization, the r e are many 
different cormnittees which h o ld periodic meetings . These 
meeting s have some value as educationa l media . Safety 
manua l s with safety procedures have been prepared on 
II 
some operations. Manufacturing processes are written in 
detail. Each -step in the process is checked for safety . 
Changes in the process cannot be made without clearance 
from the Safe ty Department. These manuals and procedures 
are good training aids . Not onl y on bul l etin boards but 
also in the ~·1erck pub l ications safety is stressed . Monthl y 
safety reports are sent to a ll supervisors . 
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C. Discussion .. 
Merck ' s accident prevention program is made up 
of many elements. It looks very good on paper, and based 
on their record, most of the elements which are on paper 
are being carried out. There are good reasons for skep-
ticism when it comes to believing whether or not written 
procedures and forms are used as they are supposed to be. 
For example, Professor Pegors of Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology once visited an automobile plant which had 
an effective indoctrination procedure on paper . He asked 
to see their completed file of filled out forms . The 
first day, it seemed that the file had been "mislaid"; 
however, the next day, they had to admit that they had no 
forms filled out. 
Merck has made a 78Jb improvement in their Injury 
Frequency in the past ten years. They seemingly could do 
as well in the next ten years. "The improvement is prin-
cipally due to the fact that we are undertaking a great 
many safety activities today whereas our safety program 
didn ' t amount to much fifteen years ago. We are now doing 
something to prevent accidents . There are many things which 
will be added to the list n. ~,. 
By reorganizing their own deficiencies and cor-
recting them, by adding these other activities to the list, 
Merck should still proceed to better their accident preven-
tion experi.l;;nce. 
*26 
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IV. DuPont - The Leader 
E. I. duPont deNemours and Company rank as the 
leading domestic producer of commercial explosives, dyes, 
ce llophane a nd Nylon, and are one of the leaders in the 
product ion of rayon, finishes, pigments, plastics, heavy 
chemicals, tetraethyl l ead , agricultural chemicals and 
refrigerants. I As Table II shows, they are also the leade r 
of the Chemical Industry in control of Accident Frequency 
and Severity. In 1951, of their one hundred and fourteen 
plants, l aboratories and construction projects, seventy-
five completed the year without a single lost-time injury. 
Three of this 75 had each gone twenty-two years or more 
with a perfect record. 
The following is a description and discussion of 
some of the elements which comprise their accident preven-
tion program . 
A. Organization 
DuPont p l aces a lot of emphasis upon having respon-
sibility and authority clearly defined . Safety is clearly 
the responsibility of the line organization . A great deal 
of emphasis is p l aced on the functions of safety committees 
on the various l evels. 
l. Line Supervision 
"Supervision has and must accept the responsibility 
to see that the conditions under which the employees work 
8 
are safe; that all safety devic es are in place, in good re-
pair a nd functioning as they should; that the necessary 
personal protective equipment is avai lable and in good c on-~ 
di t i on; and that t h e emp loyees 1-<:now· how and when to use 
such equipment and do so. 
Supervision must make sure that the employee s 
k n ow how to work sa.fe l y and thoroughly und e rstand that 
they are to work safely, that safe ty is just as much a 
part o f their j ob as is following the estab lished opera -
ting procedure in order tha t a satisfactor y product may 
be made . 
Superv is ion nn).St be constant and since r e in its 
eff orts to secure and maintain the employees ' s ympathetic 
coope ration in or der that they participate whole - hearte dly 
in the safety program. 
Hanagement, department heads a nd foremen should 
a hm.ys set a worthy example in the prac tic e of safe t y . "* 
The supervisor ' s responsibilities are clea rly 
spelled out . The r e is no question as to wh o is respon-
sible f or t h e safety of a supervisor 's employees . Cl early 
the position of the Safety Department is a staff or advisory 
one . This e l ement of defined line responsibility was not 
apparent in Merclc ' s Safe ty Program but should be a pa rt o f 
a n y good organization . The prob l em of preventing accidents 
is n ot too complex or difficult wh en management a nd super -
-x-22 
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vision assu~e the ir r e sponsibility to see t hat the emp l oyees 
thorou ghly understand that they are to work safe l y . The 
wise executive definite l y p l aces this operating respon-
sibili ty on the supervisor ' s shoulders . vlhen a ll empl oyees 
from the top t o the individua l worker serious l y d e termine to 
prevent persona l injuries, they will cease to occur . 
2 . The vlorker 
Each employee at duPont is a lso charged ~'lith his 
individual responsibility . This is important since too 
often an employee gets the attitude that the company is 
c ompl etely r e sponsible for his safe ty. He should know 
that h e is expecte d to work safe l y at al l times, neve r 
take chances, neve r indulge in unsafe practices and never 
perform acts which may endanger hims e lf or his fellow 
emp loyees . He should follow prescribed rules and pro -
cedures, use persona l protect i ve equipment provided when 
required and report any unsafe practices or conditions to 
supervision . To get emp l oyees to assume this responsibility 
will be difficul t . Most wi ll cooperate but wi t h a few, 
corrective action wil l have to be used. Some may h ave to 
l ose compensation benefits to have their responsibility 
brought forc eably to their attention. 
3 . Committees 
"Plant Safety Cormnittees, as a part of the plant 
~~--- ------. 
safety organization, are recognized as probably the best 
means of securing employees ' cooperation, carrying out 
company po l icies, educating the empl oyees in safe prac -
tices, and sustaining his interest in safety . "* 
Exhibit XIII shows a typical p l ant safety or-
ganization a nd demonstrates how the c ommittees on the 
various l evels function. (See the second page of Exhibit 
XIII. ) 
The schedule of frequency of meeting shoul d be 
noted. They are h e ld more frequent l y than are the meetings 
of Merck ' s similar committees . DuPont fe e ls that shorter 
but mo r e frequent meetings dea l ing sole l y with safety are 
most effective . This is probab l y true . The psychology 
of l earning shows that short frequent training classes 
are more effec tive than the equiva l ent time spent in onl y 
a few infrequ ent meetings . 
On the Foreman Safety Corruni ttee meetings is 
placed the importanc e which was stressed in the first 
paragraph above --to ge t emp l oyee cooperation . These 
<Heekly educational meetings are very important . However, 
they ca n be onl y as successful as the extent to which their 
leade r is trained and prepared . This then p l aces a great 
dea l of importance on the higher l e v e l meetings . Fore men 
are not by nature good conference leaders, educators or 
*22 
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EXHIBIT XIII 
Functions of duPont ' s Safety Committees 
1. Centra l Plant Safety Committee 
Originate, guide and coordinate plant safety 
activities 
Distribution mediu m for all safey policies, etc. 
Supervise gen e ral plant safety educational work 
Final investigation of personal injuries or plant 
accidents and means of e liminating causes 
Plant safety j_nspections and elimination of hazards 
Plant safety rules and standards, etc . 
Type, maintenance and use of safety devices 
Safety publicity, contests, campaigns, etc . 
2. Departmental Safety Committee 
Originate, guide and coordinate departmental 
activities 
Distribution medium safety policies, etc . 
Investigation of departmental personal injuries 
Departmental rules and standards 
Departmental inspections 
Correction of hazards 
Departmenta l Publicity, contests, etc. 
3 . Foreman Safety Committee 
Distribution medium 
Education and training of new employees 
Preliminary investigation of personal injuries or 
accidents 
Inspections of area under foreman 
Correction of minor hazards 
Area rules and standards 
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l ecturers. They n eed training t o be ab l e to hold better, 
more e ff e ctiv e safe t y mee t i n gs . 
B. Safe ty Philosophy 
The following i s duPont 1 s phi l osophy· t oward 
a ccident prevention : 
1. 11A firm be l ief tha t al l personal injuries 
can b e prevented a nd should be pre vented . 
2 . A convict ion tha t it is possible to safe-
guard all operating exposures which may resul t 
in occupational injuries. 
3. An understanding by all employees that i t is 
to their own advantag e, as wel l as the com-
pany ' s, to work safely and that they are ex -
pected to cooperate to that e nd . 
Lf . A recognition that active, a lert awa re super-
vision, from top management to foreman or 
group leade r, is · ~ vital factor in carrying 
out the safety program. 
5 . An acceptanc e of the fact that the prevention 
of p e rsonal injuries is good business from 
the standpoint of efficiency and, economy . 
Briefly : That ma nagement must accept the respon -
sibility for emp lo;yee safety. r r.~<-
This safe ty philosophy is exemplified by the or-
ganizat i on a nd assigned responsibilities as wel l a s b;-.r 
other actions of management . Although parts of this ph i l os -
ophy are in vn• i t ing , duPont do es not place much emphasis o n 
a written policy a s such . The ir philosophy is a good on e . 
Management , superv i sion, a nd the empl oyees are a ll embraced 
by this statement of du Pont' s philosophy . Their conviction 
t hat a ll accidents ca n be prevented should b e contrasted 
I'Tith Merck ' s accident analysis in which they g ive a llowances 
for ''Unavoidab l e Accidents .'' 
The subjec t of "accident prone " employees is 
a provocative on e . DuPont's stand is that calling a man 
"accident prone" is rea lly an a l ibi which is used for in-
effective safety programs. It wa s inva riably found that 
the recurrence of injuries to c e r ta in employee s could b e pre-
vented if conditions unde r which they wer e wo r king were im-
proved .n They refuse to accept acc ident proneness as a cause 
of a n accident . 
Becau se c l o se attention on the part of supe rvision 
a nd , p r ob a bly, the Safe ty Department to the unsa f e condi-
t ions causing repeated injuries to one employee vm s kept 
a n d was r esponsible for the e limination of continue d i n -
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juries, this does not e liminate the problem of the "accident 
prone " per se. In any given group of emp loyees supposedly 
working unde r similar condition, a small perce ntage of them will 
have a l a r ge percentage of the injuries . ( i . e ., In on e 
Monsanto Departmen t of 63 empl oyees, during 1951, 1395 of 
the emp l oyees had 3~-% of the first-aid cases; 41 ~.6 had 69% 
of the injuries .) The ''accident prone " does exist and is 
a definite prob l em . A statistica l study to determine who 
are the accident prones is necessary . Then more time must 
be spent with them to determine the basic cause of their 
difficulties. ~fuerever practical consideration should be 
given t o this prob l em when hiring or assigning workers . 
Ceteris paribus, some _emp l oyees have more in-
juries than others. The fact that an employee is "acci-
dent prone" · should not be used as an alibi but shoul d be 
r e cogni zed as a prob l em which wil l take more of the super-
visor ' s attention to solve. Ba sic cause analysis may re -
vea l some psycholog ical cause which may be corrected . 
C. Techniques to Prevent Accidents 
1 . Design 
"The techno l ogy of a process or an operation is 
considered to be incomp l ete until every possible element 
of danger has been mastered or eliminated . And no such 
project gets the go - ahead signa l until the safety factor 
is satisfactory . The rule is inexorable, a nd app l ies 
equa lly to a p l ant costing mil lions or a stairway costing 
a few dollars . Chance cann ot be r uled out of any man ' s 
vwr k , in industry or e ls evJhe r e . But predictab l e chance 
can be r e duc e d to a minimmn that continua lly shrinks in 
duPont p lants toward the visionary irreducib l e ."* 
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When a new plant or operation is in the design 
stage, safety engineers work close l y wi th design people 
to make sure that equipment has every possible safety 
f ea ture. Before the equipment in a plant goes into ope ra-
tion, it is carefully inspected by a committee of the same 
people who wi ll b e responsible for its operation . 
DuPont's procedure of c h ecking to be sure that 
new e quipment and proc e sses are safe is an excel l ent one . 
The practic e of having the safety engineers and designers 
work together is rather unusual but should be valuable. 
Al l new equipment and construction should be reviewed 
so l ely for safety . Since safety is not the primary con-
cern of the design engineer, he usua l ly does not give his 
work the practical detailed review that is required . By 
having this practice, duPont is ab l e to eliminate mBny un-
safe conditions before they exist . 
2. Contests 
During the past quarter century, several types 
of safety contests to inspire and sustain employee in-
terest have been used . The object of the earliest con-
t est was to teach employees to recognize unsafe practices 
and unsafe conditions . Severa l other contests were run 
to establish injury-free records, initially of from one to 
six months . 
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In 1923 after one p l ant went one million manhours 
without a l ost-time injury, a 11 President 1 s No - Accident Plan 11 
e stablished a ·wards for other p lants who could dup licate 
this r e cord. In four years, nineteen p l a nts had broken 
the record . 
The present award plan offers three l evels of prizes 
fo r outstanding r e cords ; the Genera l :rr.tanager ' s Award, 
President ' s Award, and the Board of Dire ctor's Award . 
Th e comp l ete contest awa rd progr am is described in 
Appendix A. This particular contest has brought about a 
remBr kab l e r eduction in the l ost time injury frequency 
for duPont. vJorth•Hhile prizes are g iven t o each employee 
as each l e v e l of a chie v ement is gained. Be c a us e of the 
interest - arousing nature of this c ontest, it has been u sed 
by many other fi rms. 
3 . Safe p-.cactices 
· Unsafe conditions are prevented by proper design, 
g ua rding a nd installing safety d e vic e s. Unsafe practices 
are p r e v ented by training, promotion, procedures, providing · 
protective equipment . 
11Vl e b e lieve in well thought-out and thorough tra ining 
programs f or n ev-I emp l oyees . The teaching o f correct vw r k 
h abits a t the outset c ontributes to efficient operation 
a nd avo i ds the da n ger t hat new employees will fa ll into im-
proper work habits which a r e unsafe as we ll as inefficient . 
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Now how do we promote safety ? We have l aws, 
regulations, rul es, dri lls, training, app l iances a n d 
protective c l othing . All t h ese a r e of value , but it seems 
to me that, i n the l as t ana l ysis, safety must be achieved 
in the minds of men. 
In saying t his , I do not attempt to minimize 
or underestimate the importanc e o f rules and their en-
forc ement. What I am trying to emphas ize is t h e vita l 
essential --the creation of a wi ll f or safety . We wi ll 
n e ver b e safe unless we v.rant and try to be safe . This 
app lies to a ll of u s .. . man agement, e mployee s, a nd the 
general pub l ic . 'Lx-
For a compl e te program of ac cide nt prevention, 
attention must be g iven to both unsaf e conditions and un-
safe p r actices . Throu gh their promotion, proeedures, 
and c on tests, duPont i n sti lls in each emp l oyee a safety 
con sciou sness a n d s ense of teamwork which aims at prevent-
i n g accident s . They claim t o emp loy every kn own meth od 
to assur e that they have well-trained peopl e who wil l u se 
e very precaution and a void pe rsona l injury . 
D. Discussion 
A more detai led a na l ysis of duPont ' s p rog r am 
would s how that they have most if not a l l of the basic 
e l ements of a we ll-rounded saf ety program . The chief 
*21 
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reason for their success seems to lie in their safe ty or -
ganization . Each emp loyee r ea lizes his responsibi l ity for 
preventing accidents . Top management, especially, e~_hibits 
a n ac tive interest which stimulates the participation 
throughou t the organization . Because of top management 's 
safety policy and practice, Safety is viewed in its proper 
perspective--given a high priority . 
The results of their safety program can be see n 
in Figure 3 . In 1912, when statistics were first taken, 
duPont had a Freque ncy of 43 .15 and a Severity of 9.26 . 
I n 1953 these were 0.55 and 0.70 respectively. 
The last column in Table II, in the Int roduction, 
give the a verage n~rrnber of days l ost per injury. This is 
obtained by dividing the Severity, which is the days l ost 
per on e thousand man-hours, by the Freque ncy, which is 
the a ccidents per million man-hours . From this there c a n 
b e seen quite a discrepancy between duPont and most of 
the other chemical companies listed . Ex tremely high av -
erage figures may be obtaine d occasiona lly due to the 
occurrence of fatalities or other very serious injuries . 
How ever, for the previous five years, the average number 
of days lost p e r inj ury were as follows : 1952 - 925; 
1951 - 685; 1950 - 635; 1949 - 506; 1948 - 691 . 
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It could be t hat onl y the more serious injuries 
occur or that medical treatment is far superior at duPont ; 
n evertheless, it seems more likely that their standard 
basis for judgin g a Lost-Time Injury is different from the 
rest of t h e industry . They cannot be using t he American 
Standards Cod e 216 .1 - 1945 and interpreting it in the same 
manner as the other companies . It seems like l y that one 
result of their intense spirit of competition is to g ive 
more liber a l interpretation to injury standards . Definite l y 
many of the in juries whic h are of a short duration are not 
being counted . In t h e past two years it would seem that in 
their drive for continued improvement in Frequency they have 
become even more liberal. 
This incons istency does not materia lly l essen the 
effectiv eness of their progr am, however , I f their average 
days l ost per in jury in 1953 were 300 days instead of 1 273, 
with the same Severity of . 70, t h e Frequency would be 2. 33 
which is still exce llent . 
DuPont ' s phi l osoph y toward the "acc ident prone " 
seems to i ndicate that they are n ot too concerned with basic 
causes of accidents . They have the attitude that being acci -
dent pron e is ·not a cause . True enough, it may not be an 
excuse but it is a basic cause. More attention s h ould be 
paid by them to the cause of the unsafe conditions and un-
safe p rac t ic es . Ask vfuy? Why? Why? until the cause of the 
troub l e is located . 
DuPont ' s program is a good one . Sma ll companies 
vwul d do Ne ll to emulate their a ctivity . The great strength 
they have in organization and management philosophy is of 
major importanc e . 
V. Monsanto Che mical Company 
Monsanto manufactures and sells a widely diver-
sifi ed line of chemica l p roducts 1.vhich are sold to many 
d iffe r ent industries. Among the products are heavy chem-
icals, intermediate s, pla stics, p l asticizers , phosphorus 
c ompounds, medicina l and f ine chemicals, rubber chemicals, 
insecticides , h e rbicide s, fung icides, wood preservatives, 
so lvents and synthetic detergents . 
Monsa nto ' s safe t y r e cord, Figure 4, is second 
amon g the simi l ar large chemical produc e rs, which duPont 
l eads . 
A. Organization 
1~ safe t y program, to be effective, requires top 
p l ant :m..a nagement adrninstration to indicate to a ll employees 
that ~anagernent supports and insis ts upon safety . Depend-
ing on the p l ant ' s size, the top management group may be 
supplemented by other p l ant groups to assist in promoting 
t h e safety progr am ."* 
A typica l p l a nt safe ty organization is shown in 
Exhibit XIV. The safe t y func t i ons a nd responsibi l itie s of 
the various peop l e in this organi zation do not appear any -
\tJhere in writing . The responsibility of the line supervisor 
and of each empl oyee , however, do appea r in the Safety 
Policy ( Exhibit XVI - discussed l ater ). It is a weakness 
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that the functions are not indica ted in writing somevvhere, 
especially the functions of the Steering Cowmittee . The 
Safety Director and Plant Manager are co-chairmen of this 
committee. Agendas (See Exhibit XV) are prepared by the 
Safety Department and discussed by the group composed of 
representatives of every level of supervision and ever y 
l arge function in the p l ant. Total membership is about 
eight peopl e . 
Their fLmction should be to set overa ll policy, 
to advise and set the objectives of the year ' s safety 
program, to review the initial objectives periodica lly to 
see that they are progressing proper l y, to ana l yze overa ll 
program weaknesses vvhich may appear and set up ways to over -
come them, to appoint sub -committees to carry out specific 
detail programming, analysis or investigation work . The 
Everett Pl ant committee, however, has not functioned a l ong 
these lines. If they have selected any objectives, other 
than having a perfect record, for 1954, then it is not known 
by the employees . More specific concrete objectives are nec-
essary. 
The fact that this high l eve l committee exists is 
encouraging. Having top leve l interest in the safety program 
is essentia l for success. But it takes more than interest 
The Pl ant Manager ' s time should be spent profitably . His 
time shoul d not be consumed with discussions on minor prob -
lems or with minor decrsion making . Also, the activities 
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of this Steering Committe e should be pub licized, which is 
not being done at present. 
B. Safety Policy 
nit is important t hat there be in existence, and 
made k nm'l'n to all employees, a definite safety policy 
based on the realization that safety is just good busi-
ness; that the Company does not expect production at the 
cost of injury to the employees; that the Company wil l 
support a ll reasonab l e means to guarantee the safety of 
its emp l oyees. ~~~~ 
As was indicated before, a copy of a typica l 
plant Safety Policy is shown in Exhibit xiTI. Having a 
written policy pub l ished is a good idea. However, the 
actions that precede and fo llow it are more important . 
For example, the po licy states that supervision sha l l 
prepare safety rules and procedures and r equire compli-
ance . The preparation may be easy, ye t requiring compli -
anc e necessitates constant fo llow up . It creates prob -
lems . How is compliance to be required? To what l ength 
shoul d supervision go ? t~1at is the ' basis for requiring 
complianc e ? Al l supervision will have to be reminded of 
this procedure, the basis - on which any corrective action 
is to be taken and the suggested manner in which it is t o 
be performed . 
-X-L~ 
3UBJECT:: 
POLICY: 
DEP AR'001lf'l'S 
RESPONSI BILI'l'f: 
ONS 0 C 
DI SION 
rt"t e • 
Accident pr ,r~n . i.on - t se.f' ~ t:y ot th-:: ~n i1 vidual -
inv-olves .D!Ol:'e ~..h.a'o e. simp e s a+e ~nt; o · intent. It 
is a vit<U part of 1ndw3tr19.l ope:::~ ions based on an 
o ligation to pur v ~a.no a aJ.lable to insure 
~are vor.IO.llg conditi.ons , The-. obl.lgat!on is equally 
that of ma.o.ag t and o ach employe . The Compa.ny 
must act to d ~ _lop an1 tain ~at~ wo king tacili-
ties; e employe has a du to a- s~s~ per onal in 
the prevention of ac~id ta and ~ne ~1 minat~on ot 
hazards o hia own s y nd "::b.at of oth r • 
All d .p t nt ~ . 
ontlnl~ce or planned 
.. and b}· all our 
t ace. d nt 
In further auppozt of ~ Moasan o-Mezr_ma~ Safet 
Pol~c outl~d abov~ : followtng ape 1!1~ points 
o respon ibill a.r he _b' no+: ~ 
1. Sat' t Cl'l.l.a.ll ing pro-
cedure S pe ta nta 
o.t sate pra<"t-i'" e"' a.ud Ei et;r rules for me 
operation.:> under tbeir- jlll"'i die. · i on. They 
a~......._. r uiz . C0!71J?l ianc h Uc.h p actices 
and rul .s , Failure on part of' an mplo,-
to conform ·O su~ accident p nti n regu-
la ions · shall b~ cctns1.ie:r .d un a 1 factory 
ob perf orman~; ~ 
EXHI BI T XVI 
71. 
-. 
YA.'{A :.EMEN'l FU'LI..FTI #1- 0C· 0: 
F~l_::la.:·_.- 26 ~;5.;. 
FESPONSfB:L'!'T": : 
Cor~,.. 1 
U. . 
.::: 
...... 
~ Plan 
0 a:pp .,....l"'"l + .r,.,._a, .. i ·- pro._E.3 9 an· 
. ·':"· 
:: I) ,..'Wl. "t 
ti.lf: b 
b:1.1.1:tv 
c o~ c=a e_ ln prc -'o es fo.,.. con-
a .:ate :p:r ar<::·- - ba..o::-"' 0 ~l':t.tl.on 
In~~ P.~~~ Plant t~~ ~espons1 
Sat t ~ &tLi 
·wo:r _ • "Is.:r e 
~ :pc-..:!:"7.. C C, 
~- . 1 1 :<.: a 
!3 ,ax .t1 D1r ·to . 
~ .. : ~ 1 •. 
't·c • .., 1. n.s ~d !· 
·-::: r-_r-o:-a.Ul hat 
"'"q•-lpm.:m • mach n. rt 
:"".:.' "' .i':" ~~"~ .:~a 5.1'~ 
a~- -~-0~!. .UL 
The .t:n.d.act:r.U!A~ :..c-:: ·>!' ~ · "' 1 ye<;, and . 
trM r1na o! &.1 1 ~·~ ... .:. :in .il'= f:t.v~1.ia.'"l. ~e of' 
Q.,.. ~-· ::-: "· ,.. ,. ~d rc..! ..u1• of t..tu.s 
• ~ ~.0 ·~ 'L: ·-~R~ l 
~of 1.- '{ 
e.: .. i t:i.m'=-..s .,.. .U.e:s ":.1: •• a~l '-' 
tc ell'.&... a:.:-• .:. .::.."'-.: t , · c ..: k.a·p1t:g o:r 
~-r:~_, ~s:..·cl.~ . .!!.!...1 ~,4:-L~!Jlll"'.: - c. 
c..:..a.:r .. ~ ..1.."-'- .d. £iaf ~:: ~U.O.:U t .! ·:::. - c.i io1L41: 
wC'r .i..'t'. a ::w:f"" . -prs.· :.::...::a.:: .. Jr.':. !i~!" .. - ot ... on-
~ :j ... :.!.Q2. ... :t, s.a :::7, o'! c- ·:~r ; . 
72 
l..: .. s~ug toge ther in ac · cr.iancc: 'lol'it:::... ::b~ .2a.f -<: • pr:1J1c-1p1 "!S _~ '''= t..areby pledge our elves 
~ ..: ~ant'~~. 1L - of a.r c. are: s.r :!.e: ·' pe .so.~ p ::. -r .. ~-'..II·! . 1, .: i '18 our or-
Again cooperation cannot be expected from the 
empl oyees unless management a nd immediate supervision do 
their part . Every emp l oyee may be 11 charged with respon-
sibi l ity of keeping safety first in his mind . 11 This in-
eludes supervision . Cooperation cannot be expec ted from 
every employee unless management demonstrates its concern 
by taking a ll reasonab l e precautions. The responsibility 
must be accepted by a ll on a ll levels . 
c. Actions to Prevent Accidents 
1. Supervisor Safety Instruc t i on 
11 The key to maintaining and fostering employee 
interest in accident prevention and in eliminating and 
controlling accident and fire hazard~ lies largely in the 
supervisor ' s attitude toward safety . To create super -
visory interest and cooperation in the safety program, 
supervisors should recognize their responsibility for 
accident prevention, nmst be instructed in emp loyee train-
ing methods, should know how to detect and e liminate 
sources of accidents. This can be accomplished through 
supervisor safety instruction meetings and by appointing 
them to safety committee and specia l campaign committees. 11 * 
An exampl e of a supervisor ' s training program 
which was used at Monsanto ' s Springfield, lf.tassachusetts 
plant is giv en in Appendix B. This is a good basic course 
in Accident Prevention. The fundamental phil osophy and 
techniques of accident prevention are discussed . The 
-li- 4 
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method of instruction , by small group discussions, has been' 
found to be the best . Stimul at ing t h e thinking of each in -
dividua l and getting him to think out the solution to t he 
prob l ems involved i s the best mann er to assure that the in-
dividua l wi ll retain wha t has been evo lved . In a more ad -
vanced course o f instruction where more t e chniques are dis -
cussed, it would be advisab l e t o ha v e p r a c tic e s essions in 
which each man participates; i . e . , each man makes out a 
job instruction shee t which i s corrected and discu ssed; 
each one makes an accident i nvestigation , and each ma ke s 
a comp l ete inspect ion. By having practice sessions, the 
instructor can be more c e r tain that training on these 
specific techni ques has been l ea rned a n d will be perf o r med 
according to the approved ma nner . 
2 . Indoctrination a nd Edu cation 
11 1-1. definite safe t y i ndoc t rination p l an is essen-
tial to an effective safe t y program . Employees should r e -
c eive safety instruct i on b efore t h ey s t art their j obs and 
whi l e on the job . A safety educationa l p r ogram s h oul d be 
estab lished t o keep emp l oyees interested in acc i dent and 
fire prevention by conducting mee tings, conte sts, 
campaigns, etc . "-K-
A gr eat dea l of emphasis i s p l a c ed on this e ssen-
tia l pa r t of a safety program. It is important that the 
ne~·i, r ehired, or transferred emp l oyee is started off 
'cL~ 
right on his job. At this time Safety is given proper 
emphasis . The employee learns the correct methods of 
operation first, which overcomes the prob l em of later 
trying to break a we ll-entre nched improper method . Ex-
a mples of a plant and a department check list are shown 
in Exhibits XVII and XVIII. 
Merck had one check l ist rather than the two 
whi ch are used at the Everett Plant. ( This is not in-
dicated on either form .) Merck ' s printed form with a 
fuller heading seems to indicate more importance has 
been placed on this function than has Monsanto - Evere tt. 
The points covered are very much the same. The depart-
ment check list to some extent attempts to get av.ray from 
the forma 1 atmosphere of the other check sheets . The ne1-1 
man is set more a t ease . He is introduced to his f e llow 
workers , shown the who l e department, given some back -
ground information. In addition, some information about 
the individua l is obtained for the foreman ' s benefit . 
When shown his job, safety a nd the job are expl ained at 
the same time. 
The two points of putting the man at ease and 
stressing safety as a part o f the job should be incor-
porated in a smoo th indoctrination program. The proper 
personne l atmosphere should be created initially when a 
new man appears on a j ob . The ma n will be more rec eptive 
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I NDOCTR I NATION CHECK LIST 
SAFETY DEPARTMENT 
~ME NO. DATE 
·---------------------------------- -----------~ 
l. 
~. 
3. 
+· 
..J 
) 0 
/ 
:::>. 
7. 
8. 
9· 
o. 
l. 
2. 
CHFr:KED 
Explain Plant Safetr Policr. 
Emphasize the safety of the Everett plant c ompa re d with the 
record of all industry and the ch emical indus t_!.'_y . 
Describe the plant safety program and organi zation. 
Emphasize the i mpo rtance of accident prevention. 
Give a g eneral idea of the products and hazards. 
Issue a Safety Rule Book and emphasize the i mportant points •. 
Tell what to do in case of acciden t. 
Explain procedure for r~orting unsafe conditions. 
Outline the plant fire p revention and ~rot e ction p rogr am . 
Tell what to do in c a se o f fire --location of fire alarm boxes. 
Out line the medical and health f a cilities available. 
Exp lain nece ssity of contacting p lant physician for any 
unusual symptoms appearing af t e r leaving work 
(* Indicates it ems t o be discuss ed the first day. Others 
to be checked after.) 
(TO BE MA:DE OUT FOR EACH NEW MAN IN THE DEPARTMENT) 
Signed 
-----------------------------------
~XHIBIT XVII 
1. 
2. 
3. 
·--------------NO. DATE, __________________ __ 
Introduce new man to everyone in department as you 
and be meet them during lk through the dep3rtment. 
Explain wba t H-Ac id is am bow 1 t ia used. 
P1nd out what the mn did previous to being hired 
by Monsanto .. 
A. Ie he married' 
B. If" so, haa he any children? 
c. Where does he live? Get address and telephone 
number. 
4. Discuss the job he is going on. 
5. Discuss the "S&tety" ot his Job. (Do ~ot make him 
rear the acid, caustic, eq ipm nt, etc., he is going 
to use during the discussion. 
6. 
A. Explain the use of ~oggles, gloves, boots, eye 
tounta1n, aatety showers, caustic wash, gas mask, 
and what he should do 1n case ot an acid or 
caustic burn. 
B. What to do in case ot minor injUl"l". 
c. What to do in case ot tire. 
1. Show location ot tire extinguishers . 
2. Show location or tire boxes. 
Put man on the job. 
A. ke sure that he and the m n he is going to work 
with know ach other by their tirst names. 
B. Caution th men on the job with him to help him 
in the aatety ot his ork on the Job. 
C. Further explain his Job it necessary. 
D. Bas the man a~ more questions to ask about his job? 
1 ,. Atter the uan baa been on the Job three or tour hours, 
check with him a a to how thing a are going. 
EXHIBIT XVIII 
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if he is at ease . The other point il l ustrated by the depart-
ment check list is that safety shoul d n o t be separated from a 
' · b It should be a part of it . I t is therefore ma n s JO . 
p rope r that the job instruction shoul d inc l ude the stressing 
of safety . 
Another effective means of education which is 
widely used by Monsanto is department safety meetings . 
These are usually conducted b y the foreman, but for 
variety other supervisors or even hourly vwrkers may be 
called upon to participate . The objective of the meeting 
should be specific department problems or topics so that 
the men will profit from it. The meetings shoul d be about 
fifteen minutes in length . vfuenever possib l e' it is b en-
eficial to obtain g roup participation . Their stimulated 
thinking may bring up suggestions of hazards which s h ould 
be corrected . These shoul d b e corrected expeditious l y, 
since the group ' s attention is focused on t h em . Variety 
adds interest to these meetings . Demonstrations , props, 
movies shoul d be used where appl idab l e . Monsanto ' s safety 
departments and campaign committees have he l ped the fore -
men by suppl ying him with meeting agendas, specific in-
formation and "variety" mater i a l. 
3 . Promotion 
Promotion, as defined by Mon santo, i s to en-
courage employee interest in safety b y methods designed 
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to st i mulate interest, usua lly on a plant - wide basis, to 
crea te and encourage safety consciousness, and a desire 
to wor k safely . In other words it concerns the sales 
approach to safety--an angle which cannot be over l ooked in 
a safety program . 
The one promot i ona l method that has received 
more attention than a ll the r est is the safety campaig n . 
11 If proper l y planned a nd promoted, a safety campaign is 
difficul t to match in capturing the interest of employees 
because it combines a group of media into one intensive, 
coordinated effort which is a l most sure to attract atten-
tion . rr* 
The media that are used in a campaign are poster, 
bul l etin boards, exhibits, meetings, rallys, pub l ications, 
contests and awards . The way these are combined in a 
campaign can be seen in Appendix C, a campaign on eye 
safety . This particul ar program was highly successful as 
measured by the n~mber of unsafe acts and eye injuries 
before and after the campaign . As pointed out in the re -
port , a great deal of the s uccess was due to the coopera-
tion of a ll employees . This was the first program in 
wh ich the loca l union actively participated . Their coop-
eration was most instrumenta l in obtaining greater em-
p l oyee cooperation. 
~r.- 4 
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vJhere a union or employee organization exists, 
its cooperation shoul d be solicited whenever a safety 
campaign involving emp l oyees is to be presented . \'lith the 
union wholeheartedl y behind the program, greater employee 
interest and cooperation vvi l l manifest itse l f. 
Monsanto has shown its faith in the results ob-
tained from safety campaigns by having six packaged pro -
grams prepared by the Centra l Safety Section on the 
following topics : 
1 . Face and Eye h~otection 
2 . Fire h 1 evention and Contro l 
3 . Safety Match I dea 
L!. . Cl ean up Program 
5. Handling Materia l s Safe l y 
6 Sprains and Strains 
These a l ong with fifty-nine other programs 
which have been presented by the various p l ants are on 
fi l e and available for plant use in the Centra l Safety 
Section at St . Louis. These programs represent six 
• 
years of effort with this type of activity . The programs 
cover the fo l lowing topics : 
1. Accident Prevention Contro l 
2 . Color Coding 
3. Department Safety Meetings 
~-. Electrical Hazards 
8 
6 
5. Eye a~otection 
6. Fal ls 
7. Fire ~~evention 
8 . First Aid 
9 . Hand Tools 
10 . Horseplay 
11. Housekeeping 
12 . Job Analysis 
13 . Machine Guarding 
14. Materials Handling 
15. Off - the - job Safety 
1 6 . Persona l Protective Equipment 
1'7 . Plant Emergency Pl anning 
18 . Supervisory Safety 
19 . Unsafe ~~actic es 
20 . Safety Attitude Survey 
21 . Genera l Safety 
Any plant c ould find enough materia l in this l ibrary of 
safety campaigns to carry out an active program for a 
number of years . 
L~ . Hazard Control 
"To detect, elirninate and control hazards re -
quires ana l ysis of all p l ant accidents and fires by types 
and locations to determine sources, and nec essitates 
regul arl y scheduled plant inspections to discover hazards 
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and to see that protectiv e equipment is p r oper l y ma in-
tained .~~~~ 
Accidents must b e i nvest i gated to . determine 
causes so t hat prevent i v e measures can be taken . A 
typica l investigation f orm is s h own in Exhibit XI X. 
Some of Monsanto ' s p l ants investigate al l first aid cases 
while others investigate onl y t hose which seem t o be a 
high poten tia l. By inve stiga ting a ll injurie s, a mor e 
LU1biased statistical picture of the types a nd causes of 
ac cidents will be obtain ed . Too often, l eaving the deci-
sion of when t o investigate up to one individua l rnay a llov.r 
the system to s lide i n to disuse . Inve stigations shoul d be 
n~de a nd kept up . Having the a cc ident investigation f or m 
fill ed out is on e way of assuring that the f oren~n has 
carried out a prope r investigation . It serves t o keep 
him awa r e of the ac cidents which are occurring in hi s 
department and to have him s eek so lutions to the causes . 
From the data on the back of the a ccident in-
ves t iga t ion form, the Safety Eng ineer a na l yzes an a g -
grega te of acc ident s and deter min es a reas of weakn e ss . 
Exhibi t XX is a typica l ana l y sis shee t used by Monsanto. 
Al l first-a id injuries f or a month a r e put on the chart. 
Data fo r the a na l ys i s a r e obta ined by the nurse from the 
injured empl oyees . I t i s a rather cursory investigation . 
Henc e bas ic ca u ses are not obtained, a lso causes of in-
-x- 4 
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dividua l accidents are not necessari l y corrected . Thi s 
analysis sheet has a breakdown that is too detai l ed. for 
practical use. Ra r e l y has a clear cut, statistically 
significant change occur in the minor categories . More 
of interest are the trends in the l arger categories such 
as fa lls, eye ac cidents, l iftin g accidents and so forth , 
and the effect which corrective action has on these trends . 
5 . Iv1a na gement Review 
Monsanto ' s basic program has six essentia l s for 
a ·wel l-rounded and balanced safety program . Five have 
already been discussed: Organization, Safe t y Policy, 
Sup ervisor Instruction, Indoctrination and Education, and 
Hazard Control . The sixth is Management Revie·w . 
desirab l e that safety engineers keep their p l ant managers 
acquainted vJith the status of the p l ant safety program. 
This can be done by furn ishing the p lant manager with a 
monthl y report out l ining the progress on safety objectives , 
l isting new objectives, nu.mber of inspections maq_e , saf ety 
meetin gs held, accident and l oss statistics and compari-
sons, etc . "* 
Usually, written mon th l y reports are pub l ished 
for all supervision . In them is a brief d iscussion of 
the month ' s record, rn..a j or and sub - major injuries, a n y 
points of specia l significance and a copy of the acci -
dent analysis form . 
-K-l.j. 
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As indicated under Organization~ a good p l ace 
for the discussion of progress on safety objectiv es and 
the li s ting of n ew ones woul d be at meetings of the 
Safe ty Stee ring Committee . Here woul d be the proper 
p l a c e for Management ' s Review . 
D. Discussion 
Al though Monsanto has an excellent r e cord, there 
is still room for improvement . New techniques are being 
deve l oped constant ly ~ some of wh i ch are being tried out 
( see Rat io De l ay in Chapter VI I) whi l e others have not 
yet be e n comp l etely exp l ored ( i . e . , persona l ized safety ). 
The basis for a strong fundamenta l program has been starte d . 
By the exchange of ideas and experiences ~ the most success -
ful ways of preventing accidents will be obtained . 
I n Appendix D is a detai l ed discussion of 
~~1onsanto ' s safety program by t h e director of t h e Safe ty 
Se ction, Mr . George L. Gorbel l . He conc ludes that the 
most important f a ctor which has brought about i mprovement 
in Monsanto ' s record has bee n supervisory training. In 
his a na l ysis he points out the importance of exchange of 
information and establish ing a basic program on which to 
build . 
Judged by theii' improvement in rec ent y ears and 
by their es t a b l ished "ground work " ~ Monsanto shoul d con-
tinue to be increas ingl y successful in preventing acci-
dents . 
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Chapter VI 
Persona l ized Safety 
The most recent appr oach to accident preven tion 
and the one which gives the greatest promise for t h e fu-
ture is npersona lized safety ." Thi s is the app l i cation 
of psychol ogy and good human relations to t h e cause and 
cure of accidents . 
A. Emotiona l Causes of Acciden ts 
I n t h e Basic Philosophy given in Chapter I I, 
Heinrich' s nAccident Sequ ence 11 was i llustrated . The 
prox imate or inm1ediate cause of an accident is the un-
safe act or condition . The s u b cause is the fau l t of 
person which may be one of t h e fo llowing : 
l. Lack of instructions 
2. Disregard for safety rules 
3 . Improper att i tude 
" Ji 
-,- . I nattention 
5 . Inexperience 
6. Physica l defects 
It is the psycho l ogica l cause of t h e sub cause with which 
this newest approach to accident prevent ion deal s . 
Dr. F . A. I~goun, ~~esident of Human Re l ations I ncorp . , 
has indicated two "accident causing c onditions and 
activities .n One is Physica l and the other is Emotional . 
nThe cause of an accident is not the fai l ure to cover hair 
with a kerchief, or lifting with the back instead of with 
the l egs . These things are only the METHOD by which the 
accident happened. The cause is what led to the employee 
using that method. 11 This may be many things, for example: 
1. Monotony 
2. Revenge against the company 
3 . Self-punishment 
11 Anger 
' . 
5. Loneliness 11* 
For a well-rounded accident prevention program 
it is not only n ecessary to consider the immediate or 
proximate cause, but also the sub causes and psychologica l 
causes of accidents. A program based on all causes will 
be more successful than one which considers only unsafe 
acts and conditions. 
B. Accident Pre vention 
Accident prevention has been developed along 
five distinct lines: 
*20 
11 Step 1. Guarding and el imination of machine and 
physical or material hazards without 
the use of cause analysis. 
Step 2. Selection of remedies based on practical 
cause analysis that stops at the selec-
tion of the direct and proximate causes, 
including personal unsafe acts, when 
results are not produced by simple r 
methods. 
.9 
St Selection of r emedies based on knowledge ep j . 
of persona l sub caus e s or reasons for 
the c ommiss ion of unsafe acts a nd wh i ch 
considers underlying causes onl y when the 
prob l em does n o t y ie l d to direct attack . 
Step 4 . Se l ec tion of r emedies based on ana l y sis 
of unde r l ying causes. 
Step 5. Se lection of remedies based on psycho l ogical 
ana l ys i s . 
Indu s try i n gener a l has n ot ye t taken f u l l advant a ge of 
its opportunities in t h e first three steps. The ideal 
. 
situation is one v"here in all five steps are taken as 
necessary . "'~ 
Magoun stated that in texts on accident prevention~ 
there is much on prevention of chemica l exp l os ions ; 
a l mos t nothing on emo tiona l exp l osions, yet here is how 
most accidents are caused. "vla tch the effect on the 
emp loyee of emotiona l upset at home or on the job . Take 
an emotiona lly upse t person off a hazardous job 1.m.til the 
emotion is gon e.. Accident prevention depends p rimari l y 
on good human r e lations. Truly happy peopl e seldom have 
accidents. tLx-* The prob l em then is to obtain good human 
relations . Rosenstein off ers some guideposts and sugges -
tions to this end: 
~c-2 P. 325 -326 
~H20 
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C. I mprov e d Hw11an Relations 
The first step is to l earn the " spec i fications" 
of ht.:unan na ture . These are as fo llows : 
"1. No one i s perfect . Th e first ma jor prob l em of 
human nature on t he job is found e d on the menta l, 
emotiona l and physica l inadequacies of peopl e 
wh ich just cannot be changed . 
2. Everyone n eeds praise a nd buildu p . 
3 . Peop l e want to know what ' s going on . Peop l e 
want to kn ow t hings that wi ll affect t h e m. 
4 . IVIe n don ' t l i ke to be bos sed b y men . I t is a j ob 
which has authority . IVlen n e v e r puck the demands 
of a j ob . But men a l ways buck the dema nds of 
men--men who try to assume that authority and 
s uperiority unto themse lves . 
5 . Peop l e want to b e l on g t o something, a nd vvant 
something to live up to . I t 1 s a ·worthy purpose 
to give men p r ide in t h e ir c ompa ny and in the ir 
j obs . 
6 . Peop l e just do n o t l ook a h ead . Most of us are 
not g ifte d with applied fo r esigh t . Peop l e will 
dis r egard safety rul es which interfere wi t h wha t 
t h ey wa n t to do at the moment . 
7 . Everything in nature is l oaded with i nert ia - -
a nd that includes huma n nature . Peop l e have no 
• 
a 
part icular goa ls in l ife that can be expressed 
dramatica lly . They want security~ l e iSUI'e and 
a chance to make a living . 
8 . People resent change and are a fraid of the new . 
Peop l e do not like new ways because new ways 
always demand l earning n ew things . 11 ~'" 
App l ying these specifications to practica l 
human relations, prob l ems boil down to fo llowing the 
Golden Rul e . ''Do unto others a s you would have them do 
unto you . 11 Treat your subordinates as you would like to 
be treated by your supervisor . 
D. A Practica l Demonstration 
At one of the p l ants of the Genera l El ectric 
Company in 1943~ management began to experiment with 
a new approach to safety educa tion, having earlier found 
fr om carefully c onducted tests that t h e conventiona l type 
of acciden t-prevention prograrn coul d n ot be re l ied upon 
to achieve more t ha n min ema l standards of safety . It 
l'Jas soon found that the accident frequency rate coul d be 
cut more than in half by using persona liz ed safety instruc -
tion and supervision. The rather spectacular resul ts ob -
tained from the new approac h and the record of how they 
were accomplished are discuss ed in detail by G. Roy Fuga l 
i n July , 1951, Harvard Bu siness Review . 
.;:-23 
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The instru ctional procedure was simil ar to that 
described in the Nationa l Safety Council ' s Psycho l ogy of 
Safety in Supervision, "Teachin g Safety On the Job ." 
Job breakdovms v?ere first prepared, l"l'i th proper emphasis 
on safety . Each foreman then carried out an intensive 
app l ication of individua l ized, continuous instruction and 
fo l lo·w·-up of each worker. The supervisor paid special 
attention to any particul a r habit the individual worker 
might have . Suitab l e recognition ... nbo t h positive and 
negative 11 ••• were given each man . Rosenstein ' s "specifica -
tions of hmnan naturerr were und e rstood in app l ying this 
technique . Individua l ized imperfections were r e cognized. 
Praise and buildup were applied . Employees took greater 
interest in their jobs. They took into consideration the 
individual inertia and resistanc e to change. 11 Differences 
between workers were recognized and the lnability of most 
persons to learn new habi ts without doing t h em over and 
over again " was tak en into consideration . 
Fugal ' s conc lusions are as follows: 
11 Most industria l accidents are due to poor vwrker 
attitudes a nd l ack of knowledge or skill about the j ob . 
It seems apparent that both o f these causes may be in-
fluenced quite substantially by individualized safety 
education, which is quite effective not onl y in reorienting 
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the ind ividua l' s think ing about his job but in inducing 
better work habit s . 
The p r i ncipa l specific re c om~endations of t h e 
f or egoing study can be summarized as f ollows : 
l . Group-administered safe ty education , as gen -
era l ly uti l ized by industry, is r e l at ive l y 
ineffe ctive . It does not r ea l l y accomplish 
wha t mana gement thinks it accomplishes . A 
genera l r edire ction of effort toward a con-
tinuing, individua l ized, persona l ized in -
struction is neede d . The effectiveness o f 
this type of training has been d emonstrated . 
2 . The prob l e m of training the emp l oyee to wor k 
sa f e l y is n o t so much the act , for exampl e , 
of teaching him to put on his g l oves . I t 
i s more than that. The r e is the additional 
factor of es tab l ishing in the employ e e ' s 
dai l y conduct the habit of wearing his 
g l ov es . Furthe r, ma nagement must r e cogniz e 
that the f a ctors of skill and understanding 
ca n be trained into the employee on l y with 
diligence and pat i e nc e . Such l earning takes 
a l on g time, and management must discard its 
idea s t ha t these factors that enter so 
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definitely into the safety-training activ-
ity can be acquired by the employee throug h 
the 11 shot in the arm " variety of industria l 
education . 
3 . During r e c ent ~rears increasing numbers of 
educator s have campaigned for individualized 
instruction in the school room, pointing out 
the superior results ob ta ined over other 
methods . This experimentation provides an 
industrial education counterpart to the 
claims advanced by the f orma l educators in 
that the great individual differences in the 
attitudes, abilit ies, and habits of ·workers 
are recognized . 
4. The new approach to accident prevention is 
applicable to industry in general . The fact 
that the General Electric Pl ant wher e the 
tests ·wer e made is l arger than most compan y 
plants should n ot be considered a restric -
tion on this statement . Indeed, sma ller com-
panies and plants are often in a better posi -
tion to practice individua lized training 
because of a greater f l exibi lity and the 
close r working relations between employees 
and the ir supervisors . rLx-
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E . Discussion 
Personalized safety as demonstrated by Fugal is 
the neHest phase of app l ied accident prevention techniques . 
It is the fifth phase in the se l ect i on o f r emed i es to pre -
v ent accidents . It results from the safety e ngineer and 
the psychologist collaborating to eliminate the emotiona l 
causes of accidents . There is a vast and practical l y 
virgin fi e ld of useful ness in applied safety psycho l ogy , 
and it is one that should receive more immediate and wide -
spread consideration. By no means, however, woul d it be 
v1ise to a ct on the f a lse assumption that safety engineer-
ing has outlived its usefu lness and that psychology is 
a ll that remains . As a matter of fact , a great dea l of 
psycho l ogy is an iW1erent part of proper l y conducted 
safety engineering and is applied daily under the guise 
of better understood terms. 
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VII . Appraising Safety Performance 
For any safety prog ram, an essential feature is a 
means of measuring results. Statistical control of the 
p rogram is necessary for cont inued improvement and for 
p roper guidance. The following are some of the indicators 
which have been used to appraise safety performance. 
A. Frequency and Severity 
The two main yardsticks most commonly used for ap-
praising safety performance and for competition are Lost 
Time Injury Frequency and Se verity . The main disadvantage 
o f these has already been indicated; they place too much 
emphasis on Lost Time Injuries and therefore not enough 
emphasis on all accidents. Of the two, frequency is the 
better yardstick since severity is a matter of luck or 
chance. For example, u nder the same circumstances, a man 
may have an accident and slip on some ice. Luck determines 
whether he has no injury, whethe r he suffers a brok:en arm 
or whet her he fractures his skull and dies. Illustrations 
o f these yardsticks have been given in the chapters on 
each of the company 's prog rams. 
Another diff iculty with using these indicators occurs 
when try i ng to compare o.ne company with another. This was 
i ndicated in Table II in Chapter I and discus sed in Chap t er 
IV. Comparisons between any two companies will not be 
valid unless their injury data are on the same basis. This 
does not nullify a company's comparison with its past record 
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unless over a period of time their basis changes . 
B. Costs 
Important to management are the costs of in-
juries . Hence, the costs of injuries can be used as a 
measuring stick to show the effectiv eness of a safety 
program. Costs should be analyzed in the l ight of 
p revious years ' costs, taking into consideration the 
rising cost of each accident . 
Figure 5 is an illustration of injury costs 
used to appraise safety performance . The total 
''Massachusetts Rate 11 is affected by the rising costs for 
each injury as well as the average injury experience of 
all companies in Massachusetts . "Actual Costs" are 
affected by the rising costs for each injury (medical 
and hospita l expenses ) as wel l as the experience of the 
individual firm . When in a period of rising costs, the 
best guide is the 11Experience Modification Factor . 11 This 
is the per cent of the Massachusetts Rate 11 that the 
11actual cost 11 represents. In other words it is a meas-
ure of how much better than the averag e Massachusetts 
company a particular firm ' s injury costs are . In 19 51 
Monsanto ' s Everett Plant had an Experience Modification 
Factor of 40%. It ' s 11actual costs " were 40% of the 
Averag e Massachusetts company. This indicates that be-
caus e the Evere tt Plant had an active safety program 
.8 
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rather than being an "average tt plan t , their r esul tant 
savings \-Jere 60% of the "Massachusett s Rate . 11 This 
savings makes safety pay . 
C. Fir st Aid Ana l ysis 
As previousl y indicated , first aid cases shoul d 
• 
be investigated to determine the cause s , types and agencies . 
An ana l ysis of these can revea l the areas of high est fre -
quency of occurren ce. Safety programs can be p l anned 
accordingly . Frequen cies can be made up for p l ants or 
ind~vidua l departments . These c oul d be first aid cases 
per one hundred workers or forty thousand manhours . Statis -
tica l con tro l charts can be set up fo r each pr oduction unit 
to keep check on when it gets out of control. I t is not 
advisable to give first aid frequency any spec i al pub l ic -
ity or use it as a basis for competition since doing so 
discourages men from going to the medica l depa r tment for 
first aid treatment . 
D. Ratio De l ay 
This new t echnique wa s r e c e n t l y app l ied at t h e 
Mon santo Everett Pl ant . Thirty- four observer s were used 
for approximately eleven hundred empl oyees. Each observer 
made seven or eight observations of his fellow emp l oyees 
each day in order to de t ermine the type and frequency of 
unsafe acts . At a set time in re l ation to the hour ( i.e., 
at t en minutes past the hour ) the observer noted how many 
'2 
peop l e were within view, how many were wor k ing unsafely 
and what types of unsafe acts were being performed. He 
reco r ded his ob servation on the special form, Exhibit XXI, 
wh ich was turned in to the Safety Depa rtment dai l y. Both 
hourly a nd salaried, shift and day workers wer e us ed . 
The theory b ehind this technique is that a 
statistical samp l e can b e taken in this manner which 
wi ll be r epr e s entative of the who l e g roup . Also sinc e for 
a bout every ten unsafe acts, one minor injury will occur, 
this method of measurement will b e at least ten times 
fast e r than ana l yzing first aid cases, and will anticipate 
r ath e r than fo llow . 
In Monsanto ' s tr~al observation seventy- nine 
hundred ob servations were made . Of the acts observed , 
8 . 69"6 of them wer e unsafe . The various categories of un-
safe a cts are shown in Tab l e IV . As can b e s een from 
ana lysi s of this tab l e , efforts to educate emp l oyees in 
using protectiv e equipment or to refrain from 11 horseplay 
and running 11 would mater i a lly benefit the accident pre -
vention p rogram. Since the stat istics are p l ant - wide a 
specia l p l a nt - wi de campa i gn simi l ar to thos e used b y 
Monsanto coul d be us e d to r educ e unsafe acts. I ts 
effect i veness c ould be measured by comparing ratio delay 
check s before and after . 
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TABLE IV 
Ratio Delay and Determination 
of Unsafe Acts 
Monsanto-Everett Plant 
April, 1954 
Unsafe Act 
Perc ent of Total 
Unsafe Acts 
1. No using personal protective equipment 13.8 
2. Horseplay and running 13. 8 
3. Not fol l owing safety procedures 13.3 
4. Work area not kept safe or orderly 12 . 4 
5 . \vearing unsafe or improper c lathing 9 . 7 
6 . Using equipment without authority 6 . 7 
7. Improper use of ladders, stag ings, unsafe 
equipment 6.1 
8 . Improper use of too l s 5. 8 
9 . Unsafe carrying or use of sharp objects 5 . 1 
10. ilnproper lifting , carrying or stacking of 
materials 3 . 4 
11 . Work area not protected (not roped off ) 3 . 1 
12 . Disregarding safety signs 2. 8 
13 . Smoking in restricted area 1. 6 
14. Improper use of motor vehicles 1.1 
15 . Improper use of ma t erials handling equipment 0 . 9 
16. Improper hand l ing of flammab l es 0.7 
17 . Miscellaneous 1 . 2 
Data courtesy of the Ev~rett Pl ant, Monsanto Chemical Co . 
E. Other Indicators 
High l evels of good housekeeping~ maintenance~ 
machine guarding~ lighting, ventilation~ operating methods 
and supervision are usually good indicators of good safety 
performance. The attitude of top management and morale of 
all employees also tend to indicate hm'l effective a safety 
program is. 
Another yardstick measures the safety activity 
rate of a plant. Some good correlations have been found 
between this rate and injury-frequency (See Figure 6. ). 
Safety Activity x 5~000~000 
Manhours worked x Avg. no. employees 
*Activity rate= 
The nsafety activi ty 11 is the sum of ( l) safety recommenda-
tions made~ (2) unsa fe practices reported~ ( 3 ) unsafe con-
ditions reported, (4 ) the number of safety meetings held. 
Although good correlations have and may be obtained this in-
dicator is statistically unsound when compared with injury 
rates. Since one activity may be more effective than 
another, to be statistically summed up each should be 
11weightedlf so as to be on the same basis. There may also 
be some question as to the accuracy of the data. However~ 
it can be used as a guide, using the sum or each activity 
separately. Compare this with the past experience of the 
same unit. 
Because small plants cannot wait for Lost-Time 
Injuries to be the basis for progress in accident preven-
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mendations, (2) unsafe practices, and (3) unsafe condi-
tions reported during the period, plus the number of 
safety meetings held in that ~eriod 
1947 
tion, they must look at the possibility of using some 
othe r measuring stick . Until Ratio De l ay was introduced, 
the best was analysis of first aid cases. Ratio Delay g ives 
faster and probably a more accurate measure of unsafe acts . 
Increased safe ty activity is bound to improve results eve n 
t hough the inverse correlation may not follow too closely . 
Sinc e Ratio Delay is n ew, its potentials are still to be 
explore d . 
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VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
Acc i dent p r evention is a mos t i mportant prob l em 
for management in the Chemica l Industry . Those c ompanies 
where the managemen t has rea lized t h e importance of the 
prob l em have been the most s ucc essful in solving that 
problem. 
Various elements and techniques make u p the 
safety programs of the l eaders of t h e Chemica l Industr y 
and are used 1i>Ti th differen t emphas i s to keep the i r pro -
grams dynamic . 
From the literature a nd from the companies 
studied , it woul d seem that the foll owing basic essentials 
shoul d be considered fo r a s ucc essful program: 
A. Ac cident Prevention Organization 
1. Management Support 
2. Sa f e t y Eng ineering 
3 . Safety Po licy 
B. Fact Finding Procedures 
l. 
2 . 
-:J 
..) . 
l j • 
5. 
Inspec tion 
Ac cident I nvestigation 
Review of Records 
Ob servation 
Ratio De l ay 
C. Ana l ysis of the Facts 
D. Act i ons to Pi"event Ac cident s 
1 . Indoctrination and Education 
2. Operating Procedures 
3 . Supervisor ' s Education 
4. Promotion 
5. Good Human Re l ations 
Al though this l ist of basic essentials may 
seem to be formida b l e, t h e compani es described hav e most 
of these e l ements . Further discussion and conclusions 
vvill stress the i mportance that each p l ays in the over -
a l l p rog ram. 
A. Accident Pre v ention Organization 
The organization is the fra mework by means of 
which the safety work is accomp l ished . I t is nec e ssary 
to define the responsibility and authority of al l within 
the organization with r egard to a ccide nt prevention . 
Fai lure to do so causes conf l icts and ineffective func -
tioning . Each of the companies , Merck , duPont, and 
Monsanto have done this . 
The organization must be so arranged that the 
v.rh o l e Sa f ety Program ca n be effective l y carried out . I t 
is interesting t o note that al l three of t he companies 
discussed mad e conside rab l e use of committee s . The most 
important corMaittee s are t h o se where emp l oyees partie -
ipa te . DuPont ' s three l eve l safe ty conlll1i tt ee organ iza -
tion is an excel l ent one . 
l. ~~nagement Support 
'rhis is the most important element, for without 
the interest and participation of top management , how 
coul d a program survive? In recent years , management has 
come closer toward knowing its employees, has tried to be-
come more friend l y vfi th the workers, and in many cases no 
l onger l ooks down its nose a t worker ' s groups seeking in-
forma tion or stating grievances . It now l ooks at those 
same workers horizontal l y across a tab l e . There is now 
a persistent, firm realization by top management that 
vvork ers are human beings and not commodities, and that 
there is a necessity for teamwork in al l modern industry. 
The initiative should be taken by top management . With-
out its interest, the other e l ements o f the safety pro-
gram vvould suff e r because of l ack of fux1ds , poor or-
ganization and apathy . There are many ways in which 
management support can be exempl ified: ( l ) Provision of 
safe working conditions, ( 2 ) Approval of funds for safety 
activities, ( 3 ) Attendance at safety meet ings , (4 ) Ta l ks 
before emp l oyee groups, ( 5 ) Endorsement of a Safety 
Policy and ( 6 ) Requirement of reports from subordinates 
on their activities . The best examp l e of strength in 
this a rea is duPont. 
2 . Safety Engineering 
In most organizations , the responsibi l ity for 
~P the accident prevention program is de l egated to the 
staff position of Safety Dire ctor or Safety Engineer . In 
smaller plants this function may be combined with other 
under one individual. Here is where safety may suffer from 
l a c k of emphasis . 
The Safety Engineer shoul d act as an advisor to 
the line management . He assists in or has the direct 
r esponsibility for the other e l ements of the safety pro -
gram; i . e . , inspection, keeping accident record, writing 
up accident investigation reports, keeping supervision in-
formed, analyzing facts~ determining areas on which to 
work . The safe t y department is the l ogica l centra l agency 
to evaluate fire, hea l th and physica l hazards vJhich are 
usually present in al l chemica l oper ation s . Both Monsanto 
and duPont have the Safety Engineer in c l ose contact with 
the top plant management man . The c l oser this contact, 
the more effective will be the safety program . 
3 . Safety Po l icy 
Management ' s philosophy determines the eJl:tent to 
vJh i ch they wil l support a safety program . This phi l osophy 
ca n be demonstrated by actions, but it is effective, espe -
cial l y when a p r ogram is being s t arted or r evi t a lized , t o 
p11b l ish in writing a statement of po l icy , simi l ar to that 
discussed in Monsanto ' s program . J.Vfanagement shoul d make 
it k nown that the company does not expect to produ ce 
chemica l s at the Gost of injury to workers , that safety 
is good business and that the company will provide safe 
working conditions. Both the duPont and Monsanto philos -
ophies are wel l stated along these lines. 
It is fe l t that the change in the philosophy of 
management over the past thirty years has been the main 
cause for the eight per cent drop in the Chemical Industry 
Rate during this period (Figure 7 ). A more amazing ex-
amp l e of improvement is shown in Figure 8 where in thirty 
years the Injury Fre quency for t h e Everett Plant of 
Monsanto has dropped from about ninety to l ess than two . 
A written safety policy should be pub lished 
for a ll emp l oyees to see . In a new or revita l ized safety 
program, there wi l l be greater impact if a member of top 
management discu sses it with supervision . This is done 
at Monsanto before each new group of Emp l oyee Sa f ety 
Com..rnitteemen. The e ff e ct wi ll backfire, however, if the 
policy is not practiced. This being one of the pitfal l s, 
it woul d be better to have no written po l icy than to have 
this advers e effect occur . 
B. Fact Finding Procedures 
Facts must be obtained so that the existin g acci -
dent potential a nd hazards are known . These facts can be 
a na lyz ed so that the weaknesses are segregated to d eter-
mine their cause and cure . 
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1. Inspections 
There are various types of safety inspections 
that should be made by a ll members of the organization . 
Merck ' s program best illustrates how a wel l -rounded i n-
spection program should be set up. Frequent periodic 
inspections should be made by members of line management . 
They are most effectiv e when they are "formalized", that 
is when they a r e done in a routine, organized, systematized 
manner with safety , or even one phase of it ( such as the 
guarding of equipment ) as the onl y ob j ective . 
Even the safest plants must be inspected to 
make certain they are satisfactorily maintained. Op-
erating procedures change, equipment a nd bui l ding fac -
ilities deteriorate, and safety d evices become inopera-
tive. Inspect ions have been found to be the most effec -
tive method for finding unsafe conditions . However, this 
e l ement i n a we ll-rounded safety program is often neglec ted. 
Equipment with a high potential hazard, such as pressure 
vesse l s and high speed machinery, should be inspected 
thoroughl y by experts at least once a year. If corro-
sive chemicals are being hand l ed, more frequent inspections 
will be necessary. 
There are many pitfal l s in carrying out this im-
portant e l ement of t he program. The inspection might not 
be performed on schedul e or it might be skipped a ltogether. 
Or, even t hough inspection c h eck list fo r ms have been 
made out, they might be gathering dust in some f i l e . 
Even after the inspection has been made, no resul ts will 
be achieved until c orrective action has been taken . 
Follm'l - up ca n b e difficul t, especial l y where corrective 
action may take a l ong time . A "tickl er " file can be used 
as a reminde r of inspection dates . Fol l ow - up files or 
bulletin boards are used to high l ight incomp l eted rec -
omxnenda tions . 
2. Accident Investigations 
Safe ty programs are set up to prevent accidents . 
In spite of this effort, a ccident s still occur . They 
shoul d not be a llowed t o occur unheeded but should be in-
v es tigated immediately to de t errnine the causes so that 
corrective a ction might be taken to prevent a reccurrenc e . 
Eve n though the injury may be minor, or even if the r e is 
no i njury at all, each accident should be investigated 
sufficient l y to assure supervis i on that the same or a 
similar accident wi l l not happe n again. The higher the 
po t e ntial or actual severity of an accident, the mo r e 
thoroughly the accident shoul d be investigated . 
It is usua l ly advisab l e to have a three - or-four -
man committee investigate immed i a t e l y all lost-time in-
juries , or accidents whi ch have a high potential, even 
though no injury may have resulted from the accident . 
They should report their findings and recommendations in 
writing to higher management. Here is another opportu-
nity f or management to demonstrate their interest and 
support by either h e lping to investigate or by reviewing 
with the committee their report . So that others may profit 
by this experience, it is r e commended that abstracts of the • 
investigation be circul ated among a l l supervision. 
Accident I nvestigation forms and procedures were 
discussed under both IVIerck ' s and Monsanto ' s programs. 
There seemed to be room for improvement in Merck ' s form a nd 
method of ana l ysis. Mon santo ' s method of indicating basic 
ca uses shoul d be foll owed. No allowances should be given 
for "unavoidab l e 11 accidents . 
Simil ar weaknesses exist in accident investiga-
t ions as in inspections . Al l acc idents are not investigated 
thoroughl y enough to e l iminate a recurrence . In many in-
stances a s e rious injury wil l happen before corrective ac -
tion is t aken on the original accident . To overcome this 
v-realmess, management must insist that a proper job be done . 
By requiring t hat a form, simi l ar to I'/Ionsanto ' s Accident 
I nves tigation Form, b e fi l led out , and returned to the 
Safe t y Department, a more compl ete job of investigation 
11J'i ll be done. To fil l out this form properly and to make 
a good investigation requires training and fol l ow-u p of the 
foreman. 
Again if a system for fo llow-up of recommendation 
is not established , they may not b e a ccomp l ished . The 
member of management wh o r ece ives the committee 1 s report 
can require that they fo l l ow -up and r eport aga in when the 
recomrnendations are comp l e t ed . 
3 . Rev i ew of Re cords 
Facts can be obta ined b y r e viewing r e c ords r e l ated 
to the injured man, hi s j ob, a nd the chemica l s and equip -
ment with which h e works . The man 1 s medical record may 
revea l a n und erly ing c a use of the in j ury. J ob a na l ysis 
will show the hazards of the job and whether or not t h e 
man 1 s physica l limitations are incompatib l e vv ith the j ob 1 s 
physica l r e quire ments. 
For facts on chemica ls, there are many sourc es of 
i nformation whic h shou l d be us ed t o a ssure supervision tha t 
chemicals can be handled safe l y . De t ai l e d information on 
ma ny common ch emica l s can be found in the Chemica1 Safety 
Data. Sheets, prepar ed by the Manufac turing Chemists 1 
Associa t ion (Appendix E ) . These g ive the chemica1 and phys -
ical properties, s hipping i nfor mation , un1 oad ing procedures, 
method of safe storage , procedure for hand1ing safely, waste 
d i sposa l a nd h ea lth hazards a nd their contro l . For new 
chemica l s, data may be obtained from the manufa cturer, in-
s ura nc e companies or public h ea lth agencies. DuPont just 
r e c ent l y announced a two mil l ion do l l ar expansion of the ir 
Haskell Lab or a tories for Toxicology and Industria l Medicine, 
which t est s duPont p r oducts for e l iminat i on of h ealth haz-
ards . Unfo rtunat e l y, in the pas t the health hazard of 
many chemicals had not be e n realized. It took serious in-
juries and dea ths to bring pre cautionary methods . 
lj. . Observat ions 
Obs ervations a re t o be differentiated from in-
spect i ons in that this l at t e r are more formalized . Da ily 
obse r vat i ons by the line supervi sor a r e an exc e llent vmy 
in which to obtain facts c onc e rning both unsa f e acts and 
unsafe c ondition s . Here , howe v e r, sinc e no writ ten r eport 
is made, it is usua lly nec essary tha t corre ctive action be 
taken on the spot, or e lse the situation will s lide by un-
corrected . An unsafe a ct does not r ema in static . A good 
supePvisor wi ll correct the man at once . 
An unsafe act may occur many time s without a ny 
accident or injury re sul ting . However, an emp loyee should 
n o t be a llowed to p r ess his luck too far . Unfortunate l y, 
it is difficult sometime s to corre ct a ma n tactfully who is 
doin g a good job but performing an unsa f e act . It is f a r 
ea;sier to l et it s lide or l ook the other way . Too ma ny 
supervisor;s t ake the line of l ea st resistance. 
5. Ra tio De l ay 
The "ratio de l ay " meth od of observation, desc r ibed 
i n Chapter VII demonstrates h ow often unsafe ac t s take 
~ 
p l ace a nd wha t types of unsafe a cts are performed . This 
is a va luabl e tool fo r a n y safe ty progran1, but e specially 
f or swBller p lants where there i s insufficie n t injur y in-
vestigation data to s t atistica lly determine primary areas 
of vJeakness . For small p l ants this t echnique def i nite l y 
should be made a part of t h eir program, to be used as a 
guide for corrective action and for a c l oser appra i sal of 
results rather t han depending on infrequent l y occurring 
lost-time in juries . 
C. Ana l ysis of t h e Facts 
During each individual i nspe ction, investigation 
or observatj_on, an ana l ys is of the facts takes place . 
Facts are gath e r ed , then analyzed for basic causes, weak-
n esses or problems . Possibl e solutions should be thou ght 
out before the corre ctive action is se l ec t ed and ca r ried 
out. Th is same p roc edure whic h is foll owed for the in-
dividua l investigation s hould be follo"'led for the aggregate . 
On t h e back of r1onsanto 1 s Accide nt Investigation 
Form is the accident a na l ysis section . To obtain data for 
this, the accident mus t .b e a nalyzed f or its direct or 
proximate cause and sub cau ses. By combining t h is infor ma -
tion f or a ll injuries during a given period, the Sa f e t y 
Engineer can a na l yze these data a n d d e termine areas which 
need the mos t attention. The data can be classifi ed in 
anr one of the fo llowing gr oups to indicate t o the Safety 
Engineer v-rhere primai'Y effort shoul d be expended : ( l ) 
Departments, ( 2 ) Accident Types, ( 3 ) Accident Causes, 
(4 ) Agencies . 
Accident a na l ys is is a good t oo l for determining 
areas to wor k on. It is good f or measuring results. How -
ever, because it c a n be time consuming, a Safe ty Engineer 
can spend his time mor e p rofitab l e preventing accidents 
through other means . Further, h e is dependent upon the 
data ga thered by the many s uperv i sors i nvestigating i njury 
causes . He must be assured tha t these da t a are c orr ect and 
ana l yzed by each supervi sor on a common bas i s . This means 
training in how to fill ou t the i nvestigation form and 
c l early defining a ll of the terms . 
D. Act ion s to Prevent Accidents 
l . Indo c tr ination a n d Education 
A de f i n ite pr ogram shoul d be estab lished so that 
each emp l oyee n ev? to the c ompa ny or n ev·T t o an j_ndiv idt.ml 
department r eceiv es a f orma l indoctrination . Check lists 
as u sed by Monsanto a nd fvlerc k are a good reminder of the 
points to be c over ed . The following should be included : 
(l) An introduction t o mana gement ' s philosophy t owar d 
acc i dent p revention, ( 2 ) Genera l safety rul es and proce -
dur es , (3 ) The avai l abi l ity and use of persona l prote ctive 
equipment, ( L!- ) Use of f ire ext i nguisher'S, ( 5 ) Medica l and 
health f aci l ities . Al so included for each d epartment 
would be the specif ic chemi c a l hazards of the d epartment 
and how these chemicals are hand l ed safely . 
All of t h e three companies discussed p l ace a 
g r eat dea l o f emphasis on emp l oyee education. However, 
Me r ck ' s i ndoctrination and education program would be a 
good one to f ollow . Al l n ew or transferred men n eed tra in-
ing. I t should n o t be overlooked. 
It is said that ma n is not equipped by nature to 
work i n a chemical p l a n t . But n ovJ he is there, h e has a 
right to expec t tho se in charge to h e lp safeguard his ·wel -
f a re. I'-1ost emp l oyees accept rules or principles wi thou t 
much thou gh t about the r easons on which they a re based. 
Almost invari ab l y an emp l oyee vvi l l p l ace g r eat VJe i ght on 
his chances of not getting hurt, n o t on what w~l l happen 
to him if he should get hurt . 
Whe n the ma n is assign ed to a new j ob , he shoul d 
receive adequate training on the safe way of oper ating . 
nLa,ck of instructions n has been found to be a l ead ing sub 
cau se of industrial a ccide nt s . nif the pupi l hasn ' t 
l eai'ned, the teacher hasn ' t tau ght. n Tel l the emp l oyee 
how to do t h e j ob . Show h im how it is don e . Test him 
to rnake sure he knows h o1ov . Then follo ltJ - up f r e quent l y to 
see tha t h e cont i n u es to do it p roperly. 
Personalized training is emphasized by having a 
separate chapter on it, because it, a long wi th the cor -
r e l ary good human r e lation, is one of the i mportant new 
techniques which gives measurable resul ts . Although it 
is very time c onsuming, here at l eas t the extra time is 
v.Je ll worth the effort . This type of training, even if 
only practiced to the more limited extent to which General 
El ectric had to go because of pressure of production, 
should be an essential part of every safety program . 
Too frequent l y this important e l ement of i n -
doctrination and trainin g is slighted . This is the sub 
cause of too many injuries . It is necessary for super -
vision to write operating procedures, us e indoctrination 
check lists , and train each employee , and it is doubly nee-
essary for higher management to see that this is done . 
2. Operating h~ocedures 
Written operating procedures are one of the 
finer points in an accident prevention program. They are 
a part of the personalized training program since they 
should be vrri tten before it is even undertaken . 
The step - wise procedure should be studied in 
minute detail. For ever y step, the fo llowing should be 
indicated: ( a ) The hazard or danger in that step, ( b ) 
The remedy for the hazard or danger, ( c ) The safe prac -
tice to be followed . 
The detailed study which wri ting an operating 
procedure entails is one of its chief advantages in the 
prevention of accidents . Instructions are often done 
without them . The big things may be covered, but the 
small ones - - overl ooked--cause troub l e . The instructions 
also serve as a standard reminder . The safest method 
should be incorporated in the written procedure so that 
variations will not be to l erated . I f safer methods are 
deve l oped, then they should be made a part of the approved 
p roc edure . 
Specific Safety Operating Procedures shoul d be 
written and well publicized, possib l y in an emp l oyee rul e 
book. Insurance companies have procedures and specia l 
work permits for vJe l ding and acetyl ene burning . The im-
portance of following these procedures , especially of 
having the supervisor r espons i ble personally check the 
area, was emphasized by the disastrous Genera l Motors 
Transmission Division fire. ' '" 'r here should a l so be pro -
cedures on (a ) Entering tanks , (b ) Cl eaning tank s having 
chemicals in them and ( c ) Emergency procedures . 
3 . Su pervisors' Education 
Since first line supervisors are responsib l e 
for the safety of their emp l oyees , t h ey shoul d receive 
training , assistance and encouragement to h e l p t h em 
carry out this function . This may be done through va i ' -
ious types of meetings, conferences, or v.ri th safety films . 
Monsanto ' s program given in Appendix II is a good examp l e 
of a type of supervisors ' training program . In such a 
training program is a - good opportunity for a member of 
"' '" 1 1 
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management in person to exp l ain and discuss the company ' s 
safety phi l osophy. For a better understanding of accident 
prevention techniques, the basic fundamentals- - simi l ar to 
those reviewed in Chapter II- -should be discussed . It 
should be shown that a c c i dents can be prevented by using 
statistics and specific examples. 
There are many subjects which should be covered, 
as indicated earlier in these conclusions: ( a ) Techniques 
of inspecting, (b) Accident investigating and reporting, 
(c) Indoctrinating new employees, (d) Setting up a per-
sonalized training program, ( e ) Writ ing operating proce -
dures, and (f) Conducting safety meetings. (Lists of 
others and detai l ed information can be obtained from the 
Nationa l Safety Counci l.) 
If supervisory safety training is neglected , the 
whole program vJi ll suffer . So many of the other e l ements 
of the program depend on train ed supervisors. Except 
for TI'Ia.nagement Support, Supervisors 1 Training is the most 
important e l ement of a safety program . 
As in the case of emp l oyee education , training 
for supervisors must be continuous l y followed up . I nitia l 
training may be forgotten, procedures and methods may 
s lide. The importance of this vvas pointed out under 
Accident Investigation, where sloppy data may be worse 
than none, a nd where if corrective action is not taken, 
the investigation is of little value . 
4 . Promotion 
Promotion consists of the many general vmys in 
which the accident prevention program is pub l icized . I ts 
main purpose is to malce every emp l oyee "safety conscious 11 ; 
that is, a l ways thinkin g and being reminded of safety . The 
fo llowing media are used: posters, bull etin boards, pub -
lications, exhibits , meetings ral l ys, contest and awards . 
Using the media combined in one safety campaign of one 
subject, they have more effect than separate l y . Two ex-
amp l es of campaigns are given in this thesis--one by 
Monsanto in Appendix C and another by American Cyanamid 
in Appendix F . 
Safety campaigns are a part of the educational 
program, but are presented in a general manner; i . e ., 
p l ant wide . They suppl ement the specific on- the - job 
training. 
The success of any promotion , whether separ -
ate l y used or coordinated on one particul ar subject in a 
campaign , depends upon its frequency of occurrence, its 
variety, and the impact vJhich each e l ement has . 
Of al l the media used , department safety meet -
ings are probab l y the most effective, providing they are 
proper l y conducted . Short weekl y meetings have been 
used s uccessful l y by duPont . Sinc e these mee tings depend 
a great dea l upon the ability of the l eader , it is i m-
por tant that the depar t ment fo r emen r e c e ive training, 
e ncouragement and assista nc e in h o l ding them . Variety 
can be added through change of subject matter , meeting 
type ( i. e ., conference , l e cture , movi e ) and throu g h 
changing t h e leader occasional l y . Meetings should be 
s h ort with p l e n ty of punch . Group partic i pat i on should 
be e ncouraged . Suggestions shoul d be so l icited from the 
g roup . One of the mos t important means of ga ining the 
confidence of each emp l oyee is to take care of each 
e mp l oyee 1 s safety suggestion exped itious l y . Doing so 
has great psych o l ogic a l eff e ct sinc e it has been high-
lighted b e f ore the whole g roup. The suggestion should 
be compl eted as soon as possib l e , or, if i t cannot be done, 
a satisfactory exp l a nat ion shoul d be g ive n to the man . 
1•Jhen no action i s taken OI' no anmver is given, gr eat 
harm is don e . The men soon l ose inte r e st, and get the 
impression that management is not r ea l l y inte r e sted . 
Promotion should be a part o f any we l l-rounded 
program . Peop l e forget and n eed fr equent r eminde rs . 
Good r esult s will be ob ta ined if a varied promotion a n d 
safety campaign pr ogram is carried out . Better r esults 
will be achieved if personalized training is used along 
v1 ith it . 
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5. Go od Human Re l ation s 
In n o phase of industria l phi l osophy has t h ere 
been such a quickening of the consci e nce as in the r0.a tter 
of a cc ident s . This has been due part l y t o a full e r r e -
alization through statistica l s tud i es of t h e enormou s l osses 
thu s enta iled . This does not begin to measure t he hard -
ships and sorrow that a r e invo l ved in individua l c ases . A 
h ead o f a family may ha ve his future earning capacity 
per ma n e ntly lessened . Compensation insurance i s a poo r 
substitute in such cases . 
Th e o l der phi l osophy of management assumed tha t 
the wor ker was suff iciently skil l e d or careful to l ook 
out fo r h imse lf, a nd if h e was in jured because of neg -
ligenc e on his part or on the part of a f e llow wo r ker 
t h e emp l oyer was n o t t o b l ame a nd coul d n ot be ca lled 
upon f or financial c ompensation . Today it is commonl y be-
lieved tha t i t is the emp l oyer 1 s duty to see tha t e v e r y 
pre c a ution is taken to prevent a ccidents of eve r y kind 
a nd that if a n accident does oc cur t he owner must assume 
·the financia l r e sponsibil i t y . 
Mos t a ccide nts a r e c a use d by the fau l t of a 
person . In rec ent years, grea t e r attention has been pa i d 
t o the hu.~11an fac t ors in accident prevention than any other 
factor . App l i ed safety psychology still remains a virg in 
f ie l d of u sefulness. '(.l hat are i t s effects and imp l ications? 
"' 
There are l itt l e data which show the effect o f 
good h"L:t..rna n r e la tions on accident prev e ntion. For one 
thing, good human r e lations and a good safe ty program 
are usua l l y found toge ther . However, there are good 
i ndications that a dv2rse personne l f actors cause a -·.rorsen-
ing in a ccident preve ntion . During p r o l onged turbul ent 
n ego tiations, per iods of strong adverse r eaction to 
cha nges, business r e c e ssions, more accidents are like l y 
to o ccur . rJh.., . S. F . Spe nc e , Direc tor of Sa fety for 
Amer ica n Cyanamid attributes the cause of their inc rease 
in a ccidents in 1953 (Figure 9 in Appendix F ) in their 
p l a nt t o na certain amount of l abor unres t and or ganiza -
tiona l unc ertainty . rr-;:-
A separate p rogram is necessary to i mprove and 
maintain good hmnan r e l ations . Emp l oyees should be kep t 
informed about things that eff ect them . They should be 
made t o fee l that they be l ong, that they ha ve something 
to live up· to, and should be p r oud of their job, depart-
ment and c ompany . They should f ee l free to be ab l e to 
ta l k VIith the ir supervisor . The supervisor shoul d see 
that t h ey r e c e ive recognition for work v.;ell done . 
Nothing around a p l a n t is more importa nt tha n 
t h e people wh o vJO rk in it . JVIa nage rs 1-•Jho think mon ey , 
ma t e ria ls and machines are the only r ea l it i es leave out 
the most i mportant characteristic of a ny succe s sful p ro -
gram-- the understa nding of men . 
Above are discussed the basic essentials to 
be considered for a successful accident prevention pro-
g ram. These elements have been evolved from a study of 
the literature and of the programs of Merck, duPont, 
and.Monsanto . Every chemical company should evaluate 
its own program with regard to these essentials. Are 
they a part of its program? How effectively are they 
being carried out? Where should improvements, changes, 
or additions be made? 
Accident prevention programs must be constantly 
maintained. They must first have management's support 
and second a well-rounded training program beginning 
with supervision . The program must be kept dynamic by 
the use of ever-changing elements or by changing the 
emphasis on the various elements. 
Since accidents can be prevented, it is 
sound management to do so. 
APPENDIX A 
DUPONT 'S "AWARDS FOR NO-ACCIDENT RECORDS" CONTEST 
SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION DIVISION 
SAFETY BULLETIN 
'LOYEE RELATIONS DEPARTMENT 
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 
No. 409 - Revised June 16, 1931 
Revised Dec. 31, 1942 
Reissued February 9, 1944 
Revised Sept. 10, 1951 
Reissued April 23, 1952 
"AWARDS FOR NO-ACCIDENT RECORDS" 
The "Awards For No-Ace ident Records 11 plan, replacing the 
original "President's Prize Plan" of April 1, 1923, was adopted 
January 1, 1928. In January, 1931, the plan was revised to in-
elude plant salary roll employes in the exposure hours. 
During December, 1942, a supplement was issued extend-
ing the "Goals (Classification of Plants and Time Requirements)" 
because of the adoption of the plan by plants employing abnormally 
large numbers of war workers. The 1931 revision was not otherwise 
changed. The addition merely provided comparable requirements for 
plants much larger than those considered at that time. 
The plan has proved to be thoroughly practical for both 
large and small plants or operations, and the large exposure hour 
goals, thought at one time very difficult to meet, have been sue-
cessfully attained many times. 
The plan, including revisions and additions to date, is 
as follows: -
DATE EFFECTIVE 
The "Awards For No- :c ident Records" plan became effec-
tive by Executive Committee a ton on January 1, 1928, replacing 
the "President 1 s Prize Pla n", lt was retroactive in the sense 
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that each Plant started its "No-Accident Record" as of the date 
of its last tabulatable major injury. 
PRIZES OR AWARDS 
Three prizes are made available and are known as the 
"General Managers' Prize", the "President's Prize" and the "Board 
of Directors' Prize". 
GENERAL MANAGERS' PRIZE. 
A prize based on the no-accident record required 
for the old President's Prize. 
PRESIDENT'S PRIZE. 
A prize based on a no-accident record one and 
one-half times that required for the General 
Managers' Prize. 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS' PRIZE. 
A prize based on a no-accident record two and 
one-half times that required for the General 
Managers' Prize. 
The no-accident records which must be established to 
win these prizes will be given bel ow in section entitled "Goals" 
- (Classification of Plants and Time Requirements). 
GOALS. (CLASSIFICATION OF PLANTS AND TIME REQUIREMENTS) 
The g oals f or the se prizes or awards are based upon 
plants, lab orat ories o r construction j obs operating certain defi-
nite leng ths of time, as established in the following table, with-
ou t a tabulatab l e ma j o r i nju r y . The c l as se s are determined by the 
number of e x p os ure h our s ( Pay a nd Sala ry r olls) per month, and 
eac h class i s r equir e d t o operate a certain number of calendar 
• 
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days without a tabulatable major injury, in order to become eligi~ 
ble for any of the prizes. Plants which change from one classifi-
cation to another will be credited with the proper proportion of 
the record achieved in each class. 
The following table g i ves the classes and requirements 
in calendar days* for each of the prizes or awards. 
Genl.Mgrs. President's Board of 
Prize Prize Dir. Prize 
Exposure Hours** per Mo. Class Cal. Days Cal. Days Cal. Days 
Division #1 - 0-500,000 -
400,001 to 500,000 A 150 225 375 
350,001 to 400,000 B 158 237 395 
300,001 to 350,000 c 166 249 415 
250,001 to 300,000 D 182 273 455 
200,001 to 250,000 E 214 321 · 535 
160,001 to 200,000 F 264 396 660 
130,001 to 160,000 G 318 477 795 
100,001 to 130,000 H 406 609 1015 
75,001 to 100,000 I 504 756 126 0 
60,001 to 75,000 J 592 888 1480 
50,001 to 60,000 K 662 993 1655 
40,001 to 50,000 L 724 1086 1810 
30,001 to 40,000 M 810 1215 2025 
20,001 to 30,000 N 940 1410 2350 
10 , 001 to 20,000 0 1074 1611 2685 
up 10 ,000 p 1174 1761 2935 
Division # 2 - 500 , 001 to 4, 000,000 and up -
500 , 001 t o 750 , 000 Q 146 219 365 
75 0 , 001 t o 1,000, 000 R 142 21 3 355 
1, 000 , 001 to 1,500 , 000 s 134 201 335 
1, 500 , 001 to 2 , 000 , 000 T 126 189 315 
2 , 000 , 001 t o 2 ,5 00 , 000 u 118 177 2 95 
2, 500 , 001 t o 3 , 000 , 000 v 110 165 275 
3 , 000 , 00 1 to 3 ,500 , 000 w 102 153 255 
3 , 500 , 001 t o 4, 000 , 000 X 94 141 2 35 
4, 000 , 001 and up y 86 129 215 
Re c ommended min imu m expenditure 
3· 0 0 +· 0 tD .:;,-. b d 
pe r e mploye for prizes $~ $2. 00 $~ 
* Ca l endar day = Midn i gh t t o midnight 
** Tota l pay and sa l ary r o l ls 
3 
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NO-ACCIDENT RECORDS 
The no-accident record required to win any of these prizes 
or awards is based on consecutive calendar days, except that opera-
tions which are completely shut down for more than seven consecutive 
days will have the shut-down period deducted from their records. 
No one of the individual prizes or awards may be won a 
second time without first having won the Board of Directors' Prize. 
In other words, a plant- after having won the General Managers' 
Prize - will not be eligible to win this prize a second time, but 
the goal will then be the President's Prize. Similarly, a plant 
having won both the General Managers' Prize and the President's 
Prize will not be eligible to win these two prizes again, but the 
-goal for that plant will be the Board of Directors' Prize. After 
an operati on has won the Board of Directors' Prize, it may continue 
t o win this prize a second, third, fourth or greater number of 
times by continuing the safety record for a further length of time 
equal to that required to win the General Managers' Prize. If the 
n o - a c c id e nt rec ord of the operation is terminated after having won 
t he Boa rd of Directors' Prize, the operation may start anew in the 
se r ies of prizes, t he first g oal being again the General Managers' 
Prize. 
It should be understood t hat the no-accident record mad e 
in wi nn ing any one of the prizes , if n ot terminat e d by a tabulat-
ab le maj or inju r y , i s c r edi ted toward the nex t h i gher p r ize, in -
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asmuch as the no-accident record required to win any of these prizes 
will al•tlays date from the time of the last tabula table major injury. 
FINANCING 
The cost of the prizes will be borne by the departments 
concerned. Recommended minimum expenditures per employe for prizes 
. - _ .. 
are as follows: $3.00 for the General Managers' Prize, $4.00 for 
the President's Prize, and $5.00 for the Board of Directors' Prize. 
It is further recommended that as far as practicable _expenditures 
be held as near as possible to these amounts in order to prevent 
reaction between units, particularly those in the same locality. 
Increase in the expenditure for the Board of Directors' Prize be-
cause of repeated winning does not , seem to be justified. 
CHARACTER OF PRIZES OR AWARDS 
The nature of the prizes or celebrations is left to the 
decision of the operations winning the awards. However~ the awards 
should be such as will promote the welfare of the employment as a 
whole~ but may take the form of individual prizes to each employe. 
COMPUTING NO-ACCIDENT RECORDS 
In computing the plant no-accident record as it applies 
to the Company's Safety Award Plan~ calculate what percent of the 
prize requirements was reached as of January 1, 1931, on the basis 
of the former plans. Then compute the remaining percent under 
the new plan. The following example outlines calendar days cal-
culations for a plant about to become eligible for the General 
Managers' Prize. 
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General Managers' Prize 
Last Injury - December 31, 1942 
Calendar 
Day 
* Class based on Require-
Exposure Hours per Exposure Hours ment 
Month - (Total Number of Calendar for each 
Pay & Salary Rolls) Days in each Class Class 
Month Hours D c B A 
Jan. 1943 282,342 31 D-182 
Feb. " 347,604 28 C-166 
Mar. " 386,709 31 B-158 
Apr. " 402,485 30 A-150 
May 11 463,532 31 
31 28 31 61 
Percentage requirement for General Managers' Prize 
Percentage completed as of May 31st (151 days) 
Uncompleted requirement 
Percent 
of Days 
Calendar Require-
Daye in 
each 
Class 
31 
28 
31 
61 
151 
ment 
in each 
Class 
17.03 
16.87 
19.62 
4o.6I 
94.19 
100.00% 
94.1~ 5.810 
Plant now operating in Class A - ••calendar Days Requirement" 150 days 
Percentage requirement to complete record 5.81% 
No. of days required (5.81% of Class A requirement - 150 days-
8.7 days) or 9 days · 
General Managers' Prize goal will be reached 
at end of shift on June 9th, 1943. 
*Actual hours worked. 
The Safety & Fire Protection Division, with the consent of 
the General Managers, will act as judge on any questions under 
controversy, as heretofore. 
SAFETY & FIRE PROTECTION DIVISION 
QUEENER, MANAGER 
TO ALL PLANT MANA GERS , LABORATORY DIRECTORS, FIELD PROJECT MANAGERS, 
& DEPARTMENT HEADS. 
APPENDIX B 
MONSANTO SUPERVISOR SAFETY TRAINING SESSIONS 
TO: Plant Managers 
Personnel Managers 
Safety Engineers 
November 2, 1953 
SUPERVISOR SAFETY TRAINING SESSIONS 
In the minutes of the May 1953 Honsanto Safety Engineers• Conference, 
we briefly outlined the Springfield plant•s training program for 
foremen and union stewards which was discussed by Everett Graham. 
We offered to provide a copy of Graham1s discussion outline to 
anyone who desired it. Since we have had a number of requests 
for it, we have run off a copy for each plant. 
This training program was designed to prepare the union for official 
participation in the plant•s safety program but it can be readily 
adapted for use by any plant in the supervisor safety training 
program. 
The one hundred supervisors and fifty union stewards being trained 
were divided into eight groups of eighteen to twenty. Each of the 
sessions were one and one-half hours long and were conducted by 
Everett or his assistant, Guy Booker. In order to encourage !ore-
men and union ste~ards to voice their opinions freely, no higher 
supervision was present at the sessions. It was explained to each 
group that no grievances were to be discussed; that personalities 
should be avoided; and that no issues would be dodged. Everyone 
was urged to speak out whenever he had a question, and that this 
was a conference not a lecture. 
It must be recognized that the outline notes which follow were 
prepared for Everett•s discussion and will necessitate some inter-
pretation on your part in the light of the subject being covered 
in that section of his talk. 
G. L. Gorbell 
Safety Section 
Personnel Relations Department 
SESSION I 
Content 
The first session was devoted to introducing the purpose of the 
training sessions and in outlining what was expected to be accom-
plished. It was emphasized that both management and labor were 
in agreement that accidents should be prevented and that only 
through studying and understanding the problems involved, could 
a solution be reached. 
A history of the safety movement in industry was traced from the 
early days when accidents were accepted as the price of progress 
to the present day of general acceptance that most accidents are 
avoidable. 
Outline 
1. Purpose - this meeting and those to follow --
A. History of safety movement. 
D. Basic factors influencing accident prevention. 
a. Problems facing management. 
b. Problems facing employes. 
C. Particular problems at Springfield. 
D. What we have done. 
E. What we have not done. Why? 
2. Concerning this training program 
A. Nuch of material from Blake • s "Industrial Safety" and 
U" S. Department of Labor publications. 
B. Other sources --
a. National Safety Council 
b. American Standards Association 
c. National Fire Protection Association 
d. Industrial Hygiene 
e. Own experience 
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SESSION I (Cont•d) 
3. Early industry - now power driven machinery. 
A. Electricity and steam - power - industrial use. 
B. Factories - no safe.ty - machine guards, etc. 
4. Everyone accepted accidents - price of -vmrking and progress. 
A. No thought of liability - expect injury. 
B. Indifferent and unaware of economics and personal losses. 
?. Middle l800•s 
A. Community and industry - aware large number accidents due 
to concentration in industrial areas. 
6. Accident cost to individual attracted attention. 
A. Result - First - relieve financial difficulty of persons 
but not control source of injury because injuries still considered 
unavoidable. 
B. Second - legislature - liability - Workmen's Compensation. 
a. First - "Whose fault?" 
b. Now- "No question of fault." 
C. Third --
a. Insurance companies became interested. 
b. Bureau of Labor statistics established data. 
c. Data showed cost of accidents to community. 
7. Early 1900's - a\vareness of real problem - prevention. 
A. Number of injured. 
B. Economic problems - something should be done. 
c. Not much happened immediately. 
1~0 
a. Insurance companies - more deeply interested to protect 
interests so engineers made plant inspections and recom-
mendations to remove hazards. 
8. Result 
A. Industry gradually aware of safety engineering and accident 
costs. 
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SESSION I (Cont • d) 14 
B. 1911 - Hassachusetts 
a. 'ltlorkmen• s Compensation Act. 
b. Raised costs. 
c. Accident prevention methods emphasized. 
c. 1912 - National Safety Council formed to represent industry~ 
insurance company, government departments, railroads. 
a. Purpose - clearing house - methods. 
b. Today - outstanding in all fields of safety. 
9. Promotional activities - National Safety Council. 
A. Community attitude changed - costs to persons, industry. 
B. Results: 
a. Regulations on mechanical guarding. 
b. Insurance companies - engineering department to assist 
industry. 
c. State - factory inspection systems. 
d. Large indus try - establish safety departments, attach 
problem. 
e. Trade associations - safety departments - Hanufacturing 
Chemists• Association, American Petroleum Institute, etc. 
f. Organized labor - safety consultants. 
10. This story - gradual change - 150 year period. 
A. Many factors in accident prevention. 
B. Attitude - important. 
c. Review - early injuries accepted as unavoidable. 
D. Today most accidents avoidable. 
E. Publicity today - radio, press, magazines, etc. 
F. Idea fairly generally accepted but not yet to action stage. 
G. ~fuy do I say that? We will discuss this at the next 
meeting. 
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SESSION II 
Content 
By use of National Safety Council statistics of the national accident 
picture, it was shown that individual attitudes nationwide have not 
been aroused or sold to the point where concert8d action has been 
taken to reduce the high accident toll of the country. 
It was stressed that on or off the job, personal factors play a 
predominant part in causing accidents. 
The basic philosophy of accident prevention was introduced through 
use of the "domino sequence" explanation of the five factors in the 
accident sequence as described in Heinrich•s "Industrial Accident 
Prevention" book. This is also covered in great detail in Session 
II "The Prevention of Accidents" in the Supervisory Safety Program 
issued in 1949 by Monsanto's Management Development Program. 
Outline 
1. Talked last time about history of safety movement ru1d factors 
bringing about awareness of problem but ended by stating that 
although accident prevention idea was accepted by people, it 
hadn•t yet reached the action stage. 
A. Why do I say that? Let•s look at the records 
1950 Deaths from accident: 
At work 
Motor vehicle 
Transportation 
Home 
Public (non-occupational 
non-motor vehicle) 
15,500 
35,000 
3,900 
27,500 
14,500 
Note: School children 5,500 included in above. 
Falls 
Fire 
Suffocation 
Poisons (solids & liquids) 
Gas 
Firearms 
Others 
18.3 per 100,000 persons 
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13,000 
1+,900 
1,4oo 
1,300 
1,300 
1,300 
4,300 
27,500 
SESSION II (Contrd) 
2. 
At work 
Manufacturing 
Public utilities 
Transportation 
Agriculture 
Construction 
All others 
2,600 
300 
1,300 
4,300 
2,300 
4,700 
15,500 
27 per 100,000 workers 
Cost - Wages $800,000,000 
Industry - $1,700,000,000 absorbed in costs 
Hotor vehicles 
Pedestrian 
Collision (motor vehicle) 
Non-collision (overturning, 
running off road) 
Collision (RRTrans.) 
Collision (fixed objects) 
Others 
23 per 100,000 persons 
Only 5% defects in vehicles 
8,700 
12,300 
10,700 
1,520 
1,150 
630 
35,000 
People are not yet convinced. 
A. Why does this accident toll remain high? 
B. Look at industrial accidents. 
c. Look at the hQmg accidents. 
D. Look at the motor fatalities -- it•s easy. 
a. 2o% of cases - alcohol - can STOP. 
b. 5% defect of vehicle. 
c. 22% speeding - can STOP. 
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SESSION II (Cont•Ql 
3. Of cours€, tbere a~e usually several factors involved in any 
accident. 
A. Individual attitudes nationwide not yet DTe sold to the 
point of taking action. · 
B. The same situation exists in industry. 
c. Letts face the situation. 
a. Are we satisfied? 
b. What can we do -- you and I? 
4. Itd like to have you think of this question in the light of 
the present record - i n the light of your own experience - at home, 
at work, on the high,.Tay. 
A. Hmv can we reduce this toll? 
B. 11\'.fhat is an accident?" 
a. "An unplanned occurrence which interrupts or interferes 
with the orderly procedure." 
b. An accident may or may not result in an injury. 
c. Before \ve go ir:to further detail on the various factors 
involved in a;1 accidentl I would like to demonstrate to 
you the factors in the 'Accident Sequence", as taken 
from Heinrich•s "Industrial Accident Prevention". 
5. The Domino Sequence 
A. The five factors in the Accident Sequence. 
a. Background - inheritance, environment. 
b. Defect of person - temper, ignorance of rules, nervous-
ness, physical - eyesight, fatigue. 
c. Unsafe act or unsafe condition. · 
d. Accident 
Links in chain 
e. Injury 
B. By discussion, agree that "unsafe act or unsafe condition" 
is the most easily controllable factor in the sequence. 
C. Letts end today•s session keeping in mind this "Accident 
Sequence". 
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SESSION III 
Content 
In this session the "domino sequence" \'las revie.Jed and the group 
was asked to . list types of unsafe acts and unsafe mechanical condi-
tions and to analyze specific accidents which had occurred at 
Springfield into these two categories. It was shown that accidents 
are usually caused by a combination of unsafe acts and unsafe con-
ditions. 
Outline 
1. You remember that we closed our last meeting with an illustra-
tion of the "accident sequence". Let•s briefly review it again. 
(Outline the factors and the importance played by Domino "unsafe 
act or unsafe condition".) . 
2. Now this Domino "unsafe act or unsafe condition". Can we agree 
that accidents usually are the result of a hazardous condition or 
something a person does or does not do in connection with the situa-
tion or a combination of the two? -- Yes. 
A. Now, let us see if we can look more thoroughly into the 
factors involved in any accident. 
B. Let us see if '\ve can list some of the situations, the physical 
conditions, the particular type of activity being carried out. 
a. Handling n:CJ.terial 
b. Operating machines 
c. Motor vehicles 
d. Using hand tools 
e. Chemicals - harmful substances 
f. 
g. 
h. 
i. 
j. 
c. Any comment as to relative importance? (Injury peculiar to 
industry seldom important. 
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SESSION III (Cont•d) 
D. Accidents may be from unsafe conditions, or from unsafe 
act of the person involved. Now let us go farther. 
. 
E. Letts list some of the unsafe mechanical conditions which 
might exist. (Refer to specific accidents which have occurred 
because of these listed conditions.) 
a. Ineffectively guarded machines, pipes, floor openings, 
calender, styrene cutter, etc. 
b. Poor design - hoist #6 building. 
c. Housekeeping - poor piling, crowded drums falling. 
d. Defective tools, machines or equipment - burns on 
drum rings. 
e. Unsafe buildings - wet slippery stairs. 
f. Ventilation inadequate - lead story. 
g. Light inadequate - light not on. 
h. Improper electrical installation - grounds, wires. 
i. Improper maintenance and equipment. 
j. Unsafe process or procedure. 
k. Inadequate personal protective devices - gloves, cloth 
vs. leather in shipping department. 
1. Equipment in poor repair. 
m. No means of lockout. 
n. Weather. 
o. Non-layouts - arrangements. 
p. Lack of training. 
q. 
(Keep the list of unsafe conditions on the board on 
Personal Causes) 
F. Now let•s look at the unsafe acts. Letts list them too. 
(Refer to specific accidents which have been caused by these unsafe 
acts.) 
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SESSION III (Conttd) 
a. Inadequate instruction - supervisor. 
b. Disobedience of instructions - for k truck. 
c. Taking a chance - short cuts. 
d. Inattention - distractj_on - knocked down. 
e. Mental attitude - tired, angry, indifferent. 
f. Failure to use protective equipment. 
g. Carelessness - breakdown. 
h. Unsafe speed auto, fork truck, running down stairs. 
i. Unsafe position - welder helper. 
j. Horseplay - Shawinigan - empty C02. 
k. Make safety device inoperative. 
1. Violation of lockout procedure - safe procedures. 
m. vlorking on moving equipment. 
n. 
o. None. 
3. Which is the more important? 
Are there any accidents where the unsafe condition or the 
unsafe act alone was the cause of the accident? 
A. Probably very rare. (At this poipt, the probability is 
that some accident story will be brought up for analysis. If so, 
go through with it. Agree that mechanical guarding and so forth 
is one way to prevent faulty behavior from causing an accident.) 
B. Frequently an accident highlights not only a correctable 
condition but also an irregular or faulty act. 
C. Accidents usually are a combination of the two faults. 
- 10 -
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SESSION IV 
Content 
This session . covered a discussion of the methods of controlling 
unsafe acts and unsafe conditions. Job safety analysis was explained 
and a simple job was analyzed using a job analysis sheet to show 
how hazards and precautions are determined. 
Outline 
1. Review 
A. The first and second meetings we talked about the history of 
the Accident Prevention Movement. We showed how the thinking of 
people gradually changed from one of indifference to accidents to 
one of "accidents can be avoided". Even with that, the national 
accident toll is a staggering one. 
B. We went on, during the third meeting, to get a little closer 
to the problem here in our plant. We outlined on the board a list 
of typical activities carried on here during which accidents may 
happen. Then we outlined a series of typical unsafe physical condi-
tions and a list of unsafe acts by persons. Prior to that, we 
demonstrated the accident sequence where we arrived at reasonable 
agreement that the factor of "unsafe condition and unsafe act" was 
probably the easiest factor to control in stopping the sequence 
before the accident happens. 
C. Demonstrate again. 
D. In answer to the question "Which of the two is more impor-
tant?", we finally decided that it was a rare accident where the 
cause was only an unsafe act or an unsafe physical condition. 
Usually the accident is a result of a combination of the two alonE 
with some other factors. 
E. Our big problem then "How can we go about bringing this 
tDomino' under better controi?" 
a. The answer sounds easy: 
(1) Eliminate all unsafe conditions. 
(2) Eliminate all unsafe acts. 
b. Formula for correction of unsafe conditions: 
(1) Remove 
(2) Guard 
(3) vJarn of condition 
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SESSION rl (Cont 'd) 
(4) Report to higher authority 
(5) Follow-up 
c. Formula for unsafe acts: 
(1) Tell - explain 
(2) Show- demonstrate 
(3) Check-up 
(4) Follow-up 
(5) Enforce 
d. Can we or do we correct all unsafe conditions? Ho 
e. Difficult -- Why? 
(1) Not always recognized. 
(2) Not always reported to supervisor. 
(3) Action not always taken. 
f. Why? 
(1) Forget. 
(2) Suggestion no good -- to cover up unsafe act. 
(3) Not enough money available. 
(4) Not in fact a safety item, difference of opinion. 
(5) Impractical - not best way. 
g. But hmv? Can we legislate no unsafe acts? 
h. No. We try to but it doesn•t work. 
(1) Don•t believe safety rule. 
(2) Too much in a hurry. 
(3) Sore at management for some failure to give. 
(4) Not a\Tare of safe practice, lack of instructions. 
(5) Indifference. 
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SESSION IV ( Cont' d) 
(6) Overruled by foreman. 
i. Concerning unsafe acts, there appears to be a great 
deal of responsibility present of one person. People 
have got to completely appreciate this fact. 
j. Concerning unsafe conditions, there appear to be 
several problems. Some under control at our level, 
others under control at higher levels. 
F. We could go on discussing this phase but I think we all 
can now appreciate more completely some of the problems involved 
in controlling this "Domino". 
a. Everybody is involved. 
b. But let•s look a little farther. 
- 50 
c. Are there any steps we can take to make ourselves more 
aware of the fine points or possibly those parts of our job (recall the list of activities last time) where an 
accident can occur? 
(1) "Job Analysis" 
(2) Job Description 
Duties ~ 
~ unsafe position - motions. 
Methods ~ 
Tools - conditons, prope~ type. 
Working conditions - need for respirators. 
Special skills. 
Personal requirements - size. 
Hazards - bumping. 
Lack of head room. 
(3) I•m thinking of these factors also: 
Flying objects ~ 
l How to handle? 
Hot objects l 
Reaching over moving equipment. 
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Off balance position 
Incorrect posture. 
- 51 
Hazardous position in relation to other workers. 
Necessity for electrical grounds. 
(4) What other types of things should we consider? 
(5) How often do we completely look· at our jobs? 
(6) Let•s look at one - drawing a flammable solvent 
from a pipe to a can. (Pass around analysis sheet.) 
2. Operation 
Step-Obtain proper can, 
carry or put on trucks 
Place under spout, pre-
pare to draw 
Open valve 
Close valve 
Remove can to truck 
Hazard 
Burns, eye injury, 
toxic exposure, 
shoes 
Slippery floors 
Slippery floors 
Strain, spillage 
Be sure can is clean 
not slippery, tight, 
proper type 
Ground, goggles, 
respirator, ventila-
tion, survey area for 
other operations 
Take care not to 
splash or spill or 
overflow 
Allow to drain 
Lift properly, firm 
stance, clean floor, 
control drip, se-
curely in truck 
A. That is only a very simple example. Many jobs are more 
complex. 
B. If we, as individuals, are really going to work at the job 
of accident prevention, we have got to do more of this type of think-
ing. 
C. Control of this "Domino" is not simple. vJe have, I think, 
helped at this point to have a realistic look at accident prevention. 
D. Next time, we•ll finish up by looking into accident investi-
gation. 
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SESSION V 
Content 
The final session explained the purpose of accident investigation 
and how necessary it was to determine corrective action. The quali-
fications for appointment to an accident investigation committee 
were discussed. 
Outline 
1. Revie\11 
A. This is the last discussion of the series on some of the 
accident prevention problems. One of the purposes of these dis-
cussions was to see if we could arrive at a more complete, as 
well as a mutual, understanding of the basic philosophy back of 
any safety program. \·le 'Ve talked about the history of the safety 
movement; we•ve examined the typical plant activities along with 
unsafe conditions and unsafe acts; we•ve generally accepted the 
idea that the factor in the accident sequence, labeled "Unsafe 
Condition and/or An Unsafe Act" was the factor most easily con-
trolled. 
B. Last time, we spent a lot of time talking about how we can 
go about controlling unsafe conditions and eliminating unsafe acts. 
Methods of procedure were worked out and generally agreed upon. 
However, we also found that for one reason or another, these methods 
didn•t always work. 
C. The problem of human nature seemed to be the one factor 
which made the control of these problems quite complex. That, plus 
the fact that occasionally there are economic limitations, questions 
of fact or opinions concerning the reality of an unsafe condition, 
makes the problem one not always easy to settle particularly in the 
minds of all of the employes of the Plastics Division. The dis-
cussions, up to this point, have been aimed at, not so much to pro-
vide the answers to many specific situations, but to outline the 
factors \vhich are to be considered when facing the overall problem 
of avoiding accidents and injuries. 
D. Any questions up to here? 
E. Now, let•s look at this business of accident investigation. 
a. \tlhat' s the purpose of an accident investigation? 
b. The only purpose is to discover the hazardous conditions 
and practices so that further accidents from similar 
causes can be prevented. 
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SESSION V (Cont•d) 
(4) Attempt to clarify according to outline worked 
out for investigation. 
(5) Make use of information developed in prior dis-
cussions. 
CONCLUSION 
154 
We have in these discussions attempted to discover some of the 
factors and problems involved in preventing accidents. I think 
you'll agree that the problem as a whole is not one that is a 
simple one to control 100 per cent. I hope that this information 
will help you to work with your fellow men so that we may continue 
to make progress in accident prevention. 
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APPENDIX C 
MONSANTO EYE CAMPAIGN 
~-.n 
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REPORT OF EYE CAMPAIGN, EYERETT, MASS. 
MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY 
NOVEMBER, 1950 
Introduction 
This committee was asked to organize a program during the 
month of November, 1950 to emphasize eye protection. In 
' 
a plant such as ours, with its varied eye hazards, and the 
constant exposure of a large percentage of the personnel, 
the importance of such a program can hardly be overesti-
mated. 
An ana l ysis of eye injuries readily demonstrated that_ the 
victim is almost invariably at fault. Failure to wear the 
proper protective equipment is the biggest single cause. 
A study of the reasons for this failure divided them into 
four classifications: 
1. Lack of knowledge of the hazard. 
2 . Failure to have protective equipment readily 
available. 
3 . Failure to think. 
4. Taking a calculated risk. 
It was our studied opinion that the last two listed were 
those responsible for the bulk of the accidents. 
Outline of Program 
Having defined the sources of trouble, we directed our 
program at the correction of these specific items: 
-A. Lack of Knowledge of the Hazard 
This is a departmental problem since hazards vary 
widely in our p lant. We required inspection of 
each department by its own representatives. Copies 
of these inspections were referred to and checked 
by the general committee. (See Exhibit A.) The 
report was then made the subject of a departmental 
safety meeting . 
B. Failure to Have Protective Equipment Readily Available 
By this we mean the case of the man who realizes 
the hazard~ but does not have his goggles with him 
and rather than delay the job~ goes ahead without 
them . Again we feel that this is a departmental 
problem . In the above mentioned inspection of 
each department ~ we asked that rules concerning 
the wearing of goggles be formulated and suggested 
that carrying such protective equipment at al l 
times was desirable if the exposure fr e quency 
warranted. (See Exh ibit B. ) In instances where 
repe titious exposure occurred~ we suggested that 
face shields be always available for general use. 
The location a nd maintenance of the se shie lds was 
l eft to each department . We further suggested tha t 
a supply of spare goggles be kept by each foreman. 
In order to acquaint each employee with the var-
ious types of goggles~ four permanent display 
~58 
boards were bu~lt. All t ypes of goggles stocked, 
with a descriptive paragraph of each, were attached. 
(See Exhibit C). 
C. Failure to Think 
D. Taking a Calculated Risk 
In these two categories lie the bulk of our poten-
tial accident victims. Included are the men who wear their 
goggles on their hats and honestly forget to pull them down 
and then the men who don't pull them down because (1) "noth-
ing can happen" (2) ''it can't happen to me" and (3) "the 
goggles are uncomfortable". 
Our approach here was admittedly a "scare" cam-
paign. We feel that once a man full realized the 
consequences of eye injuries, all forgetfulness 
and a ll excuse s will be eliminated. Therefore, 
we instituted a "buddy" system wherein everyone 
became "his brother's keeper". \-Je asked that 
each man, on seeing a fellow worker performing an 
unsafe act, remind that worker of the hazard. \'le 
believe excellent results were accomplished. 
We then built a propaganda campaign to emphasize 
the results of carelessness. Naturally all avail-
able posters and handouts were us ed . (Exhibit s D -
K) Props consisting of tin cups, white canes and 
g lass eyes were made available for the departmental 
safety meetings . 
K£ PACT 
The second week a movie entitled "To Live in Dark-
ness" was shown. 
The third week we were fortunate in obtaining the 
services of a young university graduate who is total-
ly blind as a result of an accident. Accompanied by 
his "seeing eye" dog, he toured the plant for three 
days talking to small groups on the difficulties en-
countered by the blind and the value of eyesight. 
(Exhibit L) 
The fourth week a totally blind secretary from the 
National Braille Press spoke at small group meet-
ing s. (Exhibit M). We believe that the contrast 
with the previous week was impressive. In one 
cas e we had a college graduate pointing out the 
difficulties of the blind in obtaining work. The 
second case showed a relatively well-off young woman 
earning a go od living although blind. In either case, 
however, the difficulties under which they live car-
ried a tremendous impact. 
General 
In order to create inte r est , a general safe ty suggestion 
conte st was run. Thre e , fifty-dolla r prizes were awarded. 
It is the opinion of this committee that the contest did 
little to make the p rogram a success. (Exhibits N, 0, P) 
Summary 
In general, we believe the program to have been highly 
successful. Participation approached 100% thanks to the 
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supervisory force, the hourly employees and Local 57. The 
committee did little more than prepare the program which 
lcould never have been carried out without such cooperation. 
The idea of the 11 Buddy 11 system and the direct contact with 
blind people were the highlights of the program. 
It is the belief of this committee that it should not be 
disbanded but should remain intact. Further, it should be 
reconvened at regular intervals to review results. If it 
appears at any time that interest is flagging, we request 
the right to become active again. 
Note : Most of the original Exhibits have been omitted from 
this thesis. The posters and handouts are similar 
to and included those available from the National 
Safety Council. 
APPENDIX D 
ANALYSIS OF MONSANTO'S PROGRAM BY 
MR. GEORGE L. GORBELL 
SAFETY DIRECTOR 
Since it is the purpose of this thesis to try 
to point out the most significant factors which are ac-
countable for the marked improvement in the Chemical 
Industry ' s re cord~ it is fitting to analyze the cause 
o f each company's improvement. Mr . George L. Gorbe ll~ 
Monsanto 's Safety Director~ has done the following com-
prehensive job of analys is of Monsanto's program: 
"There is usually a combination of factors 
involved in the consistent improvement of an accident 
frequency record and this applies to Monsanto's record 
as we ll as anyone else 's. If I ~-vere to analyze Monsanto 's 
accident freque ncy reduction from 1938 up to the present 
day~ I b e lieve that it would be as follows: 
"From 1938 up to and including 1943 our accident 
frequency showed a gradual reduction from 7.58 to 6.28 
which amounts to about a seventeen percent drop. During 
that period of time there was no formal company-wide 
safety program nor e v e n a safety director of the company ~ 
but the plants did have safe ty en g ineers and people in 
the organization responsible for safety. 
"The company's initial step in the direction 
of a company- wide safety program was made in 1943 when 
an experienced safety engineer joined Monsanto as safety 
director for the company. This man did an excellent job 
in laying the groundwork for coordinated activities~ 
safety education, supervisor instruction and applied 
safety engineering. I feel that his efforts were largely 
responsible for the decrease in accident frequency from 
6 .28 in 1943 to 3.29 in 1947, a forty-eight percent re-
duct ion. 
"In 1948 a comprehensive survey and evalua -
tion was made of each plant's safety program. This 
revealed a definite need for better understanding of the 
principl es of accident prevention, a stimulation of in-
centives to accelerate safety activities, establishment 
of wel l-balanced safety programs, better communications 
between plant safety departments, and more assistance 
from the St. Louis safety section. 
"The following steps were taken to supplement 
the existent program : 
1. Balanced Safety Program Principles: At the 
October, 1948 annual safety engineer's conference, 
six principles were set forth and agreed upon as 
j''; cs 
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fundamental to a well-balanced safety program. Every 
plant's program should conform to these principles 
in whatever degree found necessary to create a we ll-
balanced safety program. Acceptance of these prin-
ciples gave each plant a basis to evaluate its safety 
program, and establish definite objectives or goa ls 
to be achieved. 
2. Annual President's Trophy Award: As an incen-
tive for plant managers to promote safety in their 
plants, a -President's Cup award was instituted in 
1930, whereby the plant with the lowest accident 
frequency each quarter was allowed possession of 
the cup for three months. 
As the Company expanded from five 
plants in 1931 to twenty-two plants in 1947, 
this quarterly award plant lost its competitive 
value and significance due to the impracticability 
of holding appropriate award ceremonies every 
three months. To re-establish an effective award 
p lan, the President's Cup idea was retained but 
new awards were purchased, annual presentation of 
the awards were made, and the President's Trophies 
were awarded to the winning p lants with due ceremony 
by the Company President. This has resulted in 
stimulating competition for these trophies by the 
plant managements, which naturally are anxious to 
bring recognition, and the president, to their 
plants. 
3 . Monsanto Accident Prevention Manual: As a pro-
cedure manual and text book for plant safety en-
gineers, a Monsanto Accident Prevention Manual was 
prepared by the Safety Section and issued to all 
genera l managers, production managers, personnel 
directors and safety engineers. In addition to 
~f8 
general accident -and fire prevention information, 
this manual has a section for each of the six prin-
ciples of a well-balanced safety program in which 
specific examples of these principles as developed 
by Monsanto plants are shown. 
4. Safety Engineers' Quarterly : To encourage better 
exchange of ideas and information between plant 
safety engineers, a system was set up by which 
quarterly reports of plant safety activities are 
compiled and issued to the safety engineers as a 
Safety Engineers Quarterly. This has proved to be 
valuable means of communications of ideas between 
plants. 
5. 11 Packaged 11 Safety Programs: To help promote 
safety educational programs and campaigns, 11 pack-
aged 11 programs containing campaign agenda, rna te-
rials for department meetings, announcements, hand-
outs, and posters were prepared and sent to all 
plants in 1948 and 1949. Since then many of our 
plants have prepared and conducted similar safety 
campaigns. They have sent copies of their campaign 
packages to the Safety Section Library and the sixty-
five exhibits we have are used frequently by plants 
for reference purposes. 
6. Monthly Information Bulletin: A monthly accident 
ana Fire Information Bulletin p lan was started 
in 1948 to provide safety engineers with current 
information and material of interest and use in 
their safety programs . 
7. Plant Visits: Each plant is visited by a mem-
ber of the Safety Section at least once annually 
to evaluate the safety program, review activities, 
train safety engineers, and if time permits, to 
inspect premises and operations for safety and 
fire hazards. 
"It is not unreasonable to conclude that the 
reduction in frequency from 1947 of 3 .29 to 1.42 in 1952, 
a fifty-seven percent decrease, resulted largely from the 
seven activities outlined above. 
"The most important factors, I believe, in the 
improvement of an accident frequency record are manage-
ment 's active interest and support of safety, and the 
direct supervisor's acceptance of responsibility for the 
safety and we lfare of his employees. A safety program 
must be well-balanced but if you were to analyze the 
various principles which bring about this state of bal-
ance, you would find that they all lead to an increasing 
awareness and acceptance of accident prevention by em-
ployees, supervisors and top management as part of pro-
duction . Since these principles are interdependent it 
isn't easy to separate them or to evaluate them com-
paratively, but if I had my choice of any one of them 
as the best tool to bring about an improved record, I 
would choose the safety instruction of supervisors . "* 
*24 
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CHEMICAL SAFETY DATA SHEET 
Chemical Safety Data Sheet SD-5 
PROPERTIES AND ESSENTIAL INFORMATION 
FOR 
SAFE HANDLING AND USE 
OF 
NITRIC ACID 
• 
ADOPTED 1946 
REVI SED 1947 
Chemicals in any form can be safely stored, handled or u sed if 
the physical, chemical and hazardous properties are fully under-
stood and tbe necessa ry precautions, including the use of proper 
safeguards and personal protecti ve equ ipment, are observed. 
Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc. 
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NITRIC ACID 
Adopted November, 1946 
Revised 1947 
1. NAME 
Chemical Name: Nitric Acid 
Common Names : Nitric Acid, Aqua Fortis, Hydrogen Nitrate 
Formula: HNOa 
2. PROPERTIES 
2.1 Grades and Strengths. Technical, USP, Pure, CP, Fuming. 
STRENGTHS OF CP NITRIC ACID 
See MCA Manual Sheet T-5 
Manual 
Sheet 
SD-5 
% HN03 Sp. Gr. at ·Be Melting Points 
15.5°C (60 °F) ·c OF 
52.30 1.3303 36 -19.5 -3 
56.52 1.3551 38 -20.0 -4 
61.38 1.3810 40 -24.5 -12 
67.18 1.4078 42 -33.0 -27 
70.33 1.4216 43 -42.5 -45 
80.04 1.4610 45.75 -39.0 -38 
85.70* 1.4796 47 -47.0 -53 
95.11 1.5026 48.50 -52.0 -62 
* Considered "fuming acid" above this strength. "Red fuming acid" is high strength nitric acid 
containing varying percentages of oxides of nitrogen in solution at normal temperatures. At 
elevated temperatures all nitric acid will give off gaseous oxides of nitrogen (commonly called 
"nitrous fumes"). 
2.2 Important Physical and Chemical Properties 
Color: 
Liquid: Water white to light brown. 
Nitric acid vapor: Colorless. 
Gaseous oxides of nitrogen (commonly called "nitrous fumes"): Color varies from colorless 
through shades of yellow and red to dark brown, depending upon the oxides present. 
Odor: Nitric acid vapor is acrid. The oxides of nitrogen have a sweet to acrid odor. 
Boiling Point (760mm) : At 121.6°C (251 oF) a constant boiling mixture of 68 to 68.5 7c HNO~ 
is formed . 
Melting Point: See table above. 
Corrosive: Yes. Will vigorously attack most metals. 
Danger ously Reactive: Will react readily with most chemicals. Strong nitric acid in contact 
with wood or other cellulose products may cause fire. 
Hygroscopic : Yes. 
Light Sensitive: Water white acid becomes amber to brown depending upon strength of acid 
and exposure. 
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2.3 Hazardous Properties 
2.3.1 HEALTH HAZARDS (See 8. Health 
Hazards and Their Control). 
Liquid nitric acid, nitric acid vapor, and cer-
tain of the oxides of nitrogen (the so-called 
"nitrous fumes") are highly toxic, being capable 
of producing severe injury or death. if handled 
improperly. The extremely toxic oxides of nitro-
gen are formed whenever nitric acid comes in 
contact with certain heavy metals or with any 
organic material, such as wood, cloth, and paper. 
The toxic effects seen in industry are rarely due 
to nitric acid alone or to a single one of the 
gaseous oxides, but usually result from a mix-
ture of the toxic compounds. 
Since each of these chemical compounds, 
when acting alone, is capable of producing 
effects somewhat different from those produced . 
by the other substances, the signs and symp-
toms of toxicity, as seen in industry, vary in 
character and severity according to the compo-
sition of the noxious substance, i.e., the per-
centage of liquid nitric acid, nitric acid vapor, 
and j or nitrogen oxides in the mixture. There-
fore, in cases of poisoning, any of the following 
effects may appear with varying degrees of 
severity: 
(a) Effects due primarily to the nitric acid 
component of the mixture. Corrosion of body 
tissues on contact, including those of the phar-
ynx, esophagus, and stomach; itching of the 
skin or mucous membranes; painful burns; 
chronic sores with subsequent scarring; eye 
injury with possible loss of eyesight; hoarse-
ness; gastro-intestinal and respiratory signs 
and symptoms. 
(b ) Effects due primarily to the gaseous 
oxides in the mixture. The most serious dam-
age is to the lungs, resulting typically in the 
following sequence of events: (1) immediate, 
but frequently unsuspected, injury to respira-
tory tissues; (2) a period of from 5 to 30 
hours after inhalation, during which time .the 
worker exhibits virtually no symptoms of the 
pulmonary injury, but may feel extremely fa-
tigued and show signs of abnormally low blood 
pressure; ( 3) subsequent severe congestion of 
the lung (i.e., pulmonary edema), in which the 
patient literally "drowns in his own fluids." 
(This cycle is frequently preventable by ade-
quate treatment as soon as inhalation of 
gaseous oxides is suspected and before symp-
toms appear-see section 8.4.1.2.1). The signs 
and symptoms of toxicity due to inhalation of 
the oxides of nitrogen, the appearance of which 
4 
is frequently delayed in the manner just de-
scribed, are: headache, dizziness, lassitude, 
nausea and vomiting, bluish color of skin and 
mucous membranes, anxiety, difficult breathing, 
choking, suffocat ion, and sometimes death. 
For detailed description of health hazards 
and their control, see section 8. 
2.3.2 FIRE HAZARD (See 6. Handling, 
6.2 Fire Hazard). 
3. USUAL SHIPPING CONTAINERS 
Nitric acid is classified by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission as a corrosive liquid. As 
such, it must be packed in ICC specification 
containers when shipped by rail, water, or 
highway, and all of the ICC Regulations regard-
ing loading, handling, and labeling must be 
followed. 
3.1 Type and Size 
Glass bottles, 5 pint maximum, individually 
inclosed in tightly closed metal cans cushioned 
therein with sufficient incombustible mineral 
material , with cans packed in wooden boxes, 
ICC Spec. 15A, 15B, 15C. 16A, or 19A; or in 
wooden barrels or kegs, ICC Spec. llA or llB, 
for nitric acid exceeding 1.49 specific gravity 
(47.75°Be). 
Glass bottles, 5 pint maximum, in wooden 
boxes, ICC Spec. 15A, 15B, 15C. 16A, or 19A; 
or in wooden barrels or kegs, ICC Spec. llA or 
llB, for nitric acid not exceeding 1.49 specific 
gravity (47.75 ° Be). 
Boxed glass carboys, 6.5 gallon capacity, ICC 
Spec. 1D, for nitric acid of not over 1.43 
specific gravity (43 .61 ° Be). 
Glass carboys, 13 gallon maximum, ICC Spec. 
1A or 1C. for nitric acid of not over 1.43 spe-
cific gravity ( 43.61 o Be). 
Stainless steel drums, returnable, 55 gallon 
maximum, ICC Spec. 5C for nitric acid contain-
ing not over 1/ 2 per cent hydrochloric acid 
nor over 5 per cent sulfuric acid. 
Aluminum drums, or aluminum-lined steel 
drums, returnable, 55 gallon maximum, ICC 
Spec. 42B, 5X, or 42 (if made and marked 
prior to October 1. 1930), for nitric acid over 
1.46 specific gravity (45.75 ° Be) only, and 
containing not more than 0.1 per cent of hydro-
chloric acid and not more than 1 per cent sui-
Nitric Acid Ma nufactu ring Che mis ts' Associat ion , I nc. Manual 
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furic acid or more than a trace of the lower 
oxides of nitrogen. 
Tank cars, ICC Spec. 103C or 103C-W for 
nitric acid containing not more than 1 per cent 
of sulfuric acid and not more than 0.1 per cent 
of hydrochloric acid. 
Tank cars, ICC Spec. 103C-AL (Aluminum 
alloy tanks), are authorized for shipment of 
nitric acid of 95 ro or greater strength. 
For certain specified mixtures of nitric acid 
and sulfuric acid (mixed acid), tank cars, cargo 
tanks, tank trucks, metal barrels or drums, 
glass carboys and glass bottles which meet ICC 
specifications must be used. (See section 267 
of the ICC Regulations). 
3.2 Label or Identification 
3.2.1 Each container (including tank cars) 
should carry an identifying label or stencil. 
3.2.2 The Manufacturing Chemists' Asso-
ciation recommends the following in addition to, 
or in combination with, any label warnings re-
quired by statutes, regulations or ordinances. 
(See page 6.) 
3.2.3 Each drum, and each box containing 
inside containers, must bear the ICC white 
ACID label. 
3.2.4 Tank cars, and railroad cars carrying 
one or more containers of nitric acid must 
bear the ICC DANGEROUS placard. 
3.3 Disposal and Return Precautions 
3.3.1 Before returning shipping containers 
to suppliers, observe usual precautions regard-
ing complete drainage of contents and properly 
close all openings. 
3.3.2 Follow ICC R egulations regarding 
condition of empty containers and labeling; 
and condition of empty cars and placard re-
quirements before returning to the shipper. 
3.3.3 BOTTLES. Before returning bottles 
to the shipper, they must be stoppered, and 
the ICC white ACID labels on th e cases must be 
removed, obliterated, destroyed, or completely 
covered by a square white EMPTY label. 
3.3.4 CARBOYS. Before carboys are re-
turned, they must be completely drained, gas-
kets r eplaced. and stoppers replaced and wired 
as outlined in MCA Manual Sheet C-2 and as 
required by ICC Regulations. The ICC white 
ACID labels must be removed, obliterated, 
5 
destroyed, or completely covered by a white 
EMPTY label. Under no circumstances should 
carboys be used for any other liquid. 
3.3.5 DRUMS 
Certain instructions, such as those for Hand-
ling, Storing, Venting, and Removal and Re-
placement of Body Plug in MCA Manual Sheets 
D-30 (for Shippers) and D-31 (for Consignees) 
are applicable to the special drums used for 
nitric acid. 
Before drums are returned to the shipper, 
they should be completely drained, and all open-
ings must be properly closed. The ICC white 
ACID labels must be removed, obliterated, 
destroyed, or completely covered by a white 
EMPTY label. Under no circumstances should 
drums be used for any other liquid. 
3.3.6 TANK CARS 
3.3.6.1 As soon as a tank car is completely 
unloaded, the unloading connections must be 
removed and all closures made tight. 
3.3.6.2 Return empty tank cars as prompt-
ly as possible, in accordance with instructions 
received from the shipper. Shipper's routing 
instructions should always be followed strictly. 
3.3.7 If container is to be scrapped, wash 
out thoroughly and neutralize with soda ash 
or lime before scrapping. 
4. UNLOADING AND EMPTYING 
4.1 Health Hazards (See 8. Health Hazards 
and Their Control). 
4.2 Fire Hazard (See 6.2 Fire Hazard). Nitric 
acid in contact with organic materials such as 
sawdust, excelsior, wood scraps, burlap bags, 
cotton waste and rags may cause fire. Further-
more, oxides of nitrogen, which are very in-
jurious to health, result from such contact and 
are generated when nitric acid comes into 
contact with wooden floors or some metal 
surfaces. A void spills when unloading and 
keep space around unloading operations clean. 
Do not use organic materials to absorb spilled 
acid. (See 6.3 Spills and Leakage, 6.3.2 and 
6.3.3). 
4.3 Tank Cars 
Protective clothing should consist of brimmed 
felt or treated fiber hat, chemical goggles, rub-
ber gloves, hightop safety shoes (these are 
Manual 
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CARBOY LABEL 
NITRIC ACID 
DANGER! CAUSES SEVERE BURNS 
DRUM LABEL 
VAPOR EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS 
MAY CAUSE NITROUS GAS POISONING 
Do not breathe vapor. 
Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing. 
In case of contact, immediately flush skin or eyes 
with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes; 
get medical attention. 
Spillage may cause fire or liberate dangerous gas. 
CARBOY HANDLING AND STORAGE 
Before moving carboy be sure closure is securely fastened. 
Loosen closure carefully. 
Keep out of sun and away from heat. 
Never use pressure to empty. 
Completely drain carboy before returning. 
In case of spillage. flush with plenty of water. 
NITRIC ACID 
DANGER! CAUSES SEVERE BURNS 
VAPOR EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS 
MAY CAUSE NITROUS GAS POISONING 
Do not breathe vapor. 
Do not get in eyes, on skin, on clothing. 
In case of contact, immediately flush skin or eyes 
with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes; 
qet medical attention. 
Spillage may cause fire or liberate dangerous gas. 
DRUM HANDLING AND STORAGE 
Keep plug up to prevent leakage. 
Keep drum out of sun and away from heat. 
Relieve internal pressure when received and at least weekly 
thereafter by slowly loosening plug. Retighten immediately. 
Never use pressure to empty. 
Keep lights. fire and sparks away from drum openings. 
Drum must not be washed out or used for other purposes. 
Replace plug after each withdrawal and return with empty drum. 
In case of spillage. flush with plenty of water •. 
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available in rubber) and woolen outer clothing. 
Rubber acid suits should be worn when con-
necting or disconnecting the car. Water in 
ample quantity must be immediately available 
at the unloading station (see 6.10 Safety 
Showers and Washing Facilities). 
4.3.1 Unloading operations should be con-
ducted by carefully instructed reliable em-
ployees, under adequate supervision. 
4.3.2 See that train or engine crew ac-
curately spots the car at the unloading line. 
The unloading track should be level. 
4.3.3 Derails should be placed at one or 
both ends of the unloading track approxi-
mately one car-length from the car being un-
loaded, unless the car is protected by a closed 
and locked switch or gate. 
4.3.4 The hand-brake must be set and 
wheels- blocked at the time car is placed for 
unloading. Metal "caution" signs should be 
placed fore and aft of the car, fastened to the 
track, preferably near the entering switch, 
as a warning to persons and switching crews 
approaching the car. These signs must not be 
removed until the car has been unloaded and 
all fittings disconnected. Signs should be of 
size no less than 12" by 15" painted light blue 
and bearing the legend in white: "STOP TANK 
CAR CONNECTED"; the Gothic letters in the 
word "STOP" to be four inches high and the 
others two inches high. Enameled signs with 
stand are standard equipment, available from 
safety equipment dealers. 
4.3.5 Shipper's instructions for unloading 
should always be followed, and all caution 
markings on both sides of tank or dome should 
be read and observed. 
4.3.6 In the event of a leak· in tank car or 
fitting, immediately telephone or wire the sup-
plier for instructions. (See 6.3 Spills and 
Leakage) . 
4.3.7 Under no circumstances should the 
acid connection be removed until all pressure 
in the car tank has been released through the 
safety valve. Should the operator fail to re-
lease all pressure before disconnecting the acid 
line, he may be seriously injured from spurting 
acid. 
4.3.8 COMPRESSED AIR USED FOR 
DISCHARGE OF LADING 
4.3.8.1 Under no circumstances should air 
pressure in excess of 30 pounds per square inch 
be used for unloading tank cars. Use of air 
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beyond this pressure constitutes a hazard and 
may result in tank damage or possible bursting. 
If 30 pounds air pressure is not adequate for 
unloading, a centrifugal type acid pump should 
be used. 
4.3.8.2 Compressed air must be as free 
as possible from oil, excess moisture and foreign 
matter. To insure this, the air supply should 
be taken from the TOP of the air receiver 
(reservoir) preferably located neal&':t.he unload-
ing spot. This receiver should be drained at 
regular intervals. If the receiver is located 
more than a few feet from the car spot, an oil 
and water separator should be installed in the 
air line adjacent to the tank car. 
4.3.8.3 Tanks are tested hydrostatically 
to sixty pounds per square inch, and so certified 
by stencilled markings on both sides of the 
tank, as required by the ICC Regulations. 
THESE STENCILLED MARKINGS HAVE NO 
RELATION WHATSOEVER TO THE PRES-
SURE USED FOR UNLOADING. The shipper 
with full knowledge of the characteristics of the 
product transported, restricts the unloading 
pressure to 30 pounds to insure safety. 
4.3.9 Discharge connections must be de-
tached immediately after tank is unloaded. Un-
loader must stay with the car throughout the 
unloading operation and until all discharge 
fittings are disconnected and car fittings re-
placed. 
4.3.10 Should any hazardous conditions 
arise, immediately close air supply, consult the 
foreman, and do not ·reopen until repairs or 
adjustments have been completed. 
4.3.11 UNLOADING OPERATIONS 
Unloading operations should be carried 
out strictly in the following sequence: 
4.3.11.1 Relieve any internal pressure in 
the tank car through the safety valve, using 
care to avoid breathing any vapor released, and 
gradually releasing the pressure that may be 
accumulated so as not to carry acid spray with 
the air and vapor. 
4.3.11.2 Carefully remove the air inlet 
nozzle cover. Be prepared to release pressure 
gradually during this operation, in case the· 
safety valve has failed to operate for some 
reason. Samples should be taken through the 
air inlet opening by means of a stainless steel 
rod with a dipping device built into the bot-
tom end. 
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4.3.11.3 Remove acid pipe cap or plug and 
connect plant acid line. 
4.3.11.4 Make pipe connection from plant 
air line to the air connection on the tank car 
dome. The air line must have a pressure re-
ducing or safety valve set at not over 30 pounds, 
also an air gauge and valve to release car tank 
pressure when emptied. The valve for releas-
ing pressure should be located so that it can be 
reached in an-emergency such as discharge line 
failure. 
4.3.11.5 Apply air pressure slowly until 
there is normal flow of acid into the storage 
tank; then adjust air pressure and maintain 
until the car tank is completely empty. A drop 
in pressure and the sound of air rushing through 
the discharge pipe indicates that car tank is 
empty. Continue the flow of air until the dis-
charge line is completely empty, then shut off 
the air, open the relief valve, and allow the 
acid pipe to drain. 
4.3.11.6 Disconnect plant air fittings from 
the air inlet on the car and replace nozzle 
cover. 
4.3.11.7 Do not disconnect the acid line 
from the tank car until the car tank is at 
atmospheric pressure and sufficient time given 
to permit complete drainage of line to the car 
tank or storage tank. 
4.3.11.8 Carefully disconnect plant acid 
line from the discharge pipe fitting and tightly 
replace blind flange. 
4.3.12 REMOVAL OR REVERSAL OF 
PLACARD. The four 10-%." by 10-%." ICC 
DANGEROUS placards on sides and ends of 
the tank car must be removed, or reversed (if 
in metal placard holders), by the party dis-
charging the tank car. The empty tank car 
must be offered to the receiving carrier either 
without placards, or preferably with four ( 4) 
DANGEROUS-EMPTY placards (See ICC 
Regulations, Sections 562 and 563) . 
4.3.13 INTERNAL WASHING. Under no 
circumstances should water or other liquid be 
introduced into car tan,ks by consignee, nor 
should any employee be permitted to enter an 
empty tank car for any purpose whatsoever. 
4.3.14 RETURN OF EMPTY CARS (See 
3.3.6 Return of Tank Cars). Return empty 
tank cars as promptly as possible, in accord-
ance with instructions received from the ship-
per. Shipper's routing instructions should al-
ways be followed strictly. 
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4.4 Drums 
4.4.1 Certain instructions, such as those for 
Handling, Storing, Venting, and Removal and 
Replacement of Body Plug in MCA Manual 
Sheets D-30 (for Shippers) and D-31 (for Con-
signees) are applicable to the special drums 
used for nitric acid. 
4.4.2 Protective clothing should consist of 
brimmed felt or treat ed fiber hat, rubber gloves, 
chemical goggles, rubber aprons, and rubber 
safety toe-cap shoes. 
4.4.3 Inspect drums for loose plugs and 
signs of leakage or damage before moving. 
Set aside for special handling if damage is 
found. Tighten loose plugs. 
4.4.4 In case of concentrated acid stored 
in aluminum drums, severe corrosion will be 
induced at bung opening from dilution with 
atmospheric moisture if there is any leakage at 
this point. Inspect at frequent intervals. 
4.4.5 AVOID ROUGH HANDLING OF 
DRUMS. Do not drop. Drums should be 
handled carefully to and from their place of 
storage. Before emptying contents, substan-
tially support the drums and block them to 
prevent movement. 
4.4.6 To remove the body plug, place bung 
up, and use a pipe wrench or plug wrench with 
a long handle. Stand to one side and face away 
during the operation. After plug starts, give 
one full turn. If accumulated internal pres-
sure vents, allow it to reduce to atmospheric 
pressure; then only should the plug be loosened 
further or removed. 
4.4.7 DO NOT BREATHE VAPOR. 
4.4.8 Loosen plugs of stored drums weekly, 
especially in hot weather, to release pressure 
that may build up in drum. 
4.4.9 Drums should be emptied by gravity 
only with the use of a faucet or safety siphon 
fabricated of material resistant to nitric acid. 
Application of pressure to the drum for this 
purpose is extremely dangerous and should 
never be attempted. 
4.5 Carboys 
4.5.1 The instructions for handling carboys 
in MCA Manual Sheets C-1 (for Shippers) and 
C-2 (for Consignees) should be followed. 
4.5.2 Protective clothing should consist of 
brimmed felt or treated fiber hat, rubber gloves, 
chemical goggles, rubber aprons, and rubber 
safety toe-cap boots or shoes. 
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~ .5.3 Caref1_1lly inspect all carboys on re-
ceipt and set aside any damaged ones for special 
handling. 
4.5.4 Be sure closures are securely fastened 
before moving either filled or empty carboys. 
4.5.5 Place a cap or boot over the neck of 
the carboy before moving it. 
4.5.6 Use specially designed hand-trucks 
for transporting individually boxed carboys 
about the plant. Do not use hooks. 
4.5.7 Never handle carboys by the closure 
or neck of bottle. 
4.5.8 Never "walk" a carboy on the edge of 
the box. 
4.5.9 When removing full or empty boxed 
carboys from storage tiers, trucks or cars and 
when stacking full or empty carboys, the 'neck 
of the bottle should never be tilted toward the 
workman. 
4.5.10 Filled boxed c3rboys of nitric acid 
should not be tiered more than two carboys high. 
Empty boxed carboys should be stored on their 
side, not over four tiers high, in such manner 
that the necks will not protrude into aisles or 
passageways. 
4.5.11 When opening carboys, always keep 
the hands and face to the side and never over 
its neck. In the case of 13 gallon carboys, ICC 
Spec. 1A or 1C, the recommended method of 
removing the wire holding the stopper in place 
is to use a wire cutter, (preferably the face 
type). Never attempt to remove the wire by 
twisting or prying; to do so will frequently 
break the neck of the bottle and injure the 
workman. The screw cap closure on 6.5 gallon 
carboys, ICC Spec. 1D, should be turned only 
slightly to relieve any accumulated pressure 
before it is completely removed. ' 
4.5.12 Never use air pressure to empty car-
boys. Use a tilter especially designed for the 
purpose, or a safety siphon fabricated of ma-
terial resistant to nitric acid. 
4 5.13 It is mandatory that empty boxed car-
boys be completely drained before presentation 
to the transportation company. Failure to do 
so is in violation of ICC Regulations. Do not 
wash out. 
4.6 Glass Bottles 
Employees handling glass bottles should be 
equipped with proper personal protective equip-
ment (See 8.3 Personal Protective Equipment). 
Handle the bottles carefully to avoid breakage. 
Do not breathe vapor. 
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5. STORAGE 
5.1 Hazards 
5.1.1 HEALTH HAZARDS (See 8. Health 
Hazards and Their Control). 
5.1.2 FIRE HAZARD (See 6. Handling. 
6.2 Fire Hazard). 
5.1.3 CORROSION. Special stainless steels 
or aluminum are used for storage of nitric acid 
depending upon the concentration. For details 
consult supplier or equipment manufacturers: 
5.1.4 TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS. 
Store out of direct rays of sun and away from 
sources of heat. Wide range of temperature 
change induces vaporization and condensation 
and may result in attack on container. 
5.2 Conditions of Storage 
5.2.1 TYPE AND MATERIALS OF CON-
STRUCTION FOR TANKS AND PIPELINES. 
. Nitric ~cid ~P to and including 99 % strength 
Is stored m stamless steel equipment. Aluminum 
equipment is used for the higher concentra-
tions. However, nitric acid may be stored as 
mixed acid (a mixture of concentrated nitric 
and sulfuric acids) in steel tanks. 
DRUMS. Stainless steel drums are normal-
ly used for nitric acid up to 99 % in strength. 
Aluminum drums are authorized by ICC for 
strengths above 80.04 % . Aluminum drums 
should be checked frequently for leakage at 
the bung, as corrosion will take place at this 
point if "breathing" occurs. Store drums with 
body plugs up, on skids, on a properly drained 
site. They should be stored out of the direct 
rays of the sun in order to minimize tempera-
ture changes of the contents, and resulting ten-
dency to breathe. 
CARBOYS. Carboys should be stored pre-
ferably under cover on floors of acid resistant 
brick or concrete treated with sodium silicate. 
Suitable drainage facilities should be provided. 
I~ necessary to store outdoors, keep out of 
direct rays of the sun and provide suitable dun-
nag~ for I;>ottom tier to rest on, in a properly 
dramed site. Store where contents will not 
freeze. 
5 2.2 ISOLATION (See 6. Handling, 6.2 
Fire Hazard for details). Store away from 
other chemicals and organic materials. 
5.2.3 ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS 
Electrical fixtures should be of vapor-proof 
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type to protect against corrosive action qf acid 
vapor. All wiring should be in tight rigid metal 
conduit. 
5.2.4 VENTING OF TANKS. Each stor-
age tank should be provided with a vent of 
sufficient size and discharging at a point out-
doors where no working areas can be con-
taminated. 
6. HANDLING 
See MCA Manual Sheets on carboys 
(C-1 for Shippers and C-2 for Cqn-
signees) . Certain instructions, such 
as those for Uandling, Storing, Vent-
ing, and Removal and Replacement of 
Body Plug in MCA Manual Sheets D-
30 (for Shippers) and D-31 (for Con-
signees) are applicable to the special 
drums used for nitric acid. 
6.1 Health Hazards (See 8. Health Hazards 
and Their Control). 
6.2 Fire and Explosion Hazards 
6.2.1 Nitric acid will vigorously attack most 
metals. Strong nitric acid may cause spon-
taneous ignition when in contact with organic 
materials such as sawdust, excelsior, wood 
scraps and shavings, paper, cotton waste, and 
burlap bags. If fire starts, it will burn vigor-
ously. 
6.2.2 Corrodes most metals, especially iron 
or steel, depending upon strength of acid. 
6.2.3 May cause explosion when in contact 
with hydrogen sulfide and certain other 
chemicals. 
6.2.4 Nitric acid or its vapor will, under 
certain conditions, nitrate wood, wood cellulose, 
cotton and similar organic materials, lowering 
their ignition temperature and greatly increas-
ing their flammability. 
6.2.5 When storing, isolate from turp~ntine, 
carbides, metallic powders, and combustible 
materials. 
6.2.6 Safeguard against mechanical injury 
of containers. 
6.3 Spills and Leakage 
6.3.1 Spills may result in large quantities 
of nitrogen oxides being emitted. Use extreme 
caution when approaching such an area, and 
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when flushing down and neutralizing. Be sure 
to ventilate completely all gases. 
6.3.2 Do not leave spilled nitric acid un-
attended. All spillage should be removed im-
mediately by flushing the contaminated area 
with copious quantities of water; do not use 
combustibles such as cloths, sawdust, or other 
organic materials for "mopping up". Use per-
sonal protective equipment (See 8.3) as indi-
cated by the circumstances. 
6.3.3 In case of accidental spilling of nitric 
acid, it should be washed away with lar~e 
quantities of water. Absorbent combustible 
materials, especially sawdust and other organic 
materials, should never be used for this pur-
pose. Clean sand or other noncombustible ma-
terial should be used only if water is not avail-
able or if its use is impossible for other reasons. 
In case of accidental formation of gaseous ox-
ides of nitrogen, the room should be evacuated 
without delay. It should be entered only by 
specially qualified personnel familiar with the 
potential dangers of gaseous oxides and pro-
vided with proper personal protective equip-
ment. Adequate ventilation should be provided 
and the source of the toxic gases removed. 
6.4 Employee Education and Training 
6.4.1 The cooperation of the employee 
should be enlisted in the safety program, thus 
making the engineering and medical controls 
more effective. 
6.4.2 New employees should be instructed 
carefully as to the hazards of handling nitric 
acid before being placed on the jcib. 
6.4.3 All employees should be acquainted 
thoroughly with the location, purpose, use and 
maintenance of personal protective equipment . 
.(See 8.3). They should also be taught when 
and how to use this equipment and be trained 
in its use. 
6.4.4 All workers should be familiar with 
the location of safety showers, drinking foun-
tains, and hose lines. (See 6.10 Safety 
Showers and Washing Facilities). 
6.4 .5 Employee education should emphasize 
the vital need for proper use of personal pro-
tective equipment (See 8.3) and for safe 
handling of nitric acid. 
6.5 Personal Protective Equipment (See 8.3). 
6.6 Engineering Controls 
6.6.1 Operations where the formation of 
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gaseous oxides of nitrogen on a large scale may 
occur should be housed in one-story buildings. 
In case this is impossible, ea~ily accessible exits 
should be provided to permit rapid evacuation 
of the area (See 6.3.3). Special emergency 
ventilation may be required, arranged to be 
started in the event of the rapid formation of 
large quantities of gaseous oxides. 
6.6.2 The design of process piping and 
equipment is highly specialized. The technical 
problems of designing equipment, providing 
adequate ventilation and formulating opera-
tional procedures which insure maximum se-
curity and economy, can be handled best by 
engineers and safety experts. If in doubt, con-
sult supplier. 
6.6.3 It is essential for safety, that equip-
ment be used and maintained as recommended 
by the manufacturers. 
6.6.4 Nitric acid should be kept in a closed 
system, properly vented. 
6.7 Ventilation 
6.7.1 Workrooms where nitric acid is han-
dled should have ventilation adequate to reduce 
the concentration of nitric acid vapor to less 
than 25 p.p.m., and nitrogen oxides to less 
than 25 p.p.m. 
6.7.2 Since the gaseous oxides are heavier 
than air, hoods and down-draft exhaust sys-
tems should be used where general ventilation 
is inadequate. Such systems should be inspected 
regularly at frequent intervals. 
6.8 Tank and Equipment Cleaning and Repairs 
6.8.1 Tank cleaning should be under the di-
rection of thoroughly trained foremen who are 
fully familiar with all of the hazards, and the 
safeguards necessary for the safe performance 
of the work. 
6.8.2 Entering any tank to make repairs, or 
for thorough cleaning, may be hazardous re-
gardless of the material which the tank former-
ly contained. In addition to the precautions 
generally recommended for tank work, such as 
procurement of written approval of supervision, 
testing for oxygen deficiency, use of rescue 
harness or life belt and life line, provision of 
grounded equipment in good condition for port-
able lights and power tools, and stationing of 
"watchers" outside of the tank entrance; addi-
tional precautions are recommended as follows: 
(a) Disconnect and blank off all connecting 
lines. 
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(b) Drain the tank as completely as pos-
sible. 
(c) Wash thoroughly with running water 
any sludge and residues that cannot be 
drained; fill the tank completely with 
water and drain out; add soda ash or 
lime in sufficient quantity to neutralize 
any residual acid. If necessary, repeat 
this operation. 
(d) Before entering tank, a test should be 
made by a qualified person to determine 
i~ further washing is necessary, and if 
mtrogen oxides are completely absent. 
(e) Test also for oxygen deficiency. 
(f) Provide adequate fresh air supply. 
(g) Use proper personal protective equip-
ment. (See 8.3 Personal Protective 
Equipment). 
6.8.3 Be sure tank can be left by original 
entrance. 
6.8.4 One man on outside of tank should 
keep the men in the tank under observation and 
at least two men should be available to aid 
in rescue if any of the men in the tank are 
overcome. 
6.9 Repackaging 
6.9.1 In filling drums, carboys or smaller 
containers from storage tanks, and filling 
smaller containers from drums or carboys, ob-
serve the following precautions : 
6.9.2 In emptying tank cars, drums, or car-
boys, follow instructions outlined in 4.3, 4.4 
and 4.5. 
6.9.3 Use proper personal protective equip-
ment (See 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) . 
6.9.4 Provide adequate ventilation (See 6.7 
Ventilation) by a mechanical exhaust system 
with intake over the container being filled and 
designed to draw the gas away from the face 
of the operator. 
6.9.5 The interior of packages being filled 
should be inspected for cleanliness. Portable 
lights used for this purpose ·should be in good 
condition, grounded, and vapor-proof. 
6.9.6 Prior to filling drums, make sure 
that all plugs except the one being used are 
tight. 
6.9.7 Leave proper outage. 
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6.9.8 Use ICC specification containe;rs (See 
3.1 Type and Size) and label them as re-
quired by the ICC Regulations, affixing ade-
quate warning labels to each container (See 3.2 
Label or Identification). 
6.9.9 Openings should be properly closed. 
6.10 Safety Showers and Washing Facilities 
6.10.1 Working areas, storage rooms, and 
unloading areas should be well supplied with 
deluge type safety showers, easily accessible, 
plainly marked and controlled by quick open-
ing valves. These should be capable of supply-
ing large quantities of water under moderately 
high pressure. Small hose lines (garden hose) 
connected to a clean water line, and drinking 
fountains for washing the eyes are , recom-
mended in addition to the showers. Pails of 
water should be available. 
6.10.2 Blankets should be located near the 
safety showers. 
7. WASTE DISPOSAL 
7.1 Dilute and neutralize before disposal. 
7.2 bo NOT flush down drains where the 
acid will eventually pollute streams, city 
sewage systems, etc. 
8. HEALTH HAZARDS AND THEIR 
CONTROL 
This section includes not only recognized 
first aid procedures and information of in-
terest to the layman, but also suggestions 
which may be of value to the attending 
physician. 
8.1 Hazards 
8.1.1 GENERA.L. Nitric acid and certain 
of the gaseous oxides of nitrogen (commonly 
called "nitrous fumes") derived from it are 
highly toxic and are capable of producing 
severe injury or death if carelessly handled. 
The presence of nitric acid, the gaseous 'oxides, 
or a combination of the liquid and the gases, 
depends upon the temperature, humidity and 
whether or not nitric acid comes in contact 
with certain other materials such as heavy 
metals or organic compounds. Although the 
toxic effects of nitric acid and of the oxides 
differ somewhat, it is a combination of these 
compounds which is commonly encountered in 
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industry, since the oxides may be formed 
wherever nitric acid is used, and these may 
be mixed with nitric acid vapor. 
The signs and symptoms of poisoning by 
the oxides of nit rogen or nitric acid vapor de-
pend upon the concentration of the several toxic 
substances, the percentage composition of the 
gaseous mixture, the duration of exposure, and, 
to some extent, the susceptibility of the in-
dividual. The severity of injury by the liquid 
acid depends on its concentration, the location 
and size of the body area exposed and the dur-
ation of contact. 
8.1.2 GASEOUS OXIDES OF NITROGEN 
8.1.2.1 Identity. Gaseous oxides of nitro-
gen consist of n itric oxide (NO), nitrous oxide 
(N•O), nitrogen trioxide (N.Oa), and nitro-
gen dioxide (NO, and N·O·) The chemical r6-
lationship of these compounds is so close that 
they seldom occur separately in industry. 
Toxicologically the most important are the two 
forms of nitrogen dioxide, N.o. (colorless) and 
NO, (dark brown), both highly toxic. The 
color of the gaseous oxides varies from color-
less to chocolate brown, depending upon the 
percentage composition of the mixture, which 
is largely a function of temperature. A toxic 
concentration of the gaseous oxides may there-
fore be dark brown or colorless. The intensity 
of color is not an indicator of the degree of 
danger. 
8.1.2.2 Occurrence. Gaseous oxides are 
formed when nitric acid comes in contact with 
certain metals, e .g., copper, brass, zinc, or with 
any organic material, e.g., wood, sawdust, cloth, 
paper. Gaseous oxides are also present in haz-
ardous concentrations during various opera-
tions, e.g., burning of certain explosives, nitra-
t ion processes, processes involving the use of 
nitric acid, electric · arc welding, soldering, the 
operation of Diesel engines, and many other 
operations. 
8.1.2.3 Toxicity of the Gaseous Oxides. 
The oxides of nitrogen are among the most 
treacherous of the noxious gases because of 
the insidious onset of severe, and sometimes 
fatal, lung congestion (pulmonary edema). 
The breathing throughout an 8 hour period of 
as little as 25 p.p.m. (American Standards As-
sociation) may cause pulmonary signs and 
symptoms after a virtually asymptomatic in-
terval of from 5 to as much as 48 hours. De-
layed pulmonary edema may follow exposure to 
higher concentrations (100 to 150 p.p.m.) for 
only 1/ 2 to 1 hour, while a few breaths of the 
gaseous oxides in ·a concentration of 200 to 
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700 p.p.m. will produce severe pulmonary dam-
age which may result in fatal pulmonary edema 
after 5 to 8 hours or more have elapsed. 
Since the gaseous oxides ,may cause little 
or no discomfort at the time of inhalation. the 
exposed worker may continue his work feeling 
quite well, although severe lung damage has 
been suffered, the signs and symptoms of which 
become distressingly obvious several hours 
later. By that time irreparable damage may 
have been done. The typical sequence of events 
in poisoning by gaseous oxides is : ( 1) a few 
"whiffs" of the seemingly innocuous gas; (2) 
no immedi$lte reaction or very slight respira-
tory discomfort, headache, dizziness, or lassi-
tude (occasionally nausea and vomiting may 
occur immediately after exposure, or a noisy, 
asthmatic type of breathing may appear which 
usually disappears within a half hour) ; the 
victim frequently persists in his work; (3) 
five to eight hours after the exposure, perhaps 
after the worker has returned home, another 
person notices the patient's lips or ears have 
become blue (cyanotic); (4) there follow rapid-
ly increasing difficulty in breathing with ac-
celerated, somewhat irregular, respiration and 
choking, dizziness, headache, increasing blue-
ness of the lips or eat;s (severe cyanosis), a 
sensation of tightness in the chest and anxiety, 
resulting primarily from oxygen hunger; oc-
casionally there are also nausea and vomiting, 
lassitude, and palpitation. Untreated cases fre-
quently terminate fatally as a result of severe 
pulmonary congestion, i.e., from suffocation. 
Physical examination within a short time 
after the exposure reveals an accelerated 
respiratory rate, decreased vital capacity, gen-
erally suppressed breath sounds with occasional 
moist rales and rhonchi, low blood pressure, 
and an elevated blood platelet count (10-100 'ft; 
above normal), all of which signs become more 
pronounced in inadequately treated cases as 
time passes. 
Before pulmonary edema actually develops, 
there may be an abnormally low systolic, dias-
tolic, and pulse pressure. After pulmonary 
edema develops, the pulse pressure rises greatly 
and may exceed 50 to 60 mm of mercury. 
It is most important to realize that prompt, 
efficient treatment (See 8.4.1) during the 
quiescent or asymptomatic stage may avert com-
pletely the delayed, serious, and sometimes fatal, 
sequelae of pulmonary injury caused by in-
halation of gaseous oxides. 
8.1.3 NITRIC ACID. Nitric acid is a high-
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ly corrosive liquid. In contact with the skin, 
mucous membranes, eyes, gastro-intestinal tract 
or respiratory mucosa in liquid form (as a 
spray or splash) or as a vapor, the acid pene-
trates the tissues, causing destruction propor-
tionate to the concentration of the solution or 
vapor and the duration of contact. 
8.1.3.1 Skin and Mucous Membranes. 
The first symptoms are smarting, itching, and 
yellow discoloration. If the acid is not removed 
at once, intense pain and severe burns result. 
Chronic ulceration may follow with subsequent 
permanent scarring. Dilute solutions may cause 
chronic skin irritation. 
8.1.3.2 Eyes. Severe and possibly per-
manent damage to the eyes, with possible loss 
of eyesight, will result from failure to treat 
nitric acid burns of the eyes promptly. Symp-
toms of burning and watering demand imme-
diate treatment. (See 8.4 First Aid and Medi-
cal Care). 
8.1.3.3 Oral Intake. Taking nitric acid 
by mouth results in the corrosion of those 
tissues of the gastro-intestinal tract with which 
it comes in contact. There is a yellow discolora-
tion of the oral mucosa and severe swelling of 
the mucous membranes of the pharynx 
(throat) which may interfere seriously with 
swallowing and breathing. Strong acid not re-
moved promptly from the stomach may corrode 
the gastric mucosa so extensively as to result 
in a perforation or rupture of the stomach wall, 
and cause death. In these cases there is severe 
pain, nausea, and vomiting of "coffee grounds" 
material. (See 8.4 First Aid and Medical 
Care). 
8.1.3.4 Inhalation The vapor of nitric 
acid, frequently including some of the gaseous 
oxides (8.1.2), produces a choking sensation 
when inhaled and causes irritation of the eves 
and respiratory tract. Prolonged breathing. of 
such gases may result in chronic bronchitis, 
hoarseness, erosion of the teeth, and a feeling 
of weakness. 
8.2 Prevention and Control 
8.2.1 GENERAL MEASURES. Certain 
principles governing the prevention of injuries 
and the control of hazards are common to nitric 
acid, nitric acid vapor, and gaseous oxides of 
nitrogen. These are: 
8.2.1.1 Ventilation. The maximum con-
centration permissible for an 8 hour exposure 
period is 25 p.p.m. A concentration of 100 to 
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150 p.p.m. is dangerous for exposures of only 
1/2 to 1 hour, and 200 to 700 p.p.m. may pro-
duce fatal injury after exposure for a few 
minutes. Periodic examinations of the air in 
rooms where gaseous oxides might possibly ap-
pear should be made to avert concentrations in 
excess of 25 p.p.m. (See 6.6 Engineering 
Controls and 6. 7 Ventilation). 
8.2.1.2 Employee Education. (See 6.4 
Employee Education and Training) 
Employees working in those processes 
which use nitric acid and under conditions in 
which gaseous oxides might be produced should 
be impressed with the insidious nature of gase-
ous oxide poisoning, i.e., delayed lung conges-
tion, and with the necessity for reporting to the 
medical department at once any suspected ex-
posure. It would be well for the company to 
sup:gly a folder to such workers explaining the 
hazards of nitric acid and gaseous oxides and 
listing the precautions necessary to prevent 
poisoning. Such a pamphlet may be prepared 
by the plant physician from the information 
given on these sheets. 
Employee education should emphasize the 
vital need for proper use of personal protective 
equipment (8.3) and for safe handling of 
nitric acid. (8.2.2). 
8.2.1.3 Preplacement Physical Examina-
tion. 
The following groups of individuals have 
been found unduly susceptible to the harmful 
effects of nitric acid and gaseous oxides, and 
. should not be assigned to processes where such 
exposure exists : 
(a) those with chronic lung diseases, e.g., 
tuberculosis, bronchiectasis, asthma, and 
pollinosis ; 
(b) old people; 
(c) chronic alcoholics ; 
(d) those who are debilitated from any 
cause; 
(e) any who have be~n gassed previously; 
(f) those with diminished cardiac reserve. 
Preplacement examinations should include 
a chest X-ray, electrocardiogram and a spiro-
gram to indicate the worker's normal vital ca-
pacity, which tracing may be used after possible 
exposure to gaseous oxides as a standard for 
comparison with post-exposure tracings to de-
termine a significant decrease in vital capacity 
and to gauge subsequent recovery. 
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8.2.1.4 Periodic Physical Examination. 
Those who are exposed regularly to the oxides 
of nitrogen and nitric acid should be re-ex-
amined every 90 days at least. Physical ex-
aminations should be required also when signs 
or symptoms suggestive of poisoning appear, 
i.e., headache, loss of appetite, ulcers of mucous 
membranes, defective vision, unusual tooth de-
cay, unexplained lassitude, weight loss. The 
physician should examine carefully the eyes, 
oral mucosa, teeth, gums, upper and lower res-
piratory tract, and the circulatory system. 
8.2.2 SPECIFIC MEASURES 
8.2.2.1 Gaseous Oxides and Nitric Acid 
Vapor. All the general measures for the pre-
vention and control of hazards apply (See 
8.2.1). Even in the absence of symptoms, a 
worker must not be permitted to return to 
work for at least 24 hours after a suspected ex-
posure, because of the potential danger of 
developing severe edema of the lungs. This 
complication can be averted in most cases by 
the routine administration of 100 % oxygen, 
preferably exhaled against positive pressure, to 
any individual suspected of having inhaled 
gaseous oxides. This method of oxygen inhala-
tion is most efficacious immediately after the 
exposure, during the asymptomatic period. It 
is much less effective after symptoms of pul-
monary edema have appeared. For this reason, 
workers must be impressed strongly with the 
necessity for reporting at once to the medical 
department all possible exposures to gaseous 
oxides. (See 8.4.1 First Aid, Oxides of Nitro-
gen) . 
8.2.2.2 Nitric Acid. See 8.2.1 for gen-
eral measures for the prevention and control of 
the hazards of nitric acid. It is most important 
that nitric acid be kept from contact with 
metals (especially copper, brass, zinc) and or-
ganic materials, e.g., paper, wood, sawdust, 
cloth, with which it reacts chemically to form 
the insidious oxides of nitrogen. 
8.3 Personal Protective Equipment 
8.3.1 GENERAL. No personal protective 
equipment can be substituted successfully for 
safe working conditions, adequate ventilation, 
and intelligent handling of dangerous com-
pounds by workers who are well informed con-
cerning safety precautions. Such equipment 
may protect the individual wearing it, leaving 
others exposed to the 'noxious gases or corrosive 
acid. Equipment requires regular inspection, 
cleaning and replacement. This is especially 
true of industrial gas masks, since the canister 
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contents become exhausted. The insurance of 
correct use of personal protective equipment 
requires education of the worker in the proper 
employment of the materials available to him 
and careful supervision. 
8.3.2 INHALATION. Employees who may 
be exposed to dangerous concentrations of nitric 
acid vapor or to gaseous oxides, as in tank 
cleaning and repairs, in intermittent opera-
tions where general ventilation is not practical, 
for minor operations, such as cleaning up spilled 
liquid, in cases of failure of equipment, or in 
operations where nitric acid is used or pro-
duced, or where gaseous oxides may be formed, 
should be provided, when indicated, with proper 
eye and respiratory protection as follows: 
(a) Suitable gas tight safety goggles. 
(b) Rescue harness and life line for those en-
tering a tank or enclosed storage space (See 
6.8 Tank and Equipment Cleaning and Re-
pairs). 
(c) Hose masks with hose inlet in a vapor-
free atmosphere; air line masks with proper 
reducing valve and filter (suitable for use only 
where conditions will permit safe escape in case 
of failure of the compressed air supply) ; or 
self-contained breathing equipment with stored 
oxygen or air (such equipment allows greater 
mobility but requires more highly trained men). 
(d) Gas masks approved by the United 
States Bureau of Mines with canisters approved 
for use in gaseous oxides should be used only 
when there is no atmospheric oxygen deficiency 
and in strict compliance with the instructions 
issued with the mask. 
8.3.3 CONTACT WITH SKIN, MUCOUS 
MEMBRANES, AND EYES 
To aid in preventing dermatitis. burns, or 
other effects of direct contact of nitric acid with 
the skin, mucous membranes, or eyes, employees 
should be provided, when indicated, with: 
(a) Protective clothing. 
(b) Goggles where there is danger of 
splashing. 
Protective creams do not afford adequate 
protection. 
Facilities for washing should be avail-
able for immediate use (See 6.10 Safety 
Showers and Washing Facilities). 
The most effective protection against nitric 
acid burns is its careful handling to prevent 
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contact of the acid with the body. 
8.4 First Aid and Medical Care 
8.4.1 OXIDES OF NITROGEN 
8.4.1.1 Genera~ Principles. The main 
treatment objective is to maintain an adequate 
supply of oxygen to the tissues. To do this, 
the congestion of the lungs (pulmonary edema) 
which follows inhalation of gaseous oxides after 
5 to 8 hours or more must be prevented, if 
possible, or at least minimized, and oxygen must 
be supplied as soon as possible in amounts ade-
quate to maintain the normal color of the skin 
and mucous membranes. The method recom-
mended for oxygen administration is described 
in the following section. A physician should 
be called immediately, the type of exposure and 
the exact location of the patient being explained 
to him. 
8.4.1.2 Specific Actions 
8.4.1.2.1 PROPER OXYGENATION AND BED 
REST. As soon as there is any indication of 
poisoning from gaseous oxides, carry the pa-
tient (do not allow him to walk!) to an uncon-
ta~i!lated atmosphere, disperse any crowd, and 
fac1htate breathing by loosening the clothing 
around the neck and chest. Artificial respira-
tion should not be given unless breathing has 
ceased. It is at this time, i.e., in the "quiescent" 
asymptomatic period immediately after inhala~ 
tion of the gaseous oxides, and at an aid sta-
tion in the vicinity of the place of exposure, if 
possible, that the inhalation of 100 7o oxygen, 
preferably exhaled against positive pressure of 
not more than 6 em (about 2% inches) of 
water, should be started to prevent the develop-
ment of pulmonary edema. This may be effected 
readily by connecting by tubing the outlet valve 
of a snugly fitting face mask to a water bottle 
inserting the end of the tube to a distance of 
not more than 6 em below the surface of the 
water. The water pressure resisting exhala-
tion should be adjusted to the patient's toler-
ance by varying the depth of the end of the 
tube below the water's surface. The patient 
sh.ould breathe the 100 % oxygen for thirty 
mmutes out of every hour for six hours. If 
breathing appears normal, there are no signs 
of pulmonary edema, and the patient is com-
fortable at the end of this time, oxygen inhala-
tion may be discontinued. Bed rest should be 
enforced for at least 24 hours, during which 
time the patient should be under the observa-
tion of a physician or other experienced per-
sonnel to insure resumption of oxygen inhala-
tion should respiratory symptoms appear. If 
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the patient remains free of symptoms, he may 
be permitted to return to work after 24 hours. 
Under no circumstances should an employee re-
turn to work before he has been examined by 
the plant physician or other physician who is 
familiar with the hazards involved, and has 
been found free of residual signs of injury. 
Those cases which develop pulmonary edema, 
signs and symptoms of other injuries, or inter-
current infection should be treated by the 
physician according to accepted principles of 
therapy appropriate to the patient's condition. 
8.4.1.2.2 MEDICATION. Since the ex-
citement and apprehension which accompany 
inhalation of gaseous oxides are due in great 
part to lack of oxygen, those symptoms usually 
disappear when adequate oxygen is supplied 
in the manner already described. Mild an-
algesics and sedatives, such as acetylsalicylic 
acid or sodium bromide, may be given if thought 
by the physician to be desirable, but medica-
tion is usually unnecessary when adequate oxy-
gen (preferably exhaled against a positive 
pressure of 6 em of water) has been adminis-
tered immediately after exposure. Since mor-
phine depresses the respiratory center, its use 
in gaseous oxide poisoning merely handicaps 
further· .an already embarrassed respiratory 
system. Therefore, morphine should not be 
used. Because of their depressant effect on 
respiration, barbiturates should never be given 
in cases of poisoning with gaseous oxides, and 
sulfonamides should not be given initially be-
cause of the possibility of adverse effects on 
the hemoglobin, i.e., methemoglobin formation, 
with resultant increase in the oxygen deficiency 
of the tissues. If required for the control of 
secondary infection, these drugs may be used 
later at the discretion of the physician in the 
absence of signs of circulatory collapse and 
anoxia. Cardiac and respiratory stimulants 
will be found unnecessary when the underlying 
oxygen deficiency has been corrected and are not 
recommended. In certain relatively rare cases 
in which the patient has responded to the irri-
tation of the gases with laryngospasm or 
bronchospasm, so that the respiratory passage-
way is obstructed, the medication of greatest 
value is nebulized adrenalin solution (1 :100). 
This is inhaled until the functional spasm has 
been relieved and respiration is unobstructed. 
8.4.1.2.3 LABORATORY TESTS. The phy-
sician will find the following tests useful in 
appraising the patient's clinical course: 
(a) periodic spirograms to indicate changes 
in the vital capacity; 
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(b) periodic chest X-rays, not only to deter-
mine the amount of pulmonary ·edema, 
but also to aid in the early detection of 
any intercurrent pulmonary infection; 
(c) oxygen saturation of arterial and ven-
ous blood; 
(d) methemoglobin determinations. 
8.4.2 NITRIC ACID 
8.4.2.1 Contact with Eyes. If nitric acid 
has entered the eyes, tney should be flushed 
promptly and copiously with fresh, cool water 
for at least fifteen minutes, after which period 
the patient should be transported immediately 
to a place where definitive treatment is avail-
able. An ophthalmologist should be consulted. 
Under no circumstances should oils or greasy 
ointments be placed on or instilled in the eye. 
Irrigations with cool water should be continued 
until a physician is seen. 
8.4.2.2 Skin Contact. All contaminated 
clothing should be removed. The affected skin 
areas should be washed thoroughly with large 
quantities of cool water. Under no conditions 
should salves or ointments be applied to skin 
burns during the 24 hour period following an 
injury. During this time the burns should be 
covered with dressings kept wet continuously 
with a mild oxidizing-reducing solution, e.g., 
saturated solution of sodium thiosulfate. For 
persistent cases of skin irritation or for serious 
burns of the skin or mucous membranes a 
physician should be consulted immediately. 
8.4.2.3 Taken Internally 
If a person has swallowed nitric acid, he 
should drink immediately copious amounts of 
lukewarm water, soapy warm water, or milk, 
depending upon which one is most readily avail-
able. This may be followed by a demulcent, such 
as thin flour paste, raw egg white or corn starch 
paste. If the patient does not vomit spontane-
ously, give a mild emetic, e.g., a tablespoonful of 
mustard in a glass of warm water, or tickle the 
back of the throat. Repeat this procedure at 
least three times. It is advisable to leave some 
of the demulcent in the stomach after vomiting 
has ceased, to act as a "fixing agent" and diluent 
of any residual acid, thus preventing additional 
injury. 
CA UTION: Since a severely corroded pharynx, 
esophagus (throat), or stomach may be perfor-
ated eas ily, do not insert a stomach tube or use a 
stomach pump except by order of a physician 
and with the exercise of extreme care. 
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Summon a physician at once. Until his 
arrival and after satisfactory vomiting has been 
induced as directed above, keep the patient abso-
lutely quiet and comfortably warm, but not 
overheated. Give oxygen against positive pres-
sure during expiration if there is a possibility 
that gaseous oxides have been inhaled. (See 
8.4.1). Do not give any medication except by 
order of a physician. 
The medical information in this publication has been supplied by the Medical Advisory Committee 
of the Manufacturing Chemists' Association. 
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CHEMICAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS 
Acetaldehyde Manual Sheet SD-43 ____________________________ __ ________ 30 cents 
Acetic Acid Manual Sheet SD-4L _____________ ____ ________ _______ __ 30 cents 
Acetic Anhydride Manual Sheet SD-15 ____________________ __ __ __ __ ________ __ 25 cents 
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Anhydrous Ammonia (Revised) Manual Sheet SD-8 __________________________________ __ _ 25 cents 
Aniline Manual Sheet SD-17 __ ______________________________ ___ ___ 25 cents 
Aqua Ammonia Manual Sheet SD-13 ...... ------ ------------------------ 25 cents 
Benzene Manual Sheet SD-2 -------- ------- ----- --··· ____ _______ 30 cents 
Betanaphthylamine Manual Sheet SD-32 ....... ·------------------ ----------- 25 cents 
Bromine Manual Sheet SD-49 ___ ___ ___ _______________ ____ _________ 25 cents 
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Carbon Disulfide Manual Sheet SD-12 __ ____ __ ______ __ ___________ __ __ ____ __ 25 cents 
Carbon Tetrachloride Manual Sheet SD-3 --------------------------- ---------·25 cents 
Caustic Potash Manual Sheet SD-10 ____ __ __ __ ______ ____ ____ __ __ __________ 25 cents 
Caustic Soda Manual Sheet SD-9 --- ------------------------------ -- - 25 cents 
Chlorosulfonic Acid Manual Sheet SD-33 ----------------------- --________ ___ 25 cents 
Chromic Acid Manual Sheet SD-44.. __________________ ____ ______ _______ 25 cents 
Cresol Manual Sheet SD-48 ----------------------------------- - 25 cents 
Dimethyl Sulfate Manual Sheet SD-19 ____ __ _______ ___ _____ ____ ___ ________ _ 25 cents 
Ethyl Chloride Manual Sheet SD-50 .... --------------------------------- 25 cents 
Ethyl Ether Manual Sheet SD-29 ........ -------· _________ __ __ ______ 25 cents 
Ethylene Dichloride Manual Sheet SD-18 ----------·····-··-------- --------- 25 cents 
Ethylene Oxide Manual Sheet SD-38 ---··--·-----·····-·-------·------- 30 cents 
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Hydrogen Sulfide Manual Sheet SD-36 ----·----·---···-------------------- 25 cents 
Methanol Manual Sheet SD-22 ·----------··-···------··-------·-·-- 25 cents 
Methyl Bromide Manual Sheet SD-35 .............. ................. _____ _ 25 cents 
Methyl Chloride Manual Sheet SD-40 ___________ ····-··-----------------··30 cents 
Nitric Acid Manual Sheet SD-5 ----- ------····-··-·------·-------- 30 cents 
Nitrobenzene Manual Sheet SD-2L ............ ------·--··-- --.: ..... 25 cents 
Paraformaldehyde Manual · Sheet SD-6 _______ _ --·······------------------ - 25 cents 
Perchloroethylene Manual Sheet SD-24·----·----·· ········----------------- 25 cents 
Perchloric Acid Solution, Preliminary Manual Sheet SD-1L __ __ ------------ ·····--·---·---·- 25 cents 
Phenol Manual Sheet SD-4 ---- ·-·· ··---- -------------------·-·- 25 cents 
Phosphoric Anhydride Manual Sheet SD-28 ---------··-·--·--- --------------· ·· 25 cents 
Phosphorus, Elemental Manual Sheet SD-16 ----------· ·····------ -------------- 25 cents 
Phosphorus Oxychloride Manual Sheet SD-26 ___ ______________ ________ ___________ 25 cents 
Phosphorus Trichloride Manual Sheet SD-27 ____ ________ _________________ ________ 25 cents 
Sodium Chlorate (Revised) Manual Sheet SD-42 ----- ------ -------------------- ---- -- 25 cents 
Sodium Cyanide SD-30 __________________ ______ _________ ____ 25 cents Manual Sheet 
Sodium, Metallic SD-47 -· ·--·------------------------------ 25 cents Manual Sheet 
Sodium and Potassium Dichromates SD-46 ·········---------- -- -------------- - 25 cents Manual Sheet 
Styrene Monomer (Revised) SD-37·----------------------------------- - 30 cents Manual Sheet 
Sulfuric Acid (Revised) SD-20 __ ____ ______ ___ ____ __ __ ______ ___ ____ _ 25 cents Manual Sheet 
Tetrachloroethane SD-34 .... --------------- --------- -------- - 25 cents Manual Sheet 
Trichloroethylene SD-14 ....... .............................. 25 cents Manual Sheet 
MANUALS OF STANDARD and RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 
Manual L-1 Warning La bel s . -----------------__ __ ___________ -·-· ···-·-------- -------- ...... ... $1.00 
The Chemical Safety Data Sheets, and a complete list of publications 
including manual sheets on unloading tank cars, drums, and carboys when 
filled with certain chemical products may be secured from the 
MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS' ASSOCIATION, Inc. 
246 Woodward Bldg., 15th and H Sts., N. W. 
Washington 5, D. C., U.S.A. 
Please send remittance with order. 
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APPENDIX F 
AMERICAN CYANAMID's 11 SAFETY RmUNDER WEEK 11 
On the following pages are excerpts from a special 
promotiona l campaign, "Safety Reminder Week", carried out by 
the Azusa Plant of American Cyanamid. It is included in this 
thesis because it is an excellent example of a safety campaign. 
;It is a forc e ful far-reaching presentation. 
Figure 9 shows Cyanamid's injury rates for recent 
years . 
-I-
INTRODUCTION 
As stressed in the program guide for Cyanamid 
Safety Reminder Week~ this period at t h e Azusa Plant was 
us ed to consolidate and l end impetus to the continuous 
year-round program of safety observance . The time was 
used to ''remind" the supervisory force as well as the 
p l ant and office employees of the vital nature of safety 
prac tice s on the job and off~ a n d to recall to everyone 's 
attention the various safety facilities always available 
to them at Azusa. 
Th e fo llowing pages are c onc erned with a descrip-
t ion of the program of Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week as it 
was carried out at the Azusa Pla nt. 
PUBLICITY AND PROMOTION 
On October 8, 1952, the initial announcement of 
the Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week was made to the plant 
supervisory staff in the monthly Plant General Safety Meeting, 
with stress being placed on the importance of the objectives 
which had been set for the week . 
During the week before November 3 a publicity re-
lease was sent to the local newspapers. 
Early in the week of October 27 the special 
Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week announcement posters were 
placed on all bulletin boards. During the week the posters 
were changed each day, each new poster carrying a message 
pointed to a particul ar aspect of safety. 
On Friday, October 31, 1952, a proclamation of 
the observance of Cyanamid Safety Reminder week ~>vas made 
in bulletin form to every employee at Azusa by Plant Manager, 
Dr. W. N. Oldham. 
Copies of newspaper clippings, posters, and the 
proclamation bulletin by Dr. Oldham will be found in the 
following pages . (Not included in this thesis) 
.Go 
Cyanamid 
week pos-
ifferent 
Coming events cast t.eir shadow. 
Posters such as the one on the 
left ap eared on plant Bulletin 
Boards the week of ctober 27th . 
Employees wer e encouraged t o use 
the facilities of the Sugges t ion 
Plan to present their ideas f or 
impr ovement in the safety program 
/' 
EMPLOYEE SA~ETY EDUCATION 
The Thursday of Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week was 
devoted to the displays and demonstrations of Azusa Plant 
safety equipment. In order to insure maximum education and 
participation of all employees, plant personnel was divided 
into small groups and the entire day was utilized for a series 
of demonstrations . As outlined in the Safety Reminder Week 
demonstration program, visual aids and action demonstrations 
were presented during the day by Safety Department personnel. 
The Plant Fire Chief, Mr . R. E. Hardin, delivered lectures 
while demonstrations were given in the use of various types 
of safety equipment, such as the resuscitator, fresh air and 
oxygen masks, and fire extinguishers, as well as safe working 
practices such as handling of ladders and tying safe knots . 
The arm-lift, hip -lift method of artificial respiration was 
also demonstrated . 
As part of theffiucation program several pamphlets 
covering common safety hazards were distributed among plant 
employees. These pamphlets, which were published by the 
California Department of Industrial Relation, Division of 
Industrial Safety, were on the following subjects: 
How to lift 
Handy Rules for Hand Tools 
Stop Grinding out Injuries 
Ladder Safety Step by Step 
Taming the Circular Sal<'! 

-AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY 
Azusa Plant 
November 6, 1952 
SAFETY REMINDER WEEK DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM 
1. Display of all personal protective equipment items issued 
to Azusa Plant personnel. 
2. Display of all personal protective clothing issued to 
Azusa Plant personnel. 
3. Safety shoe action demonstration. 
4. Action display on use of resuscitator. 
5. Action display of self-contained one-hour oxygen mask. 
6 . Display of oxygen deficiency safety lamp. 
7. Display of explosive mixture tester. 
8 . Fire extinguisher display. 
a. Extinguishers for Class A fires. 
b. Extinguishers for Class B. fires. 
c. Extinguishers for Class C fires. 
9. Display of proper knots to beused when working conditions 
require the use of ropes. 
10. Action display on the proper use of ladders. 
a. Standard 
b. Extension 
11. Demonstration of fresh air breathing apparatus. 
12. Demonstration of arm-lift, hip-lift method of artificial 
respiration. 
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Permanent dis play boards showing personal protective clothing and equip_ ent u::;e.j 
at the Azusa Pl ant were made up for use during the Safety Reminder wee Demonstra -
t ion r ogram . They will be retained for use in connect ion '.ri th th Indue Lion i- r e -
gram fo r new employees as well as for fUture periodic safety demo strationc . 
/ 
.· 
SUPERVISORY SAFETY PROGRAM 
The general safety Reminder Week program prepared 
by the Central Safety Department was drawn upon extensively 
in preparing the supervisory safety education program for 
the we ek. Each day of Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week 
Mr. Onfield and Mr. Hardin conducted inspections . of the 
various plant departments. Each inspection was specifically 
designed to review one area of safety. In order to stand-
ardize the inspections of the departments, copies were made 
2~1 
of the Safety Check Lists which were supplied by the Central 
Safety Department, and during the inspection of his department 
each supervisor was asked to answer the applicable questions 
contained in the check list. 
The various safety areas covered during Safety 
Reminder Week were: 
Housekeeping 
Fire Safety 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Unsafe Working Practices 
On the final day of the week, supervisors held group 
meetings' with their employees to discuss off-the-job safety. 
As a preliminary step in preparing the Cyanamid 
Safety Reminder vleek members of the Safety Department 
photographed poor housekeeping and safety conditions 
noticed around the plant during the preceding week . During 
' the inspection program these conditions were called to the 
attention of the supervisors and the need for correction 
outlined. A series of "Before and After" photographs 
covering housekeeping will be found in the next section 
of this report . 
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Pi tures at the l eft ~ere taken of various locations within the working area of t he 
Azusa Plant at t.w be~innine of Gyana.,.id Safety Reminder Week. Graphic indication 
of the results of th-3 .un 1Jai gn s.pnear nn l~he pictures at the right, taken at the 
close o.f' tLe veek. 
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SUMMARY 
Cyanamid Safety Reminder Week as observed at the 
Azusa Plant served to review completely theuse of protec-
tive equipment and clothing available and utilized by plant 
personne l. The variety of departmental inspections acquainted 
supervisors with equipment within their departments available 
for fire protection and areas and working prac tic e s requiring 
safety equipment were discussed. 
Sev era l supervisors commented that they had not .I 
realized that such extensive fire fighting equipment was 
available until they had personally inspected the facilities 
within their departments. 
The daily change of safety posters, the interest 
demonstra ted by management, the exhibits and inspections all 
tended to emphasize the importance placed on safety by the 
American Cyanamid Company. The reaction of the majority of 
employees was highly favorable, and supervisory attitude was 
such that at the following safety meeting s everal of them 
suggested that a similar program should be held at least semi-
a nnua lly, and perhaps quarterly, to remind all plant personnel 
of the ir own and the company's role in plant safety . 
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